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RÉSUMÉ 
Les civilisations modernes sont dépendantes des technologies de l'information et des 
communications. Par ce fait, elles requièrent une alimentation constante en électricité pour 
assurer leur prospérité. Un siècle de travaux acharnés par des ingénieurs en électronique de 
puissance permet de garantir la fiabilité des réseaux électriques. Un des outils pour arriver à cette 
fin est une augmentation de l'automatisation et du contrôle à distance des réseaux électriques. 
Cette technologie permet aux contrôleurs qui opèrent le réseau électrique d'ajuster 
automatiquement des paramètres opérationnels pour faire face aux contraintes extérieures au fur 
et à mesure que ces contraintes évoluent. Par exemple, une augmentation de la demande suite à 
une vague de froid va automatiquement entraîner une augmentation de l'approvisionnement par 
l'envoi de commandes à distance pour ouvrir les vannes  à la centrale hydroélectrique et faire 
tourner les turbines plus rapidement. Ceci garanti que le réseau électrique fonctionne toujours à 
pleine capacité et livre l'énergie électrique avec fiabilité, sans égard aux conditions externes. 
Paradoxalement, les gains offerts par les systèmes automatisés ont introduit un risque jusqu'alors 
inconnu à la fiabilité du réseau électrique : les cyber attaques. Pour permettre l'automatisation, les 
opérateurs de réseaux électriques se sont tournés vers la technologie d'acquisition de données et 
de supervision, mieux connu sous le nom de système SCADA. De nos jours, la technologie 
SCADA se base sur du matériel et des logiciels commerciaux comme les communications 
TCP/IP via Ethernet ou comme le système d'exploitation Windows. Ceci permet aux entités 
malicieuses de faire usage de leur savoir concernant les techniques offensives qu'ils ont 
développé pour attaquer les systèmes traditionnels faisant usage de ces technologies. 
La majorité de ces entités sont des menaces diffuses cherchant principalement à acquérir de la 
capacité de stockage servant à héberger du contenu illégal, du temps machine pour envoyer du 
spam ou des mots de passe pour permettre la fraude. Cet objectif est plus facile à atteindre en 
attaquant des ordinateurs personnels plutôt que des machines d'un réseau SCADA. Toutefois, 
certains acteurs ciblent délibérément les réseaux SCADA puisque ceux-ci ont le potentiel de 
causer des dégâts dans le monde physique. Ces acteurs recherchent agressivement les 
vulnérabilités et persévèrent dans leurs attaques, même face à une amélioration de la capacité 
défensive du réseau.  Ces acteurs se font affubler le qualificatif de menaces persistantes avancées 
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ou APTs. À cause de cette volonté de cibler un réseau spécifique, il est plus difficile de détourner 
ces attaquants vers d'autres victimes. 
Si nous souhaitons empêcher ces APTs de s'attaquer aux réseaux SCADA qui contrôlent 
l'infrastructure critique, nous devons élaborer une stratégie qui ne repose pas sur la réduction 
complète des vulnérabilités. Un bon nombre de contraintes opérationnelles, comme le mode 
d'opération 24/7 qui rend la tenue de périodes de maintenance difficile, garantissent qu'il y aura 
toujours au moins une vulnérabilité potentiellement exploitable par un attaquant. 
Dans ce contexte, l'objectif de ce projet de recherche est d'aider les opérateurs de réseaux 
électriques à défendre leur réseau SCADA contre les menaces persistantes avancées. Pour 
atteindre cet objectif, nous visons à mieux comprendre comment le comportement des menaces 
persistantes avancées  se manifeste dans un réseau SCADA et à développer, en se basant sur des 
preuves expérimentales, de nouveaux outils et techniques pour se défendre contre les 
comportements attendus. 
En analysant les travaux antérieurs, on reconnaît que la vraie nature d'un réseau SCADA est de 
servir de boucle de contrôle pour le réseau électrique. Une conséquence directe est que tout 
attaquant qui obtient accès au réseau SCADA peut altérer l'état du réseau électrique à sa guise. Si 
un APT voudrait poursuivre ce but, la recherche actuelle en sécurité des réseau SCADA ne 
parviendrait pas à prévenir cette attaque puisqu'elle n'est pas orientée vers stopper les attaquants 
hautement qualifiés. Ceci rend les réseaux SCADA invitants pour les états engagés dans une 
compétition agressive. Malgré cela, aucun cyber incident majeur causant des dégâts physiques 
n'est répertorié à ce jour. 
En se basant sur cette observation, nous avons développé un modèle d'attaque pour le 
comportement d'un APT dans un réseau SCADA qui n'implique pas nécessairement des 
dommages massifs dans le monde physique. Ainsi, nous avons introduit le scénario d'attaque par 
trou d'aiguilles, notre première contribution majeure, dans lequel un attaquant cause de petits 
dégâts qui s'accumulent sur une longue période pour éviter d'être détecté. 
À partir de ce scénario, nous avons développé une stratégie consistant à augmenter la capacité de 
surveillance, c'est-à-dire de renforcer la puissance de la détection, pour prévenir l'utilisation de ce 
scénario d'attaque par les APTs. En se basant sur notre intuition que la détection d'intrusion par 
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anomalie sera particulièrement efficace dans le contexte hautement régulier d'un réseau SCADA, 
l'utilisation de cette technique est favorisée. 
Pour tester les capacités de notre détecteur, nous devons adresser le problème du manque 
d'infrastructures expérimentales adaptées à la recherche en sécurité des réseaux SCADA. Une 
revue de la littérature montre que les approches expérimentales courantes ne sont pas appropriées 
pour générer des données réseau avec une haute fidélité. Pour résoudre ce problème, nous avons 
introduit le concept du Carré de sable ICS, notre deuxième contribution majeure, qui utilise une 
approche hybride combinant la haute fidélité des résultats de l'émulation et le facteur d'échelle et 
le faible coût de la simulation pour créer un montage expérimental capable de produire des 
données réseau de haute fidélité, adaptées à l'usage expérimental. 
Finalement, nous avons été en mesure de tester une implémentation d'un système de détection 
d'intrusion par anomalies, notre troisième contribution majeure, en utilisant le Carré de sable 
ICS. En utilisant des caractéristiques simples, il est possible de détecter du trafic de 
commandement et contrôle dans un réseau SCADA, ce qui force les attaquant à utiliser pour leurs 
opérations routinières de maintenance de complexes canaux cachés dont la bande passante est 
limitée. Ceci atteste de la validité de notre intuition selon laquelle la détection par anomalie est 
particulièrement efficace dans les réseaux SCADA, revitalisant par le fait même une technique de 
défense qui a longtemps été délaissée à cause de sa piètre performance dans les réseaux 
corporatifs typiques. 
La somme de ces contributions représente une amélioration significative de l'état de la défense 
des réseaux SCADA contre les menaces persistantes avancées, incluant les menaces en 
provenance des services de renseignement étatiques. Ceci contribue à une augmentation de la 
fiabilité des infrastructure critiques, et des réseaux électriques en particulier, face à un intérêt 
grandissant de la part des cyber attaquants. 
vii 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Modern civilization, with its dependency on information technology, require a steady supply of 
electrical power to prosper. A century of relentless work by power engineers has ensured that the 
power grid is reliable. One of tools they used to achieve that goal is increased automation and 
remote control of the electrical grid. This technology allows the controllers supervising the power 
grid to automatically adjust operational parameters to meet external constraints as they evolve. A 
new surge in demand from a cold night will trigger an automated increase in supply. Remote 
control commands will be sent to open sluice gates at the hydroelectric plant to make turbines 
spin faster and generate more power. This ensures the electric grid always functions at peak 
efficiency and reliably deliver power no matter what the external conditions are. 
Paradoxically, the gains provided by the automated systems invited a previously unknown risk to 
the reliability of power delivery: cyber attacks. In order to achieve automation, utility operators 
have turned to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, or SCADA, technology. In this era, 
SCADA technology is built on top of commercial off the shelf hardware and software such as 
TCP/IP over Ethernet networks and Windows operating system. This enables malicious entities 
to leverage their pre-existing knowledge of offensive techniques known to work on these 
platform to attack the SCADA networks controlling critical infrastructure. 
Of those entities, the majority are unfocused attackers searching for commodity assets such as 
storage capacity to store illegal materials, processing power to send spam or credentials to enable 
fraud. However, some actors are deliberatively targeting the SCADA networks for their ability to 
cause damage in the physical realm. These actors aggressively search for vulnerabilities and are 
stubborn in the face of an increase in defensive measures and are dubbed advanced persistent 
threats, or APTs. As such, it is more difficult to turn them away. 
If we want to prevent these advanced persistent threats from preying on the SCADA networks 
controlling our critical infrastructure, we need to devise a defense that does not rely on 
completely removing vulnerabilities. A number of operational constraints, such as the need to 
operate 24/7 precluding the opening of maintenance windows, ensure that there will always be a 
vulnerability that can be exploited by an attacker. 
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In that light, the goal of this research project is to is to help power grid operators defend their 
SCADA networks against advanced persistent threats. To achieve that goal we aim to better 
understand how the behaviour of advanced persistent threats will manifest itself in a SCADA 
network and to develop, based on evidence derived from experiments, new tools and techniques 
to defeat the expected behaviour. 
By analyzing prior work, we recognize that the true nature of SCADA networks is to serve as a 
basic control loop for the electric grid. A direct consequence is that any attacker gaining access to 
the SCADA network could send the grid into any state he wishes. We also showed that, should 
advanced persistent threats attempt to pursue this goal, current research in SCADA security 
would not provide significant help, not being focused on preventing the exploitation of SCADA 
network by skilled attackers. This makes SCADA networks attractive to nation states engaged in 
aggressively competitive behaviour. However, no evidence of major cyber incidents causing 
physical damage is forthcoming. 
From that observation, we developed an attacker model for advanced persistent threat behaviour 
in SCADA networks that did not necessarily involve causing massive physical damage. So, we 
introduced the pinprick attack scenario, our first major contribution, in which an attacker causes 
small amounts of damage that accumulate over time in order to stay under the radar.  
From this scenario, we developed a strategy of increasing the capability of surveillance, or 
boosting the radar so to speak, in order to prevent advanced persistent threats from using this 
scenario. The use of anomaly-based intrusion detection was favored based on our intuition that it 
would prove very effective in the highly regimented context of SCADA networks. 
To test the capability of our detector, we needed to address the lack of experimental infrastructure 
suitable for network security. However, a study of the literature shows that current experimental 
approaches are not appropriate to generate high fidelity network data. To solve this problem, we 
introduced the ICS sandbox concept, our second major contribution, that used a hybrid approach 
combining the high fidelity results of emulation and the scalability and cost reduction of 
simulation to create an experimental setup able to produce high fidelity network data sets for 
experimentation.  
Finally, we were able to test an implementation of anomaly-based intrusion detection, our third 
major contribution, using the ICS sandbox. Using only simple features, it was possible to detect 
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command and control traffic in a SCADA network and push attackers to use complex covert 
channels with limited bandwidth to perform their routine maintenance operations. This attests to 
the validity of our intuition that anomaly-based detection is particularly effective in SCADA 
network, revivifying a defensive technique that suffers from poor performance in typical 
corporate networks. 
The sum of these contributions represent a significant improvement in the defense of SCADA 
networks against advanced persistent threats, including threats from nation state sponsored 
intelligence agencies. This contributes to the increased reliability of critical infrastructure, and of 
the electrical grid in particular, in the face of an increasing interest by cyber attackers. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Humans have always turned to technology to help satisfy their basic needs. The civilizations of 
antiquity built stone aqueducts to deliver drinkable water to their cities. These kinds of public 
works, required to support life, is called life support networks or, more commonly, critical 
infrastructure. As time went on and civilizations evolved, more critical infrastructure was needed 
to sustain human activity, economic activity in particular. One such infrastructure is the power 
grid. Without electrical power, most modern technology used for large swaths of human activity 
from entertainment to communication and medicine would cease to function. In Canada, the 
impact is even more direct because of the prevalence of electric heating to stave off harsh 
winters. So, the continued operation of critical infrastructure, and of the electric grid in particular, 
is a necessary requirement of modern life. 
In recent years, a new threat to this continued operation has surfaced. In order to save costs, most 
utility operators have embraced industrial automation technology, supplied from Industrial 
Control Systems (ICS). This technology enables the remote operation of equipment used in the 
field. In the electric grid, the ICS uses a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, or SCADA, 
network to allow the automated operation of the grid. The SCADA network allows power 
utilities to gather measurements on the state of the grid and send commands to active equipment 
to alter the power flow. For example, when it was once necessary to send a technician in a truck 
to operate a breaker, the same operation can be made using a computer in the corporate office. 
However, this introduced critical infrastructure network to computer security threats. 
In particular, most operators, usually profit oriented businesses, moved away from dedicated 
telecommunication lines to reap the cost savings benefit of packet switching networks, notably 
the Internet. This pushed manufacturers of SCADA equipment to converge on TCP/IP as the 
protocols of choice for communication. Unfortunately, the wealth of knowledge for attacking 
TCP/IP networks has now become transferable to attacking the critical infrastructure. This creates 
a serious network security risk to the reliability of critical infrastructure, such as the power grid, 
through the exposure of their SCADA network. 
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In order to address this risk, it is not possible to blindly apply traditional network security 
methods. Because any disruption of the SCADA system may cause unforeseen impact on the 
critical infrastructure controlled, care must be used when applying security methods. 
Additionally, SCADA networks suffer from various idiosyncrasies, such as a low tolerance for 
latency, that makes the use of some defensive technologies, like encryption, more complex. So, a 
deliberate study of how network security can be implemented in this application domain is 
necessary to tackle the risk. 
The research project presented in this thesis strives to reduce the network security risks to the 
power grid's SCADA network. In particular, improvements in the ability of SCADA operators to 
deal with the threats of attacks from adversarial nation states is the focal point of the work. In this 
process, contributions to the fields of advanced persistent threat
1
 strategy, experimental methods 
in SCADA network security and anomaly detection for SCADA networks are presented. 
To get to that point, we start by providing a brief overview of the current state of SCADA 
security in section 1.1. This overview will reveal the high vulnerability of currently deployed 
SCADA systems and will analyze the current trajectory of policy efforts to tackle the problem. 
Then, a number of incidents involving SCADA networks are presented as a testament to the poor 
performance in terms of network security of current operators and a special focus will be placed 
on attacks by adversaries affiliated with nation states. 
Using the analysis of the current situation as a starting point, we define our research problem in 
section 1.2. We start by analyzing the gap between the current situation and our goal. Based on 
that gap, we then focus the aim of our research on the goal of understanding advanced persistent 
threat behaviour to devise tools to defeat them and test those tools using experimental methods. 
In order to achieve the aim, section 1.2 also presents detailed research objectives we can use as 
stepping stones. 
Finally, section 1.3 details the organisation of this thesis in which the efforts to achieve our 
research aim are summarized. This provides a roadmap to the reader of the path we used and the 
stepping stones necessary to attain our goal.  
                                                 
1
 Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) actors are threat actors which posses a high degree of skill, usually obtained 
through years of training and practice, and a high motivation to attack a specific target making them likely to attack 
the network until successful and to maintain the presence in the network once a successful attack has been launched 
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1.1 Current state of SCADA network security 
Most security practitioners believe that no network can be 100% secure. However, knowing how 
close a network is to that mark can help evaluate its general security posture. In this section, we 
will look at the state of SCADA network security. We will start by looking at the technical 
vulnerability of SCADA systems, then we will review the policy efforts that have attempted to 
address the issue and we will conclude by looking at cyber incidents involving SCADA networks 
or companies in the energy sector. 
1.1.1 Vulnerability of SCADA systems 
According to the security firm Riptech [1], in 2001, serious misconceptions were at the heart of 
SCADA vulnerability. First, people would presume that the SCADA network is located on a 
separated, stand-alone network.  Second, that strong access controls protect any access to the 
SCADA network. Finally, that specialized knowledge of SCADA was required to hack SCADA 
systems. Maynor and Graham have made similar observations at BlackHat in 2006 [2]. Within 
those five years, industry mentality had not progressed much while the technology supporting 
SCADA networks was undergoing transformation and progressing toward even more open 
configurations.  
While most infrastructure operators are reluctant to discuss security incidents that have occurred 
in their infrastructure, documented cyber-security incidents do exist to testify to the existence of 
the problem.  In one example, U.S. officials claimed that the Brazilian electrical grid, in a country 
known for its active cyber-gangs, was penetrated for extortion [3]. The well documented 
Maroochy incident where a disgruntled insider dumped thousands of litres of sewage in drinking 
water [4] is another example. Allsop [5] also who claims in his book to have infiltrated the 
SCADA system of major U.K. operator. Finally, the tale of a professional penetration tester who 
claimed that hacking a nuclear power plant was the easiest engagement he had participated in [6]. 
All of these stories testify to both the presence of exploitable vulnerabilities in SCADA networks 
and to the capacity of causing damage to the population by exploiting these vulnerabilities.  
It could be possible that the stories that are reported are caused by bad apples with little concern 
for public safety. However, even Hydro-Québec, an operator rightfully regarded as having high 
reliability standards, suffered an incident. On December 15th 2009, an automated protection 
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mechanism in the Albanel center was triggered causing an outage affecting over 200,000 
customers over the province of Quebec [7]. Two days later, we would learn that the outage was 
caused by an employee accidentally triggering the automated protection mechanisms while 
giving a training session in Hydro-Quebec’s Rouyn-Noranda’s offices [8]. Because it was caused 
by a human error and not by a hostile source, this incident is typically not regarded as a computer 
security incident. Even so, we can at least deduce the following facts:  
 it is possible to cause major outages with no physical access; 
 the production network can be accessed from the business network;  
 deliberate malicious activity could produce the same effects that were produced 
inadvertently. 
The last two facts strongly echo the first and third misconceptions enunciated by Riptech. In that 
light, we believe that the problem of SCADA systems security is current and relevant, even for 
residents of Canada. 
In general, literature about cyber security published in power systems publications  is usually 
well behind the state of the art in terms of computer network operations. As such, their evaluation 
of their vulnerability is generally overly optimistic and their evaluation of offensive capabilities is 
unrealistically pessimistic. For example, in the vulnerability assessment methodology for a 
SCADA paper from 2007 [9], Ten, Liu and Govindarasu estimate that a 7 character long 
password with no complexity requirement is a “good” (scores 0.33 on a scale going from 1 to 0) 
password policy. That kind of password policy is on par with the infamous LANMAN hashes for 
Windows (a pair of 7 character long passwords with no capitalization) for which any password 
can be cracked in seconds using widely distributed rainbow tables. As a basis for comparison, 
NTLMv1 (aimed at replacing LANMAN) came out with Windows NT4 sp 4 in October 1998. 
So, in that particular case, we are nearly a decade behind the state of the art. As recently as 2012, 
Nordell [10] published in the IEEE Power and Energy Magazine special publication on cyber 
security for electric systems a paper to promote the use of public key cryptography based on the 
fact that is was more secure, faster and less complex than the use of symmetric cryptography. A 
claim which is widely known to be unfounded.  
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There are numerous vulnerabilities that are plaguing SCADA systems. This situation is mostly 
the result of operational constraints and the attempt to leverage legacy systems in a modern 
environment under which they were never designed to operate. 
The first operational constraint is the need to operate on deterministic delay. This makes SCADA 
networks particularly sensitive to denial of service (or network time manipulation in cases where 
timestamped messages are used). It is important to note that, even if SCADA protocols need 
short and predictable delays, they do not necessarily need high bandwidth because they only 
exchange messages infrequently. It is also important to note that a denial of service on the 
SCADA network usually causes a loss of control over the infrastructure and not a loss of the 
infrastructure. For example, if a power plant lost its SCADA system, it would lose its telemetry 
and the ability to remotely control the plant, yet it could still produce electricity.  
The second major operational constraint is the necessity to operate without interruption. The 
flipside of this is that it is difficult to schedule downtime for system maintenance. It also means 
that any action which might jeopardize the system’s uptime should be avoided. In particular, 
system patching, which requires downtime and occasionally leaves systems in an unpredictable 
state is widely avoided in the SCADA sector. In his paper, Gold [11] points out that, even with 
the advent of Windows 7, most utilities are still running Windows 98 equipment. This is 
compounded by the fact that vendors are often relying on legacy functionalities (such as 
anonymous DCOM for Windows which was phased out in the wake of the Blaster worm) and the 
vendors will rescind support if a system is migrated or patched. Even if this is not the case, 
utilities may well be required to go through a lengthy certification process to attach anything to a 
production system. The length of the process may even be orders of magnitude higher than the 
current patch frequency cycle (4 weeks). All of this means that SCADA networks typically run 
outdated software and operating systems that possess a plethora of widely known vulnerabilities. 
So, a hacker is usually not required to exploit (or even fully understand) SCADA protocols to 
gain control of a system because the underlying operating systems and supporting software are 
full of holes. This is contrary to the common belief among utilities operators that specialized 
knowledge is required to hack SCADA networks. 
The third operational constraint is the need to operate without human intervention. For example, 
machines may need to talk to other machines without requiring a human to enter a password. 
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While this would not necessarily prevent the use of machine authentication, industry experts [2], 
[4], [12] agree that access control is lacking. Some [2], [12] even go so far as to claim SCADA 
systems do not make use of authentication or authorization. That observation is consistent with 
the use of outdated operating systems that did not provide reliable ways to perform authentication 
in a networked environment. In other words, any access within the SCADA network perimeter 
allows access to any other node within the perimeter.  
The fourth operational constraint is the increased need for connectivity. The connectivity could 
be required for operators to interact remotely with nodes or because data needs to be extracted 
from the system. In fact, in his paper The Air Gap: SCADA's Enduring Security Myth [13], Byres 
says : 
As a theory, the air gap is wonderful. In real life, it just does not work.[...] As much as we 
want to pretend otherwise, modern industrial control systems need a steady diet of 
electronic information from the outside world. Severing the network connection with an 
air gap simply spawns new pathways like the mobile laptop and the USB flash drive, 
which are more difficult to manage and just as easy to infect. 
This makes SCADA network perimeters much more permeable in reality than they are on paper. 
According to multiple experts [2], [4], [12] connectivity to SCADA networks is usually 
undocumented or thought to be non-existent. The classic example is a worm brought to the inside 
by a roaming laptop that is connected through a “sneaker net”. Other examples are the connection 
of the MTU to the corporate network to allow data warehousing of SCADA data. The mere 
existence of these connections is a risk because it usually allows the bridging of SCADA 
networks to the Internet (for example through an infected laptop). The fact that they are typically 
undocumented only adds to the risk, because the connections are less likely to be adequately 
protected.  
A final operational constraint is the remoteness of the installations. This means that 
communications and computer equipment is often left unattended in remote locales. Both Wiles 
[12] and Allsop [5] testify to the lax physical security in remote substations and both claim to 
have physically penetrated their security in the course of a penetration testing exercise (against 
unnamed clients). This kind of unauthorized access can provide hackers with physical, and thus 
administrative, access to one (or more) RTU. In theory, this may be no worse than the damage 
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that can be caused if the hacker would attempt to physically damage the location collocated with 
the RTU. However, access to the RTU allows the hacker to have access to the complete SCADA 
network, which he can then leverage to achieve more widespread effects than if he damages the 
physical location at which he was located. 
1.1.2 Policy efforts to address the vulnerability 
Because of the high societal impact of cyber attacks on critical infrastructure in general and 
SCADA systems in particular, regulatory entities have taken steps to address the issue. We can 
use these efforts as a indication of the current trajectory of SCADA defense and estimate how 
close the industry is to solving the problem. 
In the United States, where such efforts are more visible, cyber security of critical infrastructure 
has been recognized as a major vulnerability. A group of experts mandated by the Center for 
International and Strategic Studies (CSIS) argued in 2008 in their Cyber Security for the 44th 
Presidency report that “cyber security is now a major national security problem for the United 
States” [14] and Kurtz [15] recalls efforts made as early as 1996 by the President’s Commission 
on Critical Infrastructure to address the issue. Unfortunately, it is unclear how much these 
initiatives have contributed to increases in cyber security. 
A main axis of improvement suggested by regulatory agencies is the push for global reduction of 
vulnerabilities. The 2003 U.S. National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace [16] has two national 
priorities addressing this issue. Priority II (a national cyberspace threat and vulnerability 
reduction program) addresses technical vulnerabilities while Priority III (a national cyberspace 
security awareness and training program) addresses human vulnerabilities [16]. Assuming that 
the operators can correctly identify their vulnerabilities, this is still a daunting task. The 
underlying assumption behind the concept of generalized vulnerability reduction is that it is 
possible to reduce your vulnerability enough to make attacking you inefficient. It is clearly not 
possible to reduce the vulnerability over the entire attack surface. Figure 1-1 illustrates where 
various threat agents are located in terms of motivation and skill in the industrial control market. 
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Figure 1-1 : Skill and motivation of threat agents in industrial control (© CFE media used with 
permission from [17]) 
 As skill and motivation increase, it becomes increasingly costly to reduce vulnerability to a point 
where no risk exists. In that light, the implied objective of national vulnerability reduction 
programs is to address the lower left quadrant of Figure 1-1, i.e. widely known vulnerabilities 
affecting your industry in general. As we will see in section 1.1.3, there are highly motivated and 
skilled attackers, also dubbed advanced persistent threats due to their high skill level, tendency to 
establish a persistent presence on targets and a tendency to be stubborn in the face of active 
defence, that specifically target the energy sector which fall outside the scope of vulnerability 
reduction efforts.  
This problem is compounded by the fact that the majority of SCADA operators are privately 
owned utilities, or publicly owned utilities that compete with the private sector. For these 
utilities, increasing cyber security is not a revenue generating investment. We could assume that 
these costs would be ultimately transferred to the customers. So, as long as no incident occurs, 
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this would actually harm the competiveness of a firm which would spend more in cyber security 
in comparison to its peers.   In their paper, Dynes et al. [18] argue that, because the majority of 
firms have not experienced a cyber event with significant external costs, firms tend to invest only 
to a level that is rational, based on internal costs such as the time required to rebuild systems and 
lost production. The societal costs are not considered because the firms themselves do not usually 
bear the cost of incidents. It is therefore not rational to reduce the vulnerability to a level that 
would be adequate to consider national vulnerability reduction programs effective against 
attackers with the resources of a typical intelligence agency for example. In that sense, it is 
unlikely that pursuing this path will yield significant results against persistent threat actors. 
1.1.3 SCADA related incidents 
The most telling sign of the vulnerability of a system is the number of incidents associated with 
that system. However, many SCADA operators are reluctant to disclose information about 
breaches in their systems. Henry in [12] reports that “only 14 of the 200 Fortune 500 companies 
that are recognized as part of our [United States] national infrastructure actively report SCADA 
incidents”.  Of those that actively report, we cannot know if they report every incident. Even if 
the companies did, they can only report incidents that they have detected. Even when the 
incidents are reported, they are generally not distributed in the public domain. The British 
Columbia Institute of Information Technology Industrial Security Incident Database (ISID), 
which was the only open source of information of cyber incidents affecting SCADA systems, 
became a subscription-based product when the ISID program was discontinued in 2006 [19]. 
Security alerts and incident reporting from both the Canadian Cyber Incident Response Center 
[20] and the Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency 
Response Team [21] are reserved for selected partners and classified "For Official Use Only" to 
prevent widespread dissemination. We must extrapolate from the incidents that do exist in the 
literature to draw conclusions. 
The Maroochy water plant incident [4], where a disgruntled insider abused the SCADA system to 
get back at his employer, provides valuable insight on real systems. In particular, the release of 
the information in the public domain allowed other researchers to draw conclusions from the data 
and learn from the experience without needing to suffer an incident themselves. Of those lessons 
learned, the most telling is the high level of susceptibility of SCADA systems in general, and of 
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SCADA endpoints in particular, to attacks. It was possible for a terminated contractor to dump 
sewage water in the stormwater drains and ultimately in the region's waterways. While an 
unemployed worker might have a lot of time in his hands and might be suitably motivated, he 
usually has access to few resources. With that line of reasoning, people asked themselves what 
kind of havoc could an entity with greater resources and motivation wreak on SCADA systems. 
The Stuxnet worm found by Symantec [22] made the world realize that nation states were 
interested in hacking SCADA systems for more than academic interests. They found that the 
worm, which remained active and undetected for many years, was specifically designed to target 
a specific brand of PLCs, and the software used to perform design and engineering for those 
PLCs. It also contained the first rootkit (a tool designed to hide the malware from the operating 
systems and from analysis tools) designed to work with a PLC. In addition, it contained a stolen 
code signing certificate, a number of zero day exploits and a sophisticated command and control 
scheme that allowed it to bridge the "air gap" of isolated systems. After more study, it was found 
that the malware was designed to cause damage to a specific type of physical equipment used in 
the process for uranium enrichment. Ultimately, the New York Times revealed that Stuxnet was, 
in fact, a cyber weapon designed by the United States to sabotage the nuclear program in Iran 
[23]. 
As revealed in the Symantec report [22], Stuxnet was probably introduced by an infected USB 
stick. Once a machine was infected, the malware would look for engineering files from the Step 7 
program designed to interact with the targeted PLCs. It would subvert these programs to be able 
to spread to PLCs when they would be plugged in with a serial cable for maintenance. In 
addition, the malware would spread laterally on the LANs with the use of network software 
vulnerabilities and with USB keys. The worm also establishes a peer-to-peer network to allow the 
malware to update itself. Whenever a new version of the cyber weapon would be inserted, the 
peer-to-peer command and control network made sure the newest version of the weapon was 
pushed onto all the infected machines. Machines with access to the Internet would also connect 
through a steganographic HTTP channel to command and control servers that allowed the 
malware operators to push updates from outside. Tofino Security presents a good summary of 
Stuxnet's communications in [24] which is reproduced in Figure 1-2. 
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Figure 1-2: Stuxnet communications (data from [24]) 
Once Stuxnet was installed on a PLC, it would check if the PLC controlled a specific type of 
equipment. The targeted equipment was a frequency regulator for spinning motors designed for 
uranium enrichment and used by the Iranian government. Stuxnet would record the values sent to 
the engineering station for a long duration of time in order to build a model of what kind of 
values  would be considered "normal" by operators. After this recoding period, it would start to 
modify the frequency of the centrifuges to make them spin very fast or very slow. This 
alternating would eventually prematurely damage the centrifuges, which are hard to acquire in 
Iran because of economic sanctions, and prevent the creation of weapons grade uranium. While 
doing so, it would use its recording to send operators reports that the machine was operating as 
normal. If a technician would connect to the machine to perform a diagnosis, Stuxnet would use 
its PLC rootkit functionality to mislead the technician into thinking nothing was wrong. 
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The discovery of Stuxnet spurred interest in SCADA security research and presented a massive 
wake up call for SCADA network operators. Unfortunately, due to the relatively recent discovery 
of Stuxnet, the efforts of researchers to create defenses is only starting to bear fruit. In a sector 
not recognized for its speedy adoption of new technology, it may take even longer to see a 
widespread adoption in the industry. On the other hand, the attackers have been cued to the 
vulnerability of SCADA systems. In particular, the poor state of security development of 
SCADA equipment and software. This provides offensive security researchers an entire field of 
low-hanging-fruit. Positive Technologies Security [25] tracked the number of vulnerabilities in 
SCADA products disclosed on public forums and we reproduce their findings in Figure 1-3. We 
can see that the number of reports exploded after 2010, the year Stuxnet was discovered. 
 
Figure 1-3 : Number of disclosed SCADA product vulnerabilities (Data from [25]) 
Another impact of Stuxnet is the realization that cyber attacks could cause physical damage. This 
information was available in 2007 when the Department of Homeland Security performed the 
AURORA test [26]. In that test, a power generator is made to buck wildly, produce smoke then 
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catch fire by sending it fake commands. However, at that time, there was much skepticism in the 
industry who believed the lab experiment did not accurately reflect how "real networks" were 
operated.  This doubt was expelled by the actual damage Stuxnet did in the wild, even if it was 
not on power grid equipment. Because Stuxnet's code is available to everyone, it can serve as a 
blueprint to create attacks on other kinds of systems. To that effect, in their program 60 Minutes 
[27], CBS revealed that more research was done in the United States to create physical effects 
with cyber systems. 
While Stuxnet was a very precise cyber-weapon, the Shamoon virus is more of a blunt 
instrument. In their description of Shamoon [28], Symantec lists multiple destructive capabilities, 
although the capabilities stay confined in the cyber realm. Notably, the virus wipes computers by 
erasing the disk and rewriting the master boot record at a specified time. So, while this logic 
bomb is reported to target Saudi Aramco [29], it is liable to infect any Windows-based computer 
and wipe it. In fact,  Shamoon forced the Quatari company RasGas to shut down its servers [30]. 
Shamoon is widely attributed to Iran as a retaliation for Stuxnet, hinting at a dangerous escalation 
of reprisals for cyber attacks. In fact, recent reports warn the industrial sector that it is the target 
of Iranian plans for cyber revenge [31]. This underlines the fact that utility companies, even if 
they are not directly engaged in cyber war, can become collateral damage. 
The collateral damage is not stopped at national boundaries and Canadian companies have been 
the target of actions by nation states.  As an example, Krebs reports that the Canadian company 
Telvent, a company that produces and distributes SCADA equipment, was targeted by cyber 
espionage [32]. The goal of this attack was to acquire confidential information regarding Telvent 
products and to possibly gain access to Telvent's customer networks through maintenance 
channels. Indicators in the incident suggest the attack was perpetrated by the "Comment Crew", a 
group that was identified in a report by Mandiant [33] as an intelligence unit of the People's 
Liberation Army in China. More recent reports of spear fishing attacks
2
 for the purpose of 
espionage targeting the U.S. energy sector to collect password and steal diagrams and plans [34] 
are also attributed to the same group. This kind of spear fishing attack is very effective on control 
room employees, with a reported 26% success rate when tested by industry researchers [35]. This 
                                                 
2
 A spear phishing attack is a form of phishing attack, i.e. an attack where a fake message is sent to a recipient in 
order to compel him to perform an action that would cause him harm, where the target of the attack is carefully 
selected and the message content is customized for that particular target. An example would be a message from his 
direct superior asking him to review a document to entice the victim into opening a document containing exploits. 
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suggests there is a dedicated campaign targeting the energy sector in which Canadian companies 
can be victimized. 
In summary, SCADA systems suffer from a number of vulnerabilities stemming from operational 
constraints. These constraints also severely limit the capacity to actively fix the problem and 
policy efforts are unlikely to yield short term results. In addition, there are highly motivated 
attackers that have specifically targeted the energy sector to perform acts of espionage or 
sabotage, which generates a high risk to this sector of the critical infrastructure. The current 
policy, pursuing generalized vulnerability reduction is targeted at the hobbyist and the script-
kiddies instead of at the highly skilled and motivated attackers such as nation state sponsored 
groups or large criminal gangs. In order to reduce that risk, we have to find new ways to secure 
SCADA systems.  
1.2 Problem definition 
A lot of work still needs to be done to secure SCADA networks and no single solution can solve 
the entire problem. This section presents how we expect to contribute to the advancement of this 
problem with our research. First, we present our general research goal of securing SCADA 
networks against targeted attacks by advanced persistent threats and we present the current 
deficiencies preventing the easy achievement of this goal. Then, we state our specific research 
aim that will advance our goal. Finally, we present the various research objectives that will be 
used as stepping stones to attain our aim. 
1.2.1 Research goal 
Incidents such as Stuxnet, Shamoon and Telvent tell us that state sponsored cyber attacks on 
critical infrastructure are now a fact of life. As such, it would be prudent for operators of critical 
infrastructure networks to take the necessary precautions to defend against these attacks. 
Currently, these utility operators are ill equipped to deal with this task. So, our goal is to help 
utility operators, in particular operators of electric grids, to defend their SCADA network against 
advanced persistent threats such as nation state sponsored cyber attackers. 
 Unfortunately for these operators, there is little publicly available information about the nature of 
cyber attacks from nation states, or other advanced persistent threats such as organized criminal 
gangs. Very recently, information, like the Mandiant report [33], has started to trickle out about 
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techniques, but fully understanding how these techniques are used in operations still requires 
expert knowledge obtained from continuous study of the field. Even with this information, it is 
unclear how the description of the techniques used for industrial espionage translates to critical 
infrastructure SCADA networks which have little value in terms of espionage. Without this 
information, it is hard for those operators to devise a defensive strategy.  
In the absence of a coherent strategy, the focus has been put on vulnerability reduction as 
evidenced by the major policy efforts in that direction. While these efforts are worthwhile in the 
face of the apparent vulnerability of SCADA networks, they are not sufficient in that they are 
aimed at threat agents that do not systematically search for vulnerabilities. These untargeted 
threat agents are easily discouraged by any increase in difficulty, especially if they can find easier 
prey elsewhere. However, those threat agents that are deliberately targeting the network will be 
more persistent in their efforts and are unlikely to be deterred by a decrease in exposure, unless 
the exposure is reduced to a level where attacks become unfeasible. Judging only from the 
current state of vulnerability in SCADA networks, this level of vulnerability reduction is unlikely 
to happen in the near future. Additionally, SCADA networks are in the hands of private 
companies which need to turn a profit. The amount of money they can invest in defense is 
dwarfed by the resources available to some intelligence agencies. So, reducing vulnerability to a 
suitable level to prevent a nation state actor from getting in is probably not economical. 
Unfortunately, vulnerability reduction seems to be the only defensive strategy considered to 
defend critical infrastructure. 
Unless they want to put their production network at risk, SCADA network operators have great 
difficulties in testing defensive strategies. Due to the complex nature of cyber-physical systems, 
i.e. computer networks where some components interface with physical devices rather than 
human users, such as SCADA networks, there is little publicly available data on which to 
perform research. Information from real deployments are typically held back because of security 
concerns and the financial and manpower cost of standing up a truecyber-physical experimental 
SCADA network at a reasonable scale is prohibitive for most researchers. As such, there is no 
good way to derive evidence-based conclusions about the effectiveness of defensive techniques. 
Until this problem is addressed, we must mainly rely on innuendos from people with access to 
confidential data from production systems. 
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In summary, if we want to target the problem of defending a SCADA network controlling the 
power grid against advanced persistent threats, such as nation state actors, we have to tackle a 
number of deficiencies in the current state of the art. Notably : 
 A lack of understanding of how advanced persistent threats attacks would unfold in a 
SCADA network; 
 A defensive posture overly reliant on vulnerability reduction which seems to be aligned 
for defending against untargeted threats such as commodity malware and hobbyist 
hackers; 
 A tendency not to inform decisions from evidence-based conclusions because of a lack of 
publicly available experimental infrastructure. 
The combination of these deficiencies makes the tackling of the problem of defending SCADA 
networks against advanced attackers a hard problem. 
1.2.2 Research aim 
Our ultimate research goal is to help power grid operators defend their SCADA networks against 
advanced persistent threats. To achieve that goal we aim to better understand how the behaviour 
of advanced persistent threats will manifest itself in a SCADA network and to develop, based on 
evidence derived from experiments, new tools and techniques to defeat the expected behaviour. 
 Our first goal is to better understand the behaviour of advanced persistent threats and how it will 
manifest itself in a SCADA network. By studying this behaviour we will be able to get a better 
understanding of the strategic goals such attackers are pursuing in SCADA network. From the 
strategic goals, we will be able to find constraints on attacker behaviour and devise a defensive 
strategy targeting those constraints. In our case, this study will lead us to postulate that the goal 
of the attackers is to introduce disruptions in critical infrastructure without triggering a 
conventional escalation. This strategic goal requires stealth so the defensive strategy should be to 
deny them easy access to stealth by increasing the capability for surveillance.  
To create evidence of the effectiveness of the proposed strategy, we require a novel method for 
generating experimental data. This new method is required to be able to produce high fidelity 
data to test our defensive strategy on an academic budget. Additionally, this data should be able 
to be published in an open domain with little confidentiality constraint. In our case, this means 
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building an experimental setup that produces high fidelity network data with which we can test 
the effectiveness of network surveillance as a strategy to detect advanced attackers. The use of a 
hybrid emulation/simulation approach will allow us to generate high fidelity emulated network 
data while keeping scalability high and costs low by simulating the physical side with a power 
flow simulator. 
Our final aim is to develop new tools and techniques to defeat the expected behaviour. Since our 
defensive strategy is based on surveillance, this means we aim to build a detector for advanced 
persistent threat communications in SCADA network. Once this detector is implemented, it can 
be tested using the high fidelity network data sets created by our experimental setup. In our case, 
the surveillance technique is actually an old technique, anomaly-based intrusion detection, that 
was mostly discarded because judged ineffective in conventional network environments. 
However, SCADA networks are different from traditional IT networks and an adaptation of this 
tool to SCADA networks should prove effective. 
Our intuition, looking at the protocols, tells us that SCADA traffic is well regimented. The master 
slave architecture and the choice of polling as the primary mode of communication suggest that 
network traffic would be generated in a deterministic manner. More importantly, the traffic 
should be predominantly generated by automated processes rather than by human users. Finally, 
SCADA systems are usually single purpose systems with purpose built hardware to perform one 
function. This would suggest that the wide variety of applications that are typical of HTTP traffic 
should not be present. Based on all these factors, our intuition infers that, unlike traffic on 
"traditional" corporate networks, there is a more precise definition of "normal" over which 
malicious traffic would stand out very plainly. In IDS technology, anomaly-based detection is 
used to detect cyber attacks by finding packets that deviate significantly from a baseline 
representation of normality. Based on our intuition, this technology would be suitable to detect 
intrusions. So, we will focus on this technology as a detector.  
1.2.3 Research objectives 
Based on our research goal, the main research objective is to build a SCADA intrusion detector 
that would detect communication from advanced persistent threats. However, this task requires 
the realization of a number of sub-objectives: 
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 Develop a model of the threat: by reviewing incidents and by extrapolating the strategic 
aims of actors sponsoring advanced persistent threat actors, we will be able to synthesize 
the behaviour of advanced persistent threat actors and develop a model for their expected 
behaviour in SCADA systems. 
 Review the research in cyber security of SCADA networks: by reviewing the literature we 
will be able to ascertain if another research group has solved the problem of advanced 
persistent threats in SCADA networks. A particular close look at how other researchers 
tackled the problem of generating data sets for experimental research will enable us to 
make sure our experiment is representative enough of a real world SCADA system. 
 Develop a methodology to perform SCADA cyber security research: because there are no 
generic SCADA datasets for network security, we will need to develop a methodology 
that will allow the generation of high-fidelity network datasets. These datasets will need 
to adhere to the protocol specifications and will need to include network attacks. In 
addition, the datasets are required to be available to other researchers that would want to 
do research in this space. 
 Build an apparatus to generate data: based on the methodology developed, we will need 
to integrate the various existing components and any new components we are required to 
build into a system that will generate data. This apparatus will also need to execute live 
malicious code. To that end, it will need to follow all the rules to prevent the malicious 
code from escaping from the experimental system to the rest of the world. 
 Select traffic features to characterize traffic: to build a detection method, we will need to 
identify features of network traffic that will allow us to classify traffic between normal 
and malicious. These features must be sufficiently indicative of the type of application 
generating this traffic. 
 Characterize normal traffic: using the features selected, we will need to build 
distributions that represent the statistical profile of normal traffic. The impact of a number 
of experiment design choices will also have to be evaluated to make sure the data 
produced is sufficiently representative of a large cross section of real-world systems. 
 Evaluate the detection performance of an anomaly detector: with the help of the 
characterization of normal traffic, we will evaluate if an anomaly detector based on the 
features we selected is sufficient to detect various types of attacks.  
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The realization of this research project will enable us to make significant contributions to the 
research community. The contributions include: 
 Introducing the model of pinprick attacks as a likely attack scenario from nation state 
actors. This work was presented at the 2010 Conference of cyber conflicts (now CyCon) 
[36]. 
 Creating a methodology to perform high-risk cyber-physical experiments for industrial 
control systems and building an ICS sandbox for the power grid. This work was used to 
provide training for a number of students from the energy sector and was presented at the 
2013 International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Security [37]. 
 Generating high-fidelity network captures of SCADA traffic with and without malicious 
traffic to be used by the research communities involved in computer security, SCADA or 
traffic analysis.  These will be made available on the web. 
 Proving the feasibility of anomaly detection in a SCADA network by testing anomaly 
detection in our sandbox. This work was submitted but has not yet attained publication. 
The sum of these contributions amounts to a significant advance in the fight to improve the 
security of the power grid against cyber attacks. 
1.3 Thesis organization 
This document presents a summary of our efforts to tackle the problem of defending SCADA 
network against advanced persistent threats. Various sections focus on the different efforts made 
to tackle our research objectives. 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the current state of the art. In particular, background information 
required to understand the problem space is presented. Also, experimental approaches from the 
literature are evaluated for their suitability to produce high fidelity network data. Other research 
efforts in the field of SCADA security are also investigated to see if they provide insight on our 
research problem. In particular, attention is directed to detection oriented research and on its 
unsuitability to the problem of advanced persistent threat detection. 
Chapter 3 studies the behaviour of advanced persistent threats to arrive at the model for pinprick 
attacks, our first contribution to the problem of advanced persistent threats in SCADA networks. 
From this model, we understand that a likely goal is disruption in a way that prevents the 
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defender from escalating the conflict. So, this chapter also presents a strategy to defeat that goal 
by undermining the ability of attackers to remain stealthy by enhancing the ability to perform 
surveillance. 
 Chapter 4 presents the ICS sandbox, a contribution aimed at providing the community with a 
research methodology to generate high fidelity network data for network security experiments in 
SCADA networks. The chapter also presents validation exercises for the ICS sandbox in the form 
of training sessions for members of the industry and of the replication of an impact assessment 
experiment from the power engineering literature. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the evaluation of the performance of an anomaly-based detector 
for SCADA networks that enables our surveillance-based strategy. This evaluation, realized on 
the ICS sandbox, shows that anomaly-based detection approaches are very effective in SCADA 
networks because of the regular nature of the traffic. The chapter also presents the boundary to 
the detection approach for covert channels that are mimicking the behaviour of the electrical 
network. 
Chapter 5 presents the general discussion of our results and contributions to show that we have 
achieved our research aim. This chapter also discusses the current limitations of our work and 
proposes avenues for future research that have been opened by our contributions.  
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CHAPTER 2 LITTERATURE REVIEW 
The public disclosure of Stuxnet provided a collective wakeup call about the security of industrial 
control systems. With this wakeup call came the inevitable conclusion that these systems, which 
include SCADA systems controlling critical infrastructure, are vulnerable to cyber attacks and 
that significant work was required to secure them. Additionally, it soon became apparent that, due 
to a number of idiosyncrasies such as a low tolerance for latency or limited processing power at 
the end points, it was not possible to directly apply well understood defensive techniques. 
Defenses need to be tailored to SCADA systems. This spurred researchers to invest efforts to 
secure SCADA networks. Due to the recent nature of the Stuxnet discovery, these efforts are only 
starting to bear fruit and we are still far from being able to feel confident about the security of 
SCADA networks, especially in the face of increasingly more sophisticated and persistent 
attackers.   
As seen previously, the security of SCADA networks, especially of SCADA networks connected 
to critical infrastructure such as the power grid, is worrying. But, how worried should we be? To 
answer this question we need to have a clearer understanding of the impact attacks on the 
SCADA system can have on the electric grid. For example, what can an attacker gaining 
administrative access to a computer in the control room access? To achieve this understanding 
requires knowledge about how SCADA networks are used to control the electric grid. 
Additionally, we need to understand how close the research community is to solving the problem 
of securing SCADA networks. Particularly, we need to understand how current experimental 
approaches do not provide an adequate framework for academic research in SCADA network 
security and how current research is aimed more at indiscriminate threats than at the problem of 
defending against advanced persistent threats.  
This chapter provides an overview of prior work in the field of SCADA security. It starts by 
presenting background information on the control of the power grid through SCADA systems, 
focusing on areas which have an impact on our research. Section 2.1 presents how the power grid 
functions as a network. Section 2.2 reviews basic elements of control theory as they apply to 
controlling an electric grid. Section 2.3 introduces SCADA networks by summarizing their 
components and describing how they are used for control. Building on this background 
knowledge, we then present an overview of research in SCADA security. Section 2.4 presents the 
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various experimental approaches used for research and explains how these approaches are not 
suitable for research focusing on network security problems. Finally, section 2.5 examines the 
results of the research and underscores where the research is either missing, as is the case for 
research about the behaviour of advanced attackers, misaligned with our objectives, as is the case 
for research aimed at vulnerability reduction, or is providing limited results or incomplete 
validation, as is the case for research aimed at attack detection.  
2.1 The power grid 
The goal of this research is ultimately to increase the security of the power grid. As such, basic 
knowledge of the operation of the power grid is necessary to the presentation of the research. To 
do so, we will start by looking at power lines and substations, the two basic building blocks of the 
power grid. Then, we will present an overview of power grid operation. 
2.1.1 Power line 
The power lines are long pieces of wiring that can transmit electric power between two points. In 
that sense, if we look at the electric grid as a graph, the power lines are the edges. While the 
power lines are not directed edges per se, it is not possible for electrical power to flow in both 
directions simultaneously. Much like a river will always flow down from the point with the 
highest altitude, electrical power will always from the power source, usually a power plant to the 
power sink, usually electrical loads such as industrial and residential consumers. This may mean 
that the flow of power through the line can be inverted if the transmission is reconfigured through 
a dynamic modification of the topology. 
Unlike the ideal lines used in theoretical models, real power lines cause power loss, notably 
through heating. The more current carried by a line, the more power it loses and the more it heats 
up. For long lengths of line, the loss becomes more significant. In order to alleviate this problem, 
grid operators usually increase the voltage, and thus reduce the current, of long-haul transport 
power lines. These high voltage lines are often called transport lines and, in contrast, the low 
voltage lines used near customers are called distribution lines.  
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2.1.2 Substation 
The electric substation is the location where power is switched from one line to another. Often, 
this is coupled with a modification of the voltage, for example switching from a high voltage 
transport line to a lower voltage distribution line, but pure switching may also occur. In a sense, if 
the lines are the edges of the power grid's graph, the substations are the nodes. Because of their 
ability to change the voltage level of the lines, they also act as the boundary between the various 
parts of the grids, for example the high voltage transport network and the lower voltage 
distribution network. In addition, because of their switching ability, substations act as the 
cornerstone of power routing redundancy. To perform this task, they often have line breakers that 
allow the grid operator to isolate a line, either to route the power elsewhere or to perform 
maintenance. 
 
Figure 2-1 : Power flow through a typical substation (Reproduced from [38]) 
The United States Department of Labor provides us with a schematic of a typical substation and a 
description of how the power flows through the substation. The schematic is reproduced in 
Figure 2-1. The power comes from the transport network's incoming subtransmission lines with a 
high voltage (34 KV) and passes through a series of air-break switches and circuit breakers that 
act as a protection layer. Then the power "steps down" in voltage to distribution level voltage (7.2 
KV) in the transformer and is relayed to the  distribution bus. The power can now be switched to 
the various outgoing distribution lines. Cutout switches also allow lines to be isolated. In modern 
power grids, all this equipment is equipped with sensors and remote operation devices. The 
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control house is used as the server room to host all computing and telecommunications 
equipment that is required to perform these functions. 
2.1.3 Overview of the power grid 
If we look at the power grid as a graph, the core of the graph, where the inter-connexion resides, 
is the transport network. Because the transport network needs to cover long distances, where 
reliability might be an issue, and because it needs to route power from a few sources to a large 
number of customers, transport networks typically have a meshed topology. While the exact 
degree of connectivity depends on a number of factors such as cost, right of way and geography, 
a higher degree of connectivity is preferred because it enables more control over routing which 
has benefits for both load balancing and reliability. 
On the other hand, the connectivity of power sources is typically more limited. Because of the 
often remote location of power plants, it is usually not economical to have a number of power 
lines connecting them to long-haul transport networks. Especially since electricity is typically not 
produced at transport level voltage and needs to go through a substation to connect to the 
transport network. Also, as previously mentioned, power needs to flow to a sink. It is therefore 
not useful to connect the various production sites to one another. As such, power sources 
typically have a substation directly on site to convert the power for a high voltage line and are 
connected to one, or two if the utility company wants redundancy, transport switching 
substations. 
On the distribution side, the sheer number of customers would make it prohibitively expensive to 
have dedicated substations as is the case for power plants. Naturally, some big industrial or 
institutional customers, like aluminium production plants and hospitals, might have more 
dedicated facilities, but that is the exception rather the norm. So, it is typical for distribution 
substations to route power to a number of distribution lines going to various clients. Each of 
those lines act as a bus from where all the clients in the neighbourhood  tap in to get their power, 
even though the entire neighbourhood can be summarized in a single sink. This usually creates a 
star topology where a number of sinks are connected to one, or more for redundancy, distribution 
substations. These substations are in turn connected to one, or more, transport switching 
substations. 
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In summary, the electric grid is divided into three sections: the production, the transport network 
and the distribution network. The production section contains all the power sources, the transport 
network performs the routing and delivery and the distribution network contains all the sinks. 
Between each zone, there are substations that convert voltage levels and allow for isolation. 
Figure 2-2 presents an overview of what such a grid might look like. In North America, this 
separation is also usually enforced through anti-monopoly regulation. The North American 
energy market considers that operating all three sections constitutes a vertical monopoly and is an 
unfair competitive advantage. This has led state monopolies to either split into multiple 
companies owned by a single shareholder (as is the case with Hydro-Québec Production, 
TransÉnergie and Hydro-Québec Distribution) or to deregulate and adopt a market-based 
approach (as is the case in Ontario). In terms of industrial automation, this fragmentation of the 
companies ensures that the control of each section of the power grid is often done independently 
for large utilities or in small islands containing the three sections for smaller utilities. 
 
Figure 2-2 : Overview of the grid 
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2.2 Elements of control 
Modern power grids are too large and too complex to operate manually. Utility companies 
require the help of automated control to ensure the smooth operation of the grid. In order to 
understand how industrial control systems are implemented and used to control complex systems 
such as power grids, we need to revisit some basic control theory concepts. We can then study 
how these concepts apply to the electric grid. Finally, we describe how the control center acts as 
the brain that adjusts the control, based on power grid operations. 
2.2.1 Basic control theory 
All control schemes follow a basic principle: a desired state of the system is set, a deviation 
between the actual and desired state is calculated and a pressure is applied to steer the state of the 
system toward the desired state. This principle defines the concept of the feedback loop 
illustrated in Figure 2-3. 
 
Figure 2-3 : Basic control loop 
The reference is the desired state, the measured output is the actual state of the system and the 
measured error is the difference between the desired state and the measured state. Pressure to the 
system is applied by modifying the system input to guide the system output, i.e. the system state, 
toward the desired outcome. Once the system output is in the desired state, the measured error 
will be zero and the controller will stop applying pressure. This process is dynamically repeated 
for the entire operation of the system. 
As an example, a driver on a highway wants to drive in a straight line in the middle of his lane 
500 meters behind the car in front of him. That trajectory is his reference. Using his eyes as a 
sensor, he can gauge if his trajectory deviates from the straight line and estimate the error. The 
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brain, acting as the controller, will provide a series of inputs (turn  the wheel, ease off on the gas 
pedal, etc.) that will, hopefully, guide the system toward the desired outcome. The driver will 
keep adjusting his distance and trajectory until satisfied with the outcome (i.e. the measured error 
is zero). He will then continuously monitor his situation to make sure that the state stays in the 
desired state even if another car brakes in front of him for example.  
Even control of complex systems follows the principle of the feedback loop. However, as the 
system to be controlled becomes more complex, such as the electric grid, it becomes more 
difficult to observe and describe its state.  The number of available inputs may also increase 
dramatically and the exact relationship between the inputs and the outputs may not be completely 
understood. This makes the job of both sensors and controllers more difficult and often requires 
multiple sensors and complex calculations by the controller to assess the correct values for the 
system inputs. 
2.2.2 Application to the electric grid 
The electric grid is a complex system with a complex state. This makes controlling the system 
more difficult than steering a car in the middle of the road or making an elevator stop on the 
correct floor. To tackle this job, the use of a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, or 
SCADA, system is required. This system is a collection of sensors and system inputs that can be 
used to collect data about the state of the system (i.e. data acquisition) or to modify inputs to alter 
the state of the system (i.e. control element). In terms of the basic control loop, the SCADA 
system provides both the system input and the measured output. The controller element is either 
provided by a human operator sitting in a control facility estimating state using his experience or 
pre-defined operating parameters and alarms, or by an automated Energy Management System, 
or EMS, that can perform automated monitoring and control tasks based on an estimation of the 
state of the grid. Figure 2-4 illustrates those control loops. 
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Figure 2-4 : Control loops for the electric grid (adapted from [39]) 
As an example, let us consider a simple reference state where power supply is equal to power 
demand. On a cold winter day, as the temperature drops, demand for power rises. Supervisory 
elements measure the state of the grid and notice that some metrics are outside normal operating 
parameters. These metrics are analyzed at the telecontrol center or by an automated power 
management system and the control logic suggests to increase power supply. A command is sent 
to the actuator of the intake door at a hydroelectric plant to increase the volume of water going to 
turbines to make them spin faster. This will produce more energy and supply will meet  demand. 
Naturally, this impacts thousands of other states. Perhaps the turbines are now spinning too fast, 
maybe the high voltage line falls outside operating parameters, a transformer overheats or the 
drop in the water level jeopardizes profits for the third quarter. Each of these individual elements 
is a part of the general state of the electric grid for the basic control loop and contributes to the 
complexity of the control. 
To solve the problem of state complexity, the divide and conquer approach is typically used. The 
network is partionned and a control is applied on the partitions. In their book, Shahidehpour and 
Wang [39]  provide a system partionning approach for voltage control. For SCADA systems, the 
ultimate consequence is that the complexity of the global state is also managed by breaking it 
down in parts. Ultimately, it is possible to break the grid down to every single piece of equipment 
and control each individually. However, in order to have a very detailed control scheme, it is 
necessary to have a fine granularity of information and the ability to make complex decisions 
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based on a large volume of data. In addition, detailed control of the input of the system is 
required. By leveraging modern communication protocols and computing power, this is precisely 
what has been done for the electric grid. Each piece of equipment is now connected to sensors 
and actuators to become a SCADA termination point.  
To enable SCADA systems to be used to control the electric grid, two types of points exist: 
measurement points for points that are sensors and control points for points that can alter the state 
of the system. We now have the control loop illustrated in figure 2-5. 
 
Figure 2-5 : SCADA control loop 
Based on measurements by SCADA measurements points, we eastimate a state S = 
{MeasurementPoint1, MeasurementPoint2, ..., MeasurementPointn}. Based on this estimation, we 
calculate the error based on business objectives or operating limits. The controller then sets the 
values of SCADA control points to provide the system input I = {ControlPoint1, ControlPoint2, 
..., ControlPointm}. This, in conjunction with outside factors that cannot be controlled such as 
customer demand, weather, physical properties of equipment and so on, define the state of the 
system output. The output is measured by measurement point sensors to close the loop. 
2.2.3 Control center 
Ultimately, all control must obey some form of control logic. This control logic requires 
conscious design and massive data processing. In modern systems, large parts of that logic can be 
fully automated with the use of automated software such as Energy Management Systems (EMS) 
and Distribution Management Systems (DMS). These systems can perform a number of functions 
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based on mathematical calculations. For example, if there is an incident and a line is suddenly 
taken offline, a computer will be able to calculate the correct rerouting of power to remaining 
lines to avoid going over operation limits far quicker than a human could. However, these 
automated routines cannot adapt well to unforeseen situations. Moreover, it might not be efficient 
to spend time to create automated responses to preplanned events that are out of the ordinary, 
such as isolating specific equipment for maintenance. Such functions are typically left to human 
operators sitting in a control center. 
The main function of the control center is to maintain situational awareness of the status of the 
grid. This allows operators to be notified of the occurrence of failures and to be able to respond 
accordingly. Another important function of the control center is to support operations, for 
example, by manually rerouting power for economic reasons or liaising with maintenance crews 
to alter the grid's topology. The main tool to achieve these objectives is the Human Machine 
Interface, or HMI, stations provided to each operator. These stations present the operator with a 
graphical interface to visualize the data collected by the sensors in a coherent way. For example, 
a schematic of the electrical network can be created and the values of each sensor can be 
positioned next to each piece of equipment. In addition, the HMI provides the operator with a 
metaphor to perform manual control of pieces of equipment. For example, clicking on 
controllable equipment in the schematic might bring up a contextual menu that enables remote 
control. Finally, preprogrammed alarms based on predefined operating limits can help operators 
identify faults and locate pieces of equipment that may be responsible. The HMI may provide a 
general alarm  browser, or locate alarms in a visual context, for example by making a piece of 
equipment turn red, or even provide sound notifications through speakers. 
To perform all these functions, control center equipment needs to communicate to the SCADA 
software for both measurements and control. This is done through vendor specific proprietary 
HMI protocols and thus requires computer network connexions. As such, operator consoles 
running HMI software typically sit on the same local area network as the SCADA central server 
on the "production" LAN. Because the operators also need access to various enterprise services, 
such as Active Directory for authentication, mail for communication, and so on, the workstations 
also need to reside on the "office" LAN. This situation can be resolved in a number of ways 
depending on the utility company's risk tolerance and budget constraints. For example, one 
company might provide two workstations for each operator while another might just collapse 
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both the production and office LANs into a single intranet.  A middle ground approach of dual-
homed workstations, with one network interface card connected to each LAN, is also common. 
 
Figure 2-6 : Control Center functions (reproduced from [40] © 2005 IEEE ) 
In addition to these workstations, the control center typically hosts a number of business 
applications that require direct access to SCADA data. Figure 2-6 illustrates some of those 
functions. For example, a utility company might want to save all the values of the SCADA 
sensors in a big database, or data warehouse, in order to be able to look at historic trends. Perhaps 
the value of power delivered for the purpose of billing is calculated from data provided by 
SCADA enabled sensors.  These applications are typically made available to users or process 
coming from inside the company. Outsiders often need to have direct access to SCADA data as 
well. For example, dynamic pricing for energy markets requires real-time access to a number of 
metrics to estimate supply and demand and establish prices. The utility company might also need 
access to data from other utilities or from major customers that are running their own SCADA 
network. For example, if the utility buys power from a privately owned power plant, it would 
require real-time data on what is available. For that purpose, the control center may require 
connexions to other control centers, including ones from external partners. 
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2.3 SCADA system architecture 
A cornerstone of the industrial control system for the power grid is the SCADA network because 
it acts both as sensors and as control input. In this section, we look at the SCADA system 
architecture for the power grid. We start by presenting a high level view of SCADA architecture 
and the role of each piece of SCADA equipment. Then we look at examples of each of those 
pieces of equipment. Finally we cover the DNP3.0 protocol which is the protocol most 
commonly used in power grid applications. 
2.3.1 SCADA system architecture 
We have seen that SCADA networks use a distributed approach for the control of the electric 
grid. As such, SCADA networks build layers of automation, starting with physical devices 
installed on power systems equipment. 
The SCADA devices connected to power systems equipment are usually hybrid analog-digital 
devices. They require an analog component to interface with the power system equipment and a 
digital component to interface with the SCADA network. The device can then either digitize 
analog values for measurement points or convert a digital value into a physical action for a 
control point. For example, a device may convert the analog value of a voltmeter into an 
instantaneous digital floating point value, feed an analog voltage setpoint value to a PID 
(proportional-integral-derivative) controller connected to an autotransformer or activate a 
hydraulic jack that will turn a breaker off. To perform this wide array of tasks, the various 
measurement and control points use Programmable Logic Controllers, or PLCs, that can be 
programmed to perform a range of control tasks. In that sense, PLCs are the hands and eyes of 
the SCADA system and they form the first level of automation.  
The PLCs need to physically interface with the machines. Because of this, they are usually 
colocated with the power system equipment they are controlling. In terms of the power grid, this 
means that power system sites such as transport and distribution substations, power plants, large 
distribution sites, and so on host a collection of PLCs. It is convenient to enable these sites to 
have local control without going through the central telecontrol center. So, it is customary to 
aggregate the data from all the PLCs in the same physical site to a remote terminal unit (RTU). 
This is done by connecting the PLCs to the RTU using short range telecommunication 
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technologies such as Ethernet wiring, serial RS-232 wiring or wireless conenctions such as 
ZigBee. The RTU allows local operators to read the values of measurement points and operate 
control points through a local human-machine interface (HMI) station and perform local control. 
In addition, the RTU can convert the communication to a protocol, such as TCP/IP, that is 
suitable for long-distance transmission towards a central controller located in the central 
telecontrol center without the need for dedicated telecommunication lines for each PLC. This 
provides the second layer of automation. 
In the case where there is only a small number of PLCs on a site, for example, next generation 
meters in smart grid applications, it may not be resource efficient to deploy an RTU. In these 
cases, an Intelligent Electronic Device, or IED, which combines the functions of a RTU and a 
PLC may be deployed instead. However, in terms of network architecture, it is functionally 
equivalent to a RTU with a very small number of PLCs connected to it. As such, throughout the 
text, we will only consider an architecture with only RTUs as the second layer of automation, but 
we keep in mind that these RTUs could be replaced by IEDs. 
The master terminal unit (MTU) is connected to all RTUs within a region and aggregates the data 
and provides control to all these sites.  As such, the MTU is typically physically located in the 
control centre of the electrical grid operator.  HMI consoles for human operators are also 
typically collocated on the same network as the MTU. In most cases, this operational network is 
separated from the operator’s administrative network by a firewall. However, for cost saving 
reasons, some of the operator stations might reside on both office and production networks to 
allow operators to read email and access the Internet on the same workstation. A historian 
application, i.e. a database that records all historical values of measurement points, might also 
reside on this operational network. This historian will typically require some communication with 
the office network in order for office workers to perform data analytics or to support other 
business functions such as billing.  
Overall, the SCADA network for the control of a power grid is a logical tree network with the 
MTU at the root of the tree.  The MTU is connected to RTUs, who can be connected to PLCs or 
intermediate RTUs.  Finally, the PLCs are connected to either control points or measurement 
points. Figure 2-7 illustrates a typical SCADA architecture. In this figure, each subdivision 
represents a physical location such as a power substation. Each subdivision hosts one RTU 
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connected to the network and could also host a local HMI if local control is required. On the 
other side of the SCADA WAN, the MTU sits in the control centre to administer an entire region. 
 
Figure 2-7 : SCADA architecture for the power grid 
2.3.2 Equipment examples 
While SCADA architecture seems simple enough on paper, the devil is in the implementation 
details. Each device operates differently based both on type of equipment and manufacturer. 
Devices are often custom made for one particular piece of equipment and so on. However, core 
functionality remains the same and most pieces of equipment of a certain type, even if one is a 
PC with custom I/O cards while the other is a custom-built circuit board, operate in the same 
way. As such, it can be useful to look at examples of SCADA equipment to better visualize the 
functionality each offers. 
At the control center level, all the functionality is typically software built on COTS type 
hardware. Control center applications typically only interact with data stored in databases. They 
can usually rely on TCP/IP over Ethernet for all their communication needs. In that sense, an 
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MTU or a historian looks like any other rack mounted server. The actual number of servers 
required depends on the number of functionalities provided and on the scale of the network. For 
example, a national level utility might host their historian database on a dedicated server and 
place Front End Processors (FEPs) to handle the communication with the RTUs to achieve better 
performance.  
The most important functionality offered by the MTU is to provide the data used in the HMI for 
the operators in the control center. Multiple kinds of metaphors and visualisations can be used to 
help operators place the data in context. Figure 2-8 presents an example of  a bare bones HMI 
metaphor that presents values and offers contextual menus for control. The color coding of 
abnormal values is also presented as a typical visual aid to identify problems to the operators. 
The top left menu also shows a number of other applications of the HMI such as the alarm viewer 
(3
rd
 button from the left), the networking monitor (5
th
 from the left) and the trend graph display 
(9
th
 from the left). 
 
Figure 2-8: Example MTU HMI 
Unlike MTUs, RTUs need to communicate with devices that may not support Ethernet. As such, 
RTU design is based around what type of communication it needs to offer. Each RTU has at least 
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one Ethernet or WAN port to communicate with the MTU and multiple ports to communicate 
with PLCs. Each of those ports will be designed to fit a protocol, whether it be RS-232 or Zigbee 
employed by that particular PLC. Figure 2-9 provides an example of a modular RTU where you 
can fit specialized I/O modules for each piece of equipment. In addition to the communication 
functions, the RTU hosts some applications to allow protocol conversion and local control 
amongst others. These applications may run on a variety of architectures from custom embedded 
software to web applications running on Windows.  
 
Figure 2-9: RTU example (adapted from [41]) 
Because PLCs are more intrinsically linked to the physical piece of equipment on the electric 
grid, they are one step more removed from COTS software and hardware than RTUs. As such, 
they are defined by the type of signal they collect or send to the physical equipment. Figure 2-10 
provides a good example that illustrates that most of the bulk of the device comes from I/O cards. 
In terms of functionality, PLCs seldom need to provide a large number of applications because 
the device is designed to operate with specific pieces of equipment. As such, it does not require 
as much programmability and adaptability in terms of processing power as an MTU or even an 
RTU does. As such, they tend to focus on embedded architectures and operating systems. A study 
of commercially available PLCs by Schwartz and al. [42] found that ARM, Motorolla 68000 and 
Power architecture were preferred for architectures while VxWorks, Windows CE, QNX and the 
occasional Linux were prevalent for operating systems. 
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Figure 2-10: Example PLC (reproduced from [43]) 
2.3.3 DNP3 protocol 
Because SCADA networks emerged from closed systems built around particular brands of 
industrial automatons, the SCADA networks of today communicate over a wide variety of 
protocols. The vast majority of protocols are proprietary protocols developed by manufacturers of 
SCADA equipment and are understood only by their own brand of automatons. However, during 
the 1990s, efforts were made to standardize SCADA protocols in order to allow interoperability 
between the various brands of automatons. While market forces proved stronger than the 
interoperability efforts, the Distributed Network Protocol version 3 (DNP3) and IEC 60870-5-
101(along with ModBus from Modicon) have managed to become de facto industry standards. 
The main advantage of these two protocols for academic researchers is that these protocols are 
so-called “open protocols”, meaning that the protocol specifications are available (for a fee) on 
request. For our purposes, we will concentrate on the DNP3 protocol because it is the protocol of 
choice for North America (IEC 60570-5-101 is more popular in Europe), particularly in the 
electrical sector. 
According to Clark and Reynders [44], DNP3 offers a large feature list including: 
 Time stamped messages for sequence of event recording 
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 The breaking of messages into multiple frames for better error control and quicker 
communication sequences 
 Peer-to-peer communication as well as master-slave 
 Support of multiple master topology 
 User definable objects 
 Unsolicited (i.e. without polling by master) reporting of exceptions/events 
 Support for “changed data” only response 
 Broadcast messages 
 Secure configuration and file transfers 
 Addressing for 65 000 devices 
 Time synchronization 
 Acknowledgements on data link and application layers 
Because of these features, the typical DNP3 mode of operation is the so-called “quiescent mode”. 
In that mode, there is no need to frequently poll the sub-stations in order to determine if a change 
occurred. The master sits “quietly” and waits for nodes to report significant changes in status by 
means of “unsolicited reporting”. Periodic polling is still used, but mainly to detect 
communication failures. The peer-to-peer communication capabilities also allow for a sort of 
hierarchical organisation where a substation can act as a master for other substations and relay 
information to the actual master.  
The DNP3 protocol is loosely built on the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model in the 
sense that it possesses multiple layers performing various functions (e.g. the physical layer deals 
with the physical means of communication) that are encapsulated in each other. However, in part 
because in the early days of DNP3 all connexions were point-to-point and no routing was 
required, DNP3 only has four layers: physical, data link, pseudo-transport and application. The 
full implementation of every layer also allows DNP3 to fulfill SCADA requirements, in 
particular the need to process packets in deterministic time. Figure 2-11 illustrates the various 
layers and their encapsulation headers. 
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Figure 2-11: DNP3 layers (reproduced from [44]) 
As seen in the figure, DNP3 implements all four communication layers. This approach is 
different from traditional communication design where specialized and interchangeable protocols 
deal independently with each layer. For example, in typical Internet communication, the Ethernet 
protocol is the data-link protocol, the IP protocol the network protocol and TCP is the transport 
protocol. As far as these typical protocol architectures are concerned, the transport protocol could 
very well have been UDP and the data-link protocol could have been ATM. That is not the case 
for DNP3. 
In order to modernize the protocol to make use of the developments in communications (i.e. 
cheap and fast communications using IP over Ethernet), it was necessary to adapt the DNP3 
protocol to allow the protocol to use a non-DNP3 transport, network and link layer. This led to 
the creation of the DNP3-over-IP specification. The concept behind DNP3-over-IP (thereafter 
referred to as DNP3) is to fully encapsulate DNP3 in an Internet communication. This means that 
the classical DNP3 physical layer is (typically) replaced by the TCP over IP over Ethernet 
combination. Figure 2-12 shows a DNP3-over-IP packet is created. 
40 
 
 
  
Figure 2-12: DNP3 over IP (reproduced from [44]) 
At the other end of the network, once the TCP/IP headers are stripped, the communication 
endpoint receives a fully formatted classical DNP3 packet, as if it had arrived from a connection 
over an RS-232 serial cable. This also means that, even if multiple hops are required to reach the 
communication endpoint, the various nodes in a SCADA network still act as if they are 
physically connected in a star pattern (in a single master design) or a tree (in a multiple master 
design). In that sense, it is important to keep the logical topology in mind when dealing with 
DNP3 networks.  
Another issue that must be dealt with is the fact that, unlike serial communication, the typical 
TCP/IP architecture relies on a shared communication medium. When multiple nodes attempt to 
use the medium at the same time, some sort of mechanism must be used to manage the conflict. 
For Ethernet, collision detection with exponential back off is used. Exponential back off is based 
on a probabilistic model to determine the back off time. Concretely, this means that the 
transmission on Ethernet is not deterministic if there is contention on the communication 
medium. In order to avoid this, operators of SCADA networks attempt to deploy them in order to 
prevent contention (e.g. using switches or point to point communications, providing high 
bandwidth or quality of service, etc.). However, this property must still be kept in mind, 
especially if operating in quiescent mode. It is very possible to trigger multiple nodes to initiate 
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communication. For example, if one could trigger a failure that affects multiple nodes 
concurrently, the nodes would all attempt to send “status change” messages at the same time, 
possibly causing contention on the network. 
2.4 Experimental approaches in SCADA experimentation 
Even if new techniques are found to defend SCADA networks, it is imperative that they be tested 
to see if they are effective. Obviously, it is preferable to avoid doing those tests in the field, 
where the new security devices and techniques might interfere with operations.  To solve this 
problem, a number of approaches have been proposed to provide an experimental framework for 
SCADA security research. This section, adapted from work we presented at the First 
International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security [37], provides an overview of 
current approaches used for SCADA and ICS security research and of the limitations of those 
approaches to perform experiments focusing on network security. 
2.4.1 Full Physical Deployment 
One of the more realistic approaches to do research on SCADA and ICS systems is to actually 
deploy a system and perform experiments on that system. The National SCADA Test Bed [45], 
with its seven substations and 61 miles of high voltage transmission lines, is an example of this 
kind of implementation. This approach allows researchers to create experiments that have a high 
resemblance to real world systems, because it is using a full implementation of both the physical 
component and the software component.  However, this approach suffers from a number of 
drawbacks for security research.  
The first drawback is that deploying a real system requires significant investment, both in terms 
of capital and in terms of manpower. In terms of capital investment, let us consider Hydro 
Quebec's annual report [46]. The cost of replacement of the software for the management and 
analysis of the transport network is budgeted at 32 million Canadian dollars. This does not 
include any physical components (such as power lines and substations).  This would suggest that 
the cost of standing up an at-scale laboratory is likely to cost tens of millions of dollars. In 
addition, SCADA equipment usually needs to be manually configured, requiring specialized 
knowledge to configure. This increases the manpower cost to stand up this kind of laboratory. 
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The bulkiness of physical equipment also creates a substantive lab space cost, especially in an 
academic setting. 
A second problem is that of "decontamination" and reconfiguration of the experimental setup.  
Because real equipment is used, any modification to the original configuration, e.g. as a result of 
performing an attack on one of the machines, needs to be undone manually. This increases the 
costs of operating the test bed, increases the downtime of the test bed and may create 
unpredictable states if the decontamination is not thorough. This causes significant drawbacks for 
the repeatability of experiments.  
2.4.2 Partial implementation 
A possible compromise to reduce lab space use is to limit the scope of both the network studied 
and the physical equipment required. The SANS Institute, with their Cyber City project [47], 
followed this path. The computer network of a small town was reproduced on virtual machines, 
including the user profiles and actions, in order to be able to train experts in attacking and 
defending networks. This training includes SCADA systems that might be operated in a small 
city, i.e. the water treatment and transport systems. The SCADA components are connected to a 
small scale model town in order for the students to be able to observe the physical consequences 
of cyber attacks. For example, an attacker might send a false command and switch a railroad 
track, causing two model trains to crash together. 
By limiting the scale to a small town, it is possible to create an environment interesting enough 
for students, while keeping it manageable, both in terms of manpower and real estate. The use of 
virtual machines allows for fast resets to initial configurations making decontamination 
straightforward. The physical consequences of attacks on ICS networks can also be very plainly 
observed. This provides a good environment for education. Unfortunately, the Cyber City model 
is limited in terms of possible research. As with physical test beds, Cyber City requires physical 
components, making it harder to do testing on configurations other than the default configuration. 
Also, addressing the problem of scale by scoping it to a small city prohibits any research done on 
problems with a larger scale.  
Other implementations of small scale SCADA networks are common in the literature. Examples 
such as Dondossola [48], [49], Quieroz [50], Morris [51] and Hahn [52] provide a framework for 
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the use of small implementations for security research. As with Cyber City, these partial 
implementations suffer from a lack of scalability because they are limited by the equipment that 
is physically available. In addition, they suffer from what Hahn calls "configuration 
management" problems. In other words, it may be difficult to reset these systems to pre-
experimentation configurations or to modify the configurations to alter the topology. 
2.4.3 Software only 
Another option for ICS security research is to use demo versions of SCADA software. A number 
of ICS vendors offer trial versions of their industrial control software. This software is usually a 
HMI application (software designed to allow human operators to interact remotely with industrial 
control equipment) with some missing functionalities such as a limited number of days the 
software can be used or a limited number of machines the software can interact with. This allows 
a researcher to observe communications that are properly formatted with minimal effort. As such, 
it is often used for research focused on protocol security (ex. [53]).  
The major drawback of this approach is the lack of physical effects. While it is possible to hook a 
trial version to a couple of actual machines and turns lights on and off, it is not practical to use 
this setup to measure realistic physical effects. Unless great care is put into designing the physical 
network connected to the SCADA system, it is unlikely that the physical network will provide a 
realistic feedback to the SCADA system. For example, in a real system, turning off a breaker will 
shut down the power to the line making the sensor register a drop in voltage and possibly 
increase the load on power generators. In that sense, a network packet may very well have a 
scope of influence far greater than is possible to model with trial versions of HMI software. 
2.4.4 Simulation 
To solve the problems of scale with physical implementations, it is possible to use simulation. A 
simulation approach uses a model that is an approximation of reality to approximate the results of 
whatever inputs a user provides the system. The production of a valid simulation testbed for 
SCADA research is an active field as shown by [54], [55] and [56]. However, it is unclear how 
most of these simulators truly approximate a real network. Sometimes, the difference is because 
of a specific research focus that does not require high fidelity of results. For example, the 
TRUST-SCADA testbed [54] is focused on system level security research at the IED/PLC level 
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and does not require complex network interactions. Others are limited because they do not have 
the capability to have detailed models or actual data and have to resort to assumptions. For 
example, the simulation framework from Quieroz et al. [56], which expands on their partial 
implementation efforts, addresses the problem of scale by simulating components that cannot be 
integrated. But this technique cannot expand on the security metrics they are observing because 
the coarse grained simulation at the network level does not allow them to look at individual 
packets.  
 Davis et al. [57] introduced a SCADA test bed that provides a user with an electrical power 
system HMI that is plugged into a computer network simulator and Bergman [58] presented its 
use for computer security research. So, when a user sends a command to turn off a breaker for 
example, this network simulator reproduces the network packet and its delivery to the 
destination. Once it reaches its destination, the simulation software generates a real packet with a 
virtual IP address and sends it to the PowerWorld electrical simulator to see what effects the 
command has on the power flow. Power World can send packets back through the simulated 
network and ultimately be displayed on the HMI. In that sense, the physical effects of cyber 
attacks on the power grid can be observed on the HMI from the results of the power flow 
calculations. Unfortunately, the approach suffers from some drawbacks. 
The first drawback is in terms of the validity of the model and the soundness of the 
measurements. Because the simulation is not using real SCADA equipment or network 
components, but a mathematical model of the equipment, there may be a significant difference 
between results observed in a simulation and an actual real world deployment. It is possible to 
validate the simulation models for both the network side and the power flow side to make sure 
they behave in a way similar to real world networks. However, security research has a tendency 
to deal with extreme or edge cases for which a model, even if it has been validated under normal 
operating conditions may react differently than a real implementation. 
Another inconvenience is that the configuration required and data produced are in formats that 
are not directly portable. For example, the RINSE network simulator used in Davis et al. [57]  is 
focused on coarse traffic metrics. So, data on the packet level is not always available. In that 
sense, results are less portable than if a more conventional packet capture file format, such as 
PCAP, was used.  
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2.4.5 Emulation 
If a physical implementation is too expensive and a simulation does not quite allow us to 
represent a real network with the fidelity we require, we may consider emulation, i.e. a system 
that duplicates exactly rather than approximates the behaviour of a real system. For security 
research, the DETER test bed [59] and the Emulab network test bed with large-scale 
virtualization [60] are two examples of medium to large scale network emulation environments 
that could be used for ICS security research and training. In both of these cases, an environment 
very similar to a real deployment can be programmatically deployed in the test bed. Malware and 
attacks can then be tested without impacting real systems. If dedicated virtual machines can be 
used, an approach similar to the isolated virtual clusters from École Polytechnique de Montréal’s 
SecSI lab [61] can also be successful. 
Past experience has shown that an emulation approach can address a number of problems such as: 
containment of experiments, isolation from concurrent experiment interference, confidentiality 
and integrity of configuration and results, and the prevention of misuse of the test bed. Also, 
because deployment and experiments are run programmatically, it is easy to perform 
decontamination and reconfiguration efficiently. In the isolated virtual cluster architecture, 
decontamination is even more straightforward using VMWare snapshots. However, these 
approaches have a major drawback – the modelling of physical effects. Because all three test 
beds described above were designed to emulate cyber attacks, they only emulate digital electronic 
components. In that sense, it is even harder to model physical effects than with the use of trial 
software. Usually, in the operating environment of emulation clusters, it is physically impossible 
to install the custom I/O cards that can create the analog signals required by many PLCs or ICS 
machines. 
2.4.6 Impact assessment 
Another aspect of SCADA security research is the evaluation of the impact of security incidents. 
Operators of SCADA networks are reluctant to part with the details of any incidents they suffer 
(with rare exceptions such as the Maroochy water facility [4]) and the prospect of infecting a live 
system to test the effect of an attack is remote at best. In that sense, researchers with access to a 
46 
 
 
reasonable experimental test bed for SCADA systems have attempted to provide estimates of the 
impact of cyber attacks on SCADA systems.  
Fovino and al. [62] have attempted to study the impact of malware designed to cause impacts in 
SCADA systems. To do so, they modeled a power plant based on observations made at a real-
world site and created a test bed. Unfortunately, they did not model their attacks with the same 
level of fidilety, opting to emulate the attacks with a mobile agent simulator that replicates the 
behaviour of malware. While this level of fidelity may be adequate to draw some conclusions 
about network data, the observed metrics focus on system level or physical impacts (with the 
exception of the minimal DoS case study) with no evaluation of the impact of the implementation 
of their malware model or the middleware required to run their mobile agent. For example, they 
noticed that none of the worms they attempted to reproduce caused a system failure. It is 
impossible to tell if this is the result of resiliency in the SCADA network or the result of their 
malware simulator not interacting with the systems in the same way real malware would, perhaps 
locking up a thread, consuming all of the memory, modifying network paths and so on. 
Another attempt by Sridhar [63] was made to assess impact of integrity attacks on SCADA 
systems. This study creates an analytical model of the attacks and integrates those attacks in a 
generic power flow balancing methodology. The assumption is that an operator would follow the 
methodology, come to an erroneous conclusion about the state of the system and perform an 
action that is contrary to his interests. A simulation is then constructed based on the analytical 
model to show that the analytical model performs as expected. Unfortunately, there is no 
validation of the model and the model seems to present serious limitations at first glance. 
Notably, there is no feedback loop that creates an electrical network effect based on the reaction 
of the operator. For example, if an operator is tricked into activating a breaker, the power flow 
will be diverted on other lines and this will trigger new measurements that are based on the 
ground truth and not on the falsified report. This would require the attackers to recompute the 
expected values for their falsification software faster than the actual system converges. At the 
same time, the power of the attacker is underestimated. In their model and attacker can only set a 
sensor to the minimum or maximum value of the sensor for a limited amount of time where in 
reality an attacker can send arbitrary values (even impossible ones) for an unlimited amount of 
time if he obtains administrative access to a machine. 
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The team of Bobbio and al. [64] have also attempted to study the impact of DoS attacks on the 
SCADA network. Unlike Sridhar [63], the attack model is very detailed and is based on an actual 
failure scenario. The network model is also very detailed because it is based on the actual 
systems. However, the study focuses only on the network effects of the DoS attack on the telco 
network. While the delay between the different SCADA nodes is calculated, we have no 
indication of how this delay affects SCADA traffic, if any critical packets are dropped or if 
operations are impaired in any way. In that sense, while the data might be useful for someone 
with a SCADA test bed to calibrate the network traffic generated by an attack, it provides little 
insight on its own. 
Instead of building a test bed where simulated attacks can be reproduced, the SCADA honeypot 
by the SCADA HoneyNet Project [65], a subproject of the HoneyNet project [66], strives to 
observe SCADA attacks in the wild. The main advantage of a honeypot is that it is a trap 
designed to lure in actual attackers and observe how real attackers behave on what they think is a 
real system. The use of honeypots, which are not connected to live systems, can therefore allow 
defenders to gather valuable intelligence on attackers without putting live systems at risk. The 
downside is that, because there is no real system behind the honeypot, it may be possible for the 
attacker to be able to determine that he is facing a honeypot and adjust his behaviour accordingly. 
Another limitation emanating from the lack of connectivity to a real system is that it is not very 
useful to gather any real knowledge about the interaction between cyber and physical 
components. As a testament to this, the SCADA honeypot project has not produced any public 
reports of SCADA specific attacks even if attacks by groups such as APT1, a.k.a Comment 
Crew, have been reported on SCADA honeypots [67]. 
In summary, while each of these approaches have merits, they are not well adapted for research 
in SCADA network security. For some, the financial cost may be too high, for others the 
experiment setup time may be too long, the system might not be scalable, the cyber-physical 
interaction may not be correctly represented or the network traffic may not be of sufficient 
fidelity. This underlines the lack of an experimental platform for the realization of repeatable, 
high-fidelity network security research.  
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2.5 SCADA security research 
Even with the lack of a platform for network security research, there are a number of researchers 
working to secure SCADA networks. These efforts come from a variety of fields, including 
information security, risk assessment, control engineering and economics. This section presents 
an overview of research efforts to address the problem of securing SCADA networks. We start by 
presenting research on offensive techniques, then we follow by research focusing on risk 
assessment and compliance and finally, we cover research on defensive techniques. 
2.5.1 Offensive research 
To fully understand the threats we need to defend against, a number of researchers have focused 
on researching offensive techniques to attack SCADA networks, or to map the vulnerabilities that 
are affecting SCADA systems. 
The first line of research is the security analysis of the SCADA protocols. The research done by 
Dutertre [68], Edmonds and al. [69] and more recently by Hagen and al. [70] are good examples 
of research in that domain. In both instances, formal modeling was applied to a SCADA protocol 
(ModBus and ModBus over TCP respectively) to find weaknesses in the protocol that could be 
exploited by attackers. Similar efforts have been made to evaluate the security of other protocols 
such as DNP3. The taxonomy of DNDP3 attacks by East and al. [71] or of cyber attacks on 
SCADA systems by Zhu and al. [72] provides a very good overview of the efforts that have been 
made in that field.  However, as seen previously, most attackers prefer to rely on the plethora of 
“traditional” vulnerabilities in SCADA networks which require much less effort to target. 
Because the formal modeling is used to help secure the protocols as well as for designing new 
attacks, it is not likely that protocol attacks will become a low-hanging fruit in the near future. 
Yet, these attacks are part of the toolkit of a skilled attacker and should be considered a viable 
option. As a matter of fact, research on defensive measures to prevent these attack often requires 
the development of attacks to have test cases (see examples Wang [73]  and Gao and al. [74]). In 
such cases, it may be hard to determine if these attacks will indeed be representative of what 
malicious actors may come up with in the future.  
In addition to the analysis of the SCADA protocols, there is also some research into SCADA 
application programs to evaluate their vulnerability. This work is done both by academics such as 
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Belletini [75] and industry researchers such as Internet Security Systems (ISS) [2] and 
TippingPoint [76]. It will come as no surprise that SCADA programs were not developed with 
security in mind. In the limited sample reviewed in their research, Maynor and Graham from ISS 
[2] observed numerous insecure coding practices such as the use of functions known to be 
vulnerable (e.g. strcpy(),  sprint(), etc.), the lack of validation for untrusted input such as network 
traffic, widespread use of clear text and little or no ability to perform authentication. These results 
can easily be explained by the fact that security was never a design specification for code that 
was intended to be run only on segregated, trusted systems. Some security experts (such as Henry 
in [12]) even caution penetration testers to avoid performing network scanning on SCADA 
systems that are over 5 years old because of the high risk that such systems would crash if faced 
with a malformed packet. This indicates that the domain of vulnerability research for SCADA 
programs is actually a widely untapped field in public domain literature. It is the assumption of 
this author that the main limiting factors to the progress of that field of research are the lack of 
availability of SCADA equipment for such research and the fear of prosecution under harsh anti-
terrorist laws for the researchers or the fear of providing adversaries with attacks. None of these 
limitations is likely to hinder a highly skilled and motivated attacker. 
Lastly, there has been some research in the field of SCADA specific malware, which means 
malware that resides on SCADA specific hardware. The most common example is the 
development or analysis of so-called “smart grid worms” (such as [77], [78], [79]). These worms 
would use the new processing and storage capacity of smart meters to cause all kinds of havoc 
with the electrical distribution system. A lot of SCADA equipment tends to be built on top of 
generic off-the-shelf operating systems (such as the Windows OS) rather than on custom-
designed hardware and does not even require custom malware. Industry reviews such as the one 
presented by ISS [2] testify to this by relating famous cases where SCADA equipment was 
infected by run of the mill worms such as Blaster and Sasser which targeted Windows machines. 
While this kind is research allows us to better understand the problem space, it is clear that it 
does not provide much in terms of solutions for securing the electric grid's SCADA system. More 
importantly, most of the research is aimed at finding specific vulnerabilities. This provides little 
guidance in terms of creating an attack model against which to test our defenses. We must instead 
turn on the few technical descriptions of cyber attacks such as Maroochy, Stuxnet and Shamoon 
to build attack scenarios. Does it really matter if Stuxnet was using a ModBus specific 
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vulnerability instead of Windows-based exploits? And, while an advanced attacker might make 
use of the types of attacks developed in this research, it is still unclear what role these attacks 
would play in their penetration plan. As such, it is difficult to find direct application of this 
research in our problem space. 
2.5.2 Preventing attacks in SCADA systems 
Because SCADA networks have a number of idiosyncrasies, a great deal of effort is spent in the 
development of SCADA specific protection. Notably, research in SCADA cryptography, 
SCADA firewalls and SCADA-aware IDS require special attention. 
Typically, SCADA protocols have not used cryptography because of the perception that limited 
computational resources and sensitivity to delay would be challenges too great to overcome. This 
did not cause a problem when SCADA systems were still isolated systems. However, when 
experts started to look more closely at the security of SCADA networks, many have identified 
lack of cryptography as a sign of lax security. Coupled with the fact that traditional cryptographic 
methods are regarded as being inadequate for SCADA, it is not unusual to see a good deal of 
effort invested to incorporate cryptography in SCADA networks. This work can take the form of 
developing new protocols or extensions into existing SCADA protocols in order to provide 
additional cryptographic functionalities (see examples [80], [81], [82], [83], [84], [85]). Another 
research axis has been to propose SCADA specific key distribution mechanisms (see examples 
[86], [87], [88], [89]). Even in light of this research, it is still unclear what the value of 
cryptography would be for SCADA security. In most SCADA deployments, confidentiality takes 
a back seat to availability and integrity. In multiple integrity attack scenarios, such as the physical 
compromise of a machine or the remote exploitation of a vulnerability in an application, adding 
encryption to communications provides no help. The data is in the clear on the physical device or 
the socket is open an accepts all packets. At the same time, cryptography may hinder other 
defensive measures based on packet captures such as network-based IDSes. 
Another avenue for defensive research is the development of firewalls designed for SCADA 
systems. The idea is to strongly enforce perimeter separation between the SCADA production 
networks and the office networks. This is typically done by creating an application layer firewall 
that can parse SCADA packets and reject anything that isn't "expected". These firewalls are 
installed in front of all SCADA endpoints to intercept all the traffic going to SCADA equipment. 
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Additional functionality, for example the inclusion of a proxy that can perform authentication, 
can also be added. Examples such as patriotSCADA [90] and Tofino security appliance [91] are 
good examples of the state of the art in that matter. Bradetich [92] offers another solution to the 
problem by applying the architecture in use for secret level networks in the government to 
enforce the "air gap" with the SCADA network. More interestingly, Hadeli and al. [93], instead 
of attempting to build a complete protocol parser for SCADA, suggest using the fact that SCADA 
networks are more deterministic than normal office networks to build firewall and IDS rules. By 
looking in SCADA configuration files, they can build of list of expected communication 
pathways and generate rules based on this expected traffic. While a useful part of the defensive 
architecture, the current state of vulnerability of the SCADA networks and the fact that 
adversaries have multiple ways to bypass perimeters and jump air gaps makes the use of firewall 
insufficient to solve the security problems of SCADA networks. The numerous examples of 
infections from a USB key are a testament to this fact. 
Instead of trying to integrate new security mechanisms to legacy systems, some research has been 
done in optimizing existing countermeasures to obtain better security for SCADA networks. In 
their work, Anwa and al. [94] have made significant efforts to optimize security for SCADA 
networks using a combinatorial approach of known countermeasures. That problem is shown to 
be a NP hard problem (can be reduced to the Multiple-Choice 0-1 Knapsack problem). To solve 
the problem, they build an analytical model of their attacker and of their network defences. They 
then choose a set of defences and apply them to their target network (in their cases a substation 
network). The set of defences that can be bought with a given budget represents their design 
space. Then, they calculate the worst case damage their model attacker could do on the network 
protected by the chosen defences. Using heuristics, they change the set of defences to cover the 
design space. The solution in the design space which allows the attacker to do the least damage is 
the optimal (or sub-optimal) solution. This approach is interesting because it takes into account 
the problem as a whole and uses a metric that is related to the controlled system (power delivery) 
instead of an information security or network metric (such as bandwidth available).  
However, the paper has some limitations. The main problem is the limitation imposed by the 
complexity of the analytical model. To cope with the complexity, the authors limited themselves 
to only three possible defences (segregation by firewall, segregation by VLAN and link 
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encryption) and their attacker model is inexplicably crippled (limited to only one tap, limited to 
one type of attack and has no economy of scale). This produces results of limited applicability in 
the real world, especially since it is unclear how the model was validated. 
Ultimately, all these efforts strive to reduce the vulnerability of SCADA systems. While this 
provides significant security gains against indiscriminate attackers, it provides less protection 
from attackers that systematically probe systems for vulnerabilities, such as advanced persistent 
threats, from eventually finding a way into the system. As such, none of these methods are 
sufficient to secure SCADA networks from advanced persistent threats. 
2.5.3 Detecting attacks in SCADA systems 
Instead of trying to prevent attacks, some researchers have focused on detecting attacks within a 
SCADA network. Peterson [95] presents a list of problems SCADA-based IDSes could address. 
For example proposing that SCADA vendors create rules to whitelist packets based on protocol 
adherence or that researchers dig in the large volume of historic data collected from SCADA 
meters to find anomalies. However, he does not provide any suggestions on how these might be 
implemented. He underlines the lack of support from traditional IDS sources for detecting attacks 
on SCADA networks. A number of researchers have attempted to provide a solution by building 
IDSes dedicated for SCADA environments. 
One possibility is to attempt to detect attacks at the host level.  In his research, Yang and al. [96] 
have attempted to build a host-based IDS that would detect a number of attacks based on 
computer performance metrics. Unfortunately, as they point out themselves, the data they use to 
test their model is inadequate. Oman and Phillips [97] instead focus on using the configuration 
files to see if alterations have been made, or if attempts to use a functionality that was not 
configured were made, to create a form of host-based IDS and configuration management system. 
Under these circumstances, an attacker sending malicious SCADA commands or exploiting a 
software vulnerability would not be detected, nor would malware that did not modify the 
standard configuration files. In that sense, the usefulness as an IDS focuses on a corner case of 
the attacker's reconnaissance and might only provide marginal usefulness.   
A number of propositions have been made to detect attacks in the SCADA network by the 
detection of anomalies in the state of the controlled system. For example, Bigham and al. [98] 
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suggest using n-grams on the state estimation data to determine if the system is suffering from an 
anomaly. Carcano and al. [99] suggest using the "proximity" between two different network 
states to detect anomaly. A disadvantage of this type of technique is that it relies on the state 
estimation of the network which is obtained through the sensors installed on SCADA devices 
(see section 2.2). A subtle attacker is likely to alter those values, as was the case with the Stuxnet 
virus, and a blatant attacker is likely to cause disruption that would be identifiable as an anomaly 
even without the use of a sensor. 
A number of attempts have instead focused on detecting attacks at the network level. Cheung and 
al. [100] and Goldenberg and Wool [101] focus on analyzing the Modbus protocol to create a 
model of the protocol and detect any deviation from it. In other words, forming a kind of white-
list of acceptable Modbus states and transitions. Unfortunately, the SCADA worm has shown that 
malware that attempts to send false SCADA traffic is likely to respect protocol formatting. This 
limits the applicability of this type of intrusion detection to detecting protocol exploits. Instead of 
using protocol modeling, Schuster and al. [102] propose using machine learning techniques to 
learn patterns over time and detect any sudden changes in those patterns. While their paper 
presents the details of how learning would be implemented and what challenges are envisioned, 
including the problem of feature selection, there is no evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
solution because they have no datasets to test it on. Rusu and al. [103] attempt to solve the 
problem by generating a dataset with a network simulator. However, the values they are using for 
the amount of traffic generated, the type of traffic, and some of the proposed SCADA topologies 
are completely arbitrary making the validity of their results suspect. While the problem of the 
lack of good datasets for testing is prevalent in IDS research [104], the problem is greater in 
SCADA security research because of the sensitivity of production network data and the high cost 
of creating test beds (see section 2.4 for an in-depth discussion). 
Some researchers have access to production network datasets and have attempted to propose IDS 
for SCADA networks. Hadeli et al. [93] use a parser of the configuration files for the SCADA 
protocol IEC 6185 to automate the creation of firewall rules to only allow legitimate traffic. 
However, their implementation is limited to creating filters based on IP addresses and creating 
IDS rules detecting missing traffic, for example the lack of traffic from a node that has been 
shutdown. Rather than using configuration files to leverage the determinism of SCADA network, 
Langill [105] parses packet captures. The goal is to create a map of legitimate communication 
54 
 
 
paths on a deployed system to create SNORT rules that detect communications falling outside of 
the legitimate pattern. Langill starts by merging the packet captures from all parts of the network. 
Then, he maps the communication pairs to create a matrix of allowed communications. Finally, 
anything that is not allowed is considered illegitimate and a snort rule is generated to detect it. 
While this approach improves on Hadeli et al., we still rely on a single characteristic of SCADA 
traffic: the logical tree architecture emanating from the application layer protocol. For example, 
the fact that all communications are originated from the MTU or that the protocol relies heavily 
on polling. Barbosa and al. [106], [107] have used data from actual SCADA deployments to 
produce communication frequency-based, and flow-based, anomaly detection and tests those 
detectors. Unfortunately, because they do not know the ground truth, they are only able to 
provide a performance evaluation of the number of alarms generated as related to each dataset. 
No evaluation of the number of false positive and negatives is provided. This indicates that even 
actual data from production environment might not be ideally suited for experimentation if the 
ground truth is not known. 
In summary, research in detection of attacks in SCADA network suffers from a host of 
limitations. The most important of which is the lack of credible evaluation of performance. While 
the value of using the "determinism" of SCADA networks as a leverage to find attackers 
producing unusual patterns of communication has been suggested, approaches have focused on 
configuration information such as configuration files or common communication paths instead of 
using traditional network-based anomaly detection. We suspect this ties back to the lack of 
datasets which might be used to characterize SCADA traffic and evaluate its suitability for 
anomaly-based intrusion detection. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have seen how the electrical grid can be considered as a collection of 
interconnected networks. At the center of the interconnection is the substation where power can 
be re-routed or distributed. These substations hold the majority of the control elements of the 
system. These control elements perform two basic functions: estimate the state of the electric grid 
and alter the state. SCADA networks are used to perform both these tasks with measurement 
points and control points respectively. This gives an attacker with control over SCADA 
equipment a great deal of power over the state of the electric grid. In addition, SCADA networks 
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provide attackers with a far greater scalability than physical attacks. This transforms sites where 
attackers could previously only do local physical damage, such as maintenance sheds and partner 
sites, into risks to the entire grid because access to the SCADA system is provided.   
To address these risks, research has been undertaken, especially since the discovery of Stuxnet. 
However, a large section of the research effort has been focused on reducing the vulnerability of 
SCADA networks. Multiple approaches have been suggested such as improving firewalls or 
adding cryptography. While this research is useful in addressing threats to SCADA networks, it 
mostly serves in reducing the threat of indiscriminate actors that do not systematically search for 
vulnerabilities. Stubborn attackers, including advanced persistent threats, will persist until they 
find a way in. 
When they do find a way in, we need to find them. A number of research thrusts in detecting 
attackers on SCADA networks have attempted to leverage the high level of "determinism" in 
SCADA networks to find attackers. Unfortunately, most of this research suffers from a lack of 
validation by providing unvalidated attack or traffic models or by abstaining from evaluating the 
performance of the suggested methods. For those that do not suffer from this lack, they have a 
limited reach because they must limit themselves to configuration files or commonly used 
communication paths. They cannot leverage traditional anomaly detection-based intrusion 
detection because they do not have access to a detailed model of SCADA network traffic. An 
anomaly-based intrusion detection system based on a detailed characterization of SCADA 
network traffic would provide a significant contribution to this field. 
The problem of generating high fidelity data sets suitable for experimentation for cyber-physical 
system is hard. A number of researchers have tackled the problem, but none of the approaches 
have produced a method that can provide the network traces at the fidelity required to perform 
experimentation in network security. Each method presents major drawbacks in terms of either 
cost, repeatability of experiments, scalability, fidelity of the cyber-physical interaction, soundness 
of network data, or combinations of the above. As such, the elaboration of a method to generate 
experimental data suitable for the generation of high fidelity network data sets is a necessary 
contribution. 
In order to create experiments that represent the real world reasonably well, we also need a model 
for the behaviour of attackers. Unfortunately, research in offensive security focuses on finding 
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vulnerabilities in SCADA networks and protocols. Very little is known about the tools, 
techniques and procedures attackers would use and no research focusing on this facet exists. As 
such the development of a model of an advanced persistent attacker that can be translated into 
attack specifications in an eventual network security experimentation is required prior to 
experimentation. 
This study of prior art in SCADA security, in particular limitations pertaining to securing the 
network against advanced persistent threats, leads us in a trajectory toward using anomaly-based 
intrusion detection based on a detailed characterization of SCADA traffic. However, to reach this 
objective, we must create stepping stones in order to fill gaps in the current state of the art. We 
must first present a model of the techniques and procedures used by an advanced persistent 
attacker. Then, we must build an experimental environment that allows us to generate high 
fidelity network data sets. Finally, we will be able to use these data sets to create a 
characterization of SCADA traffic and test the performance of anomaly-based intrusion 
detection. All of this work will be presented in the following chapters.  
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CHAPTER 3 BEHAVIOUR OF ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREATS 
Advanced persistent threats are often viewed as super hackers possessing quasi supernatural 
powers. This is even more true of hackers working for government intelligence agencies. This 
belief is often used as an excuse to avoid putting any efforts into stopping them. After all, these 
hackers are so good, nothing we mortals can do could possibly stop them. This aura is due in part 
because of the mysterious nature of the techniques and procedures used by advanced persistent 
threats. Prior to the detailed analysis of Stuxnet in 2010 and of the revelations about APT1, a.k.a. 
Comment Crew, in 2012, very little was known about the behaviour of advanced attackers. So, in 
order to stop them, we must create a model of advanced persistent attackers in order to be able to 
devise a defense. 
Using parallels from previous asymmetrical conflicts, we proposed a model for the strategy 
nation states might pursue to engage in low intensity cyber conflicts. This model, which was 
presented at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence Conference on Cyber 
Conflicts (now CyCon) in June 2010, insists that nation states actors will pursue a strategy for a 
high number of low impacts in order to prevent escalation. This puts the onus on stealth, enabled 
by the use of covert communications. Based on that realization, we build a defensive model 
focusing on increasing the capacity for surveillance which will constrict the attacker's actions if 
he wishes to remain stealthy. 
This chapter presents an attack model for the behaviour of advanced persistent threats in SCADA 
networks and a model that serves as the basis for proposing surveillance as a defensive strategy. 
Section 3.1 resolves the apparent contradiction between the desire to target critical infrastructure 
and the lack of destructive incidents by evolving the concept of cyber warfare to cyber conflicts. 
Section 3.2 presents our contribution of a model for low intensity cyber conflicts, the pinprick 
attack strategy, that can be used to envision the behaviour of advanced persistent attackers against 
critical infrastructure targets. Section 3.3 presents the model of covert communication overlooked 
by a Warden as the basis for our strategy of increasing surveillance by providing more 
capabilities to the warden in order to limit the capacity of attackers. 
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3.1 Attacking the critical infrastructure 
Modern attackers are often said to have abandoned the quest for fame to concentrate on the quest 
for profit.  In that sense, it can be legitimate to ask who would attempt to disrupt critical 
infrastructure networks. This section, Section 3.1.1. looks at different actors and evaluates how 
they would target critical infrastructure. Section 3.1.2 details how the difficulty of assessing the 
risk of high impact and low probability scenarios affects this analysis. Section 3.1.3 reframes the 
nation state actor in the context of cyber conflicts rather than cyber warfare to address the 
incertitude in terms of risk. 
3.1.1 Choosing critical infrastructure as a target 
For a cyber attacker, targeting the critical infrastructure can have dire consequences. Since 
September 2001, in many countries, an attacker causing deliberate disruption of life support 
infrastructure is considered a terrorist. The willingness of law enforcement to pursue these 
attackers and the eventual penalties imposed on culprits are overwhelmingly greater than those of 
"typical" cyber crimes such as identity theft. In that sense, it is appropriate to examine the 
motivations that entice some attackers to choose to target critical infrastructure, in particular 
electric grids. 
The first set of attacker targets critical infrastructure by accident. The distributors of mass-market 
malware and the users of indiscriminate exploitation tools typically invest little effort in targeting 
infrastructure because they are mostly interested in commodity resources, such as the bandwidth 
and processing power of compromised computers. For them, a computer in a critical system 
environment has no more value than the desktop PC in a cyber café. As such, it is in their best 
interest to avoid critical infrastructure systems which may trigger the wrath of the authorities. 
Unfortunately, the state of security controls in SCADA networks is such that the indiscriminate 
attacks sometimes get in. However, this class of attack is uninteresting in terms of engineering 
research because the countermeasures to effectively respond to this kind of attack are well known 
and the adversary is unlikely to aggressively pursue these targets if he is removed from the 
system. His efforts are better invested  pursuing low-hanging-fruit systems that will require less 
investment and less risk for the same reward. 
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The second set of attackers deliberately targets critical infrastructure. Some examples of this type 
of attackers are extortionists, hacktivists and nation states. These actors are unfazed by the harsh 
penalties associated with the cyber terrorist label either because they imagine the reward worth 
the risk or because they feel they have moral obligations to their cause or their country. Unlike 
the indiscriminate attackers, if these adversaries are repulsed, they are likely to return instead of 
looking for easier prey. Except for the extortionist, increasing the cost of the attack by adding 
more defenses is unlikely to deter them because they are not after commodity resources. For 
example, it is hard to put a monetary value on freedom of speech and say that, past a certain 
threshold of investment, freedom of speech advocates will cease their activities. 
Of the adversaries that cannot be deterred or redirected to easier targets, hacktivists are the least 
likely to cause dramatic impacts. After all, the main motivation behind hacktivists is often some 
sense of greater social good. As such, it is unlikely that they would resort to actions that would 
severely harm "innocent bystanders" because that would hurt their cause. For example, 
hacktivists motivated by environmentalist beliefs might be inclined to attack an "evil oil 
company", but they are unlikely to deliberately trigger an oil spill that would have serious 
consequences to the environment. In that light, it seems that the strategic aims of hacktivists 
would be suited better by avoiding the control systems where the risk of collateral damage is high 
and concentrate on attacking the corporate networks where confidential information is stored and 
where publicly visible targets, such as web servers, can be exploited for publicity. 
This leaves the nation state sponsored attackers that will not be redirected or deterred and that 
may want to wreak physical havoc. Since the Napoleonic era, total war, which is the mobilization 
of entire nation states for conflict targeting not only the armed forces, but also the civilian 
infrastructure that sustains the armed forces, is considered a legitimate form of warfare. One such 
infrastructure is the power grid. Therefore, we can assume that nation states are interested in 
targeting the power grid for its strategic value. At the same time, the energy market is worth 
trillions of dollars [108] and is often the domain of national monopolies or large national 
champions. So, even in times of peace, some nation states might feel tempted to provide 
competitive assistance to national economic interests and may even employ underhanded tactics 
to do so. 
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3.1.2 Low probability/high impact scenario 
When cyber warfare is invoked, images of catastrophic devastation immediately come to mind. 
TV shows predicting massive power outages in the middle of winter, nuclear meltdowns and 
massive flooding from dams are not considered possibilities, but certainties. Even if we disagree 
with those assessments, we must concede that sustained attacks on critical infrastructure can have 
a large impact on people depending on those infrastructures. At the same, it is clear that such 
attacks are not happening every day. The best documented example of a nation state sponsored 
cyber attack, Stuxnet [22], did not look like these Armageddon scenarios. On the other hand, with 
the level of control they achieved, it is likely that Stuxnet's handlers could have cause more 
damage, possibly even a radioactive spill. So, the possibility exists, even if the likelihood is low. 
Risk can be defined as the expected loss of a given scenario. As such, we can calculate risk as the 
product of the probability of the scenario and the impact of the scenario. In the case of the cyber 
warfare scenario, we have an incalculably large impact and an incalculably small probability of 
occurrence. This situation is similar to terrorist threats for which risk analysis cannot fully guide 
policy makers [109]. We cannot evaluate 0x∞, so we cannot provide a numerical calculation of 
risk. In the same vein, it is impossible to quantify the amount of effort we should expend to 
defend against this risk. In that case, how do we guarantee the reliability of the power grid in this 
context? To address this question we must build a more reasonable model of what an attack on 
the critical infrastructure in the context of cyber warfare would look like. 
3.1.3 From cyber warfare to cyber conflict 
The vivid scenarios associated with cyber warfare depend on a number of strategic assumptions. 
One of those assumptions is that causing such damage would be in the strategic interest of an 
adversary. It falls within reason that a cataclysmic attack, cyber or not, on a nation's critical 
infrastructure would be considered an act of war. The consequences of such an act for the 
aggressor would ultimately be unpleasant if the victim, or its allies, have any kind of retaliatory 
capacity. At the very least, it would invite conventional war from the victim. For a nation state 
engaging in realpolitik, the benefits gained from waging such an assault should outweigh the 
eventual consequences. Unless the victim and the attacker are locked in a state of total war, it 
seems unlikely that the balance of advantages and repercussions will favor such behaviour. 
61 
 
 
The existence of Stuxnet testifies to the willingness of nation states to sponsor cyber attacks even 
when not locked in a state of total war. In fact, the decades long Cold War, where no 
conventional military engagements between the two protagonists occurred, illustrates how 
nations can operate in an adversarial mode in a conventional setting without resorting to total 
war. Conventional military forces have developed doctrine designed to address the types of 
engagement they may face that are different than total warfare. The Canadian version, described 
in Canada's Army [110] and Land Operations [111], present an entire spectrum of possible 
military involvement, be they rescuing flood victims (military operations other than war) or 
waging war (warfighting). Figure 3-1 presents the full spectrum of warfare. 
Peace Conflict War 
Military operations other than war   
Strategic military response Warfighting 
Non-combat operations   
Operational military means Combat operations 
Figure 3-1: Spectrum of warfare 
The type of military involvement is proportional to the degree of conflict in which the country is 
entangled. We could reasonably assume that a nation state would apply a similar approach to 
cyber warfare and engage in varying degrees of intensity depending on the degree of conflict. 
This brings us to evaluate scenarios less dramatic than the catastrophic cyber attacks, but more 
adapted to a world at relative peace. 
3.2 Cyber conflict model 
In the world we live in today, full scale warfare is uncommon. To build a credible attack model 
for a nation state actor, we have to build a model suitable for cyber conflicts. In this section, we 
present our contribution to the development of a cyber conflicts model: the pinprick attack. 
Section 3.2.1 presents the model for slow, gradual degradation as a valid offensive strategy. 
Section 3.2.2 test the model by analyzing how close the operation of Stuxnet was to the 
behaviour predicted by the model. Section 3.2.3 looks at current incidents to gauge how the 
situation evolved since the release of Stuxnet. 
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3.2.1 Pinprick attacks 
This section is adapted from work published [36] at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense 
Center of Excellence Conference on Cyber Conflicts (now CyCon) in June 2010, three months 
before the publication of a comprehensive analysis of Stuxnet. 
Pinprick attacks are an illustration of what can be done with low intensity cyber warfare. With 
Pinprick attacks, the trick is for the attacker to lead the defender into believing he is facing 
unconnected single instances of small attacks. This is done by staying under his correlation 
threshold. It is similar to the practice of “slow slicing” or “death by a thousand cuts” in the sense 
that you do not perform a single crippling attack, but instead a collection on non-crippling attacks 
whose effects add up to create the crippling effect. 
In our pinprick attack scenario, individual damage per incident is low. It is therefore ill suited to 
attack hardened targets built with resilience in mind such as military communications. However, 
because it is a long-haul strategy, we can perform attacks on select points which will yield good 
results. The specific targeting of ball bearing factories by U.S. bombers in World War II is an 
example of operations designed to destroy a fighting capability without actually directly targeting 
military hardware. Can such an operation be carried out in a cyber warfare context? RAND’s 
publication “Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age” [112] offers us some insight 
into how this could be done. This report presents a methodology to evaluate a nation’s power 
using more than military power as the sole criterion. In the RAND model, combat proficiency is a 
result of the combination of strategic resources and the capability to convert these resources into 
military power. The easiest example is the case of military technology. A country with rich 
resources in terms of knowledge and money (strategic resources) can transform these resources 
into military technology through its military-industrial complex (conversion capability). Because 
we are talking about a combination, affecting either the resources or the conversion capability 
will result in a decrease in military power. We could present our “death by a thousand cuts” 
scenario as gradually injecting grains of sand into a complex clockwork mechanism in order to 
make it stop, or at the very least run less efficiently. 
Defence from this scenario, in western countries, is mostly under the control of the private sector. 
For example, privately owned banks control most of the financial system, privately owned power 
companies supply the power, privately owned companies produce most of the technology and 
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hardware used by the military. The goal of these companies is to make profits. This objective is 
usually incompatible with spending money to defend against an unlikely scenario (e.g. cyber 
warfare). Increased spending for cyber security can even be detrimental to the health of a 
company. After all, if your costs are higher than those of your competition because of high 
security measures, customers will buy your competitor’s products. This breeds a vulnerability 
rich environment which drives the costs of creating an attack operation down even in the face of 
government mandated vulnerability reduction programs. Attackers have all the time they need to 
perform exhaustive searches for vulnerabilities because the attack follows a deliberately slow 
tempo. This gives a determined attacker the agility required to attack only targets of opportunity 
and to follow the path of least resistance and pick the low-hanging-fruit. In that sense, a 
vulnerability reduction program does not offer adequate protection against pinprick attacks. 
An important aspect of pinprick attacks is to keep the defender unaware that the attacks he is 
seeing are part of a coordinated strategy.  As long as he is not able to correlate the attacks, there 
is no theoretical limit to the amount of damage you can inflict. This can be explained by the fact 
that, compared with each incident in isolation, the cost of coordinated response will always be 
higher than the incident’s damage. For example, if you find a Trojan horse on a military 
contractor’s computer, you clean it and try to assess the damage.  If you find one on someone 
else’s computer next week, you will do the same. However, if you find a Trojan on the computers 
of all the military contractors, you might take more active measures to stop whatever is going on. 
So, by design, pinprick attacks are difficult to defend against by centralized data correlation 
agencies such as CERTs.  
Because pinprick attacks reside in the low intensity part of the spectrum, they are not well suited 
for what we consider warfare scenarios which require speedy conflict resolution. However, it is 
ideally suited for competition between near peers where one of the peers wants to slow down the 
progress of his other peers to catch up with them or increase its advantage.  
Let us consider the fictional scenario where the countries of Alpha and Beta are near peers. 
However, the people of Alpha possess a significant advantage in technology over Beta. This 
advantage in technology allows the military of Alpha to hold a strategic advantage over Beta’s 
military force, even if both are similar in other aspects. If Beta were to pursue a high intensity 
cyber warfare strategy, Alpha could respond by cutting its connectivity to Beta and escalating to 
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a military conflict where Alpha has the advantage. This course of events is therefore detrimental 
to Beta. However, Beta can instead decide to be patient and use pinprick attacks.  Slowly but 
methodically launching attacks to undermine the confidentiality around Alpha’s technology. Beta 
can sum the benefits of all his attacks (plans captured by a Trojan Horse, information recovered 
from a stolen USB key, communications intercepted on the wire, etc.) to catch up with Alpha in 
technology and negate Alpha’s strategic advantage. It is unlikely that Alpha would recognize that 
the various incidents are connected to a coordinated effort by Beta to negate a military advantage 
because individual incidents only cause limited damage. 
3.2.2 The case of Stuxnet 
The pinprick attack model predicts than attacks from nation states will take a slow approach to 
avoid detection and continue doing small amounts of damage over a long period of time. The 
emphasis of the operation would be on not getting identified as a coordinated attack rather than 
on the destructiveness of the attack. The damage would be focused on disrupting military means 
at the source by restraining the supply of critical resources rather than directly attacking the end 
product. Finally, the attack would take advantages of multiple attack paths, picking all of the low 
hanging fruits in turn.  
The political context in which Stuxnet occurred is a context of conflict between Iran and the 
majority of western countries over the alleged pursuit of nuclear capabilities by Iran. The conflict 
was escalating with some countries, notably Israel, starting to think about military strikes in Iran. 
In terms of spectrum of conflict, the protagonists were in the second half of the conflict region. 
This would be the area where  pinprick attacks would occur: sufficient conflict for hostile actions, 
but not enough to require high tempo operations in support of kinetic warfighting. Our expression 
of the pinprick attack model predated the discovery of Stuxnet. As such, we might consider our 
pinprick attack model to have made a prediction on the unfolding of attacks by a nation state. We 
can consider Stuxnet to be a real world experiment of our model. If Stuxnet follows the template 
for pinprick attacks, the prediction is accurate and this lends support to the validity of our model. 
Stuxnet's damage was subtle in nature. By altering the spinning speed of the centrifuges, Stuxnet 
altered the composition of the finished product of the enrichment process and made it unsuitable 
to use for military purposes. This was done in a way that is harder to detect than if the equipment 
would just cease to function, which would immediately trigger the suspicion of Iranian engineers. 
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In fact, great care was taken to cover the damage done. The inclusion of a rootkit targeting 
embedded control software is the proof that significant effort was made to make it hard for 
engineers to diagnose the problem. Detailed analysis of the state machine by Fallieres et al. [22] 
even shows that the machine can wait for days before starting its sabotage process. This is a 
deliberately slow tempo and a deliberate focus on stealth. This conforms to the pinprick attack 
model. 
The targeting of centrifuges also conforms to the pinprick attack model. The process of 
enrichment is a critical part of developing nuclear capabilities. Much like planes cannot be 
constructed without the requisite ball bearings, it is not possible to build a nuclear bomb without 
fissile material enriched to a high level. Therefore, crippling the enrichment process directly 
cripples the capacity to build an atomic bomb. In addition, Stuxnet caused the centrifuges to 
prematurely wear out. Since this type of equipment is not readily available to a country under 
international sanctions such as Iran, Stuxnet also attacked the supply of material to the 
enrichment process. 
One area where Stuxnet did not conform to the pinprick attack model is on the systematic picking 
of low-hanging-fruit. The fact that the target was not directly accessible from remote location 
may explain this discrepancy from the model. After all, there are not a large number of 
vulnerabilities available as ingress points for the cyber weapon and, once Stuxnet was firmly 
established, there was not a lot of incentives to find other vulnerabilities. In terms of attacking 
other resources required for building a nuclear capability, financial assets for example, it is very 
hard to provide credible facts proving their existence or lack thereof. Unless caught red-handed as 
was the case for Stuxnet, it is unlikely that any attack would have been publicised by either the 
perpetrator or the victim. In that light, the fact that Stuxnet did not conform to the model does not 
necessarily deter from the validity of the pinprick attack model. 
3.2.3 Raising the bar 
Once Stuxnet became public, many speculated that it would invite a number of copycat attacks 
based on its now public code triggering a sort of cyber weapon proliferation. In fact, Stuxnet's 
influence may be even more far reaching. 
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There is little doubt that a spy caught in the act of actively sabotaging a nuclear plant would 
invite serious consequence to himself and his sponsor. Depending on circumstances, it may be 
even considered an act of war. In that light, is Stuxnet an act of war? Since Iran did not declare 
war on the United States, de facto, it was not an act of war in this particular case. However, we 
can wonder about what the answer would have been if Stuxnet's sponsor had not been a 
superpower or a country protected by one. In any case, the fact that Stuxnet was not considered 
an act of war establishes a significant precedent. It could be argued that anything, up to and 
including Stuxnet, would not be considered acts of war. In consequence, in many circumstances 
it may not be appropriate to respond with force to such attacks. This constrains deterrence of 
cyber attacks. 
If force cannot be a suitable response, the obvious response would be a response in kind. This 
means another cyber attack. In fact, some argue that Shamoon is a retaliatory strike from Iran 
[29]. The technical description of the Shamoon malware [28] reveals that Shamoon is less 
focused on stealth and more focused on destructiveness. Following the spectrum model of 
conflict, this could be construed as an escalation of the conflict. Even with its destructiveness, 
Shamoon was not considered an act of aggression. This, again, raises the bar for what is 
considered acceptable behaviour. In fact, we may only know where the line is when that invisible 
line is eventually crossed. Until then, it is reasonable to assume that this kind of behaviour will 
continue. As such, we feel that protecting critical infrastructure in general, and the power grid in 
particular, from targeted attacks from state sponsored actors is relevant. 
3.3 Defensive strategy 
In the face of mounting tensions in cyber space, it is clear that advanced persistent attackers, 
including nation state sponsored attackers, have targeted the power grid and other infrastructure. 
If our goal is to defend systems against these threats, we must devise a defensive strategy to 
counter strategies focused on stealthy attacks pursued over a long period of time. This section 
presents a defensive strategy focusing on limiting the attacker's ability to communicate covertly. 
Section 3.3.1 provides an explanation for the preference of covert communication by the 
attackers. Section 3.3.2 presents a communication model that models covert communications and 
provides the basis for enhancing Warden capabilities as a defensive strategy. 
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3.3.1 The use of covert communication by advanced attackers 
The linchpin of the pinprick model is preventing escalation. Once a protagonist is intent on 
warfighting, it becomes likely that a conflict would not be restricted to the cyber realm. In the 
face of the strength of militaries and of collective defense agreements, the threat of escalation 
makes a significant deterrent for the most egregious attacks. It is doubtful anyone would think 
that causing a nuclear meltdown in the United States would not engender a significant response. 
At the same time, as seen in section 3.1.1., critical infrastructure presents an attractive target. 
As a matter of fact, a number of incidents have suggested that advanced persistent attackers have 
specifically targeted critical infrastructure. The Mandiant report [33] identifies the energy sector 
as a top target. Krebs [32] talks about the stealing of SCADA software code. Chinese hackers 
have been caught in decoy water plants [67]. We can also mention Stuxnet [22]. So, clearly, 
deterrence does not prevent sufficiently motivated attackers from targeting systems like 
aqueducts and nuclear power plants. A possible explanation for this behaviour is simply that they 
did not expect to get caught. 
As discussed in section 3.2.2, Stuxnet had a definitive emphasis on stealth. In that sense, 
significant effort was expended to avoid getting caught. Most of these efforts were targeted at the 
engineering telemetry (the malware playing back legitimate sensor values). Some effort was also 
invested in disguising the communication going to the Internet with the use of a covert 
communication channel. Presumably, this was done to prevent defenders looking at the traffic 
going to the Internet from identifying that there was malware inside. 
If attackers are investing in stealth everywhere defenders look, we can expect attackers to make 
increased use of covert communications if we enhance detection of malicious network traffic. So, 
to build our attacker model, we must have a model of covert communication. 
3.3.2 Communication model 
In order to counteract the defenders' actions, attackers wishing to maintain a persistent presence 
in a system require frequent communications with the systems they have compromised. They 
have to update their tools, exfiltrate data, examine telemetry to gauge the defenders actions and 
so on. The more communications the attacker can establish, the more power he has over 
compromised systems. On the other hand, the more communications he has, the easier it is for the 
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defender to notice something is amiss. In that sense, there is an explicit trade-off for the attacker 
between bandwidth and stealth. 
In their paper, Smith et al. [113] provide a mathematical model for the stealth/bandwidth trade-
off based on the probability of detection of the defender. The higher the proportion of injected 
symbols to natural symbols for a given message size, the higher the probability of detection. If an 
attacker is intent on maximizing his stealth, he can deliberately reduce the proportion of injected 
to natural symbols to reduce the detection rate to an arbitrary level. However, this significantly 
reduces his bandwidth, and therefore his ability to react to the defender's actions. So, forcing the 
attacker to squeeze his bandwidth may prove a viable defensive strategy against stealthy 
attackers.  
The typical model to represent this situation is Alice and Bob, two prison inmates in different 
cells, attempting to communicate escape plans in the presence of a prison warden. Figure 3-2 
illustrates this situation. 
 
Figure 3-2: Communication model 
In the case of network communication, we can model the communication between Alice and Bob 
using the Shannon representation of a channel as shown in Figure 3-3. 
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Figure 3-3: Shannon-based communication model 
In this model, the warden intercepts network traffic between Alice and Bob and attempts to 
determine if the traffic is legitimate or malicious in nature. This is similar to the role and mode of 
operation of a network-based IDS. So, let us use a NIDS as a warden model. 
If a malware signature-based NIDS, such as Snort, is used, any encoding of malicious traffic for 
which no signature rules exist will not be detected by the warden. In that sense, the attacker only 
has to find a previously unknown exploit to either carry traffic or to bypass the NIDS to be 
completely undetectable by the warden. The number of combinatorial possibilities to craft these 
exploits makes it unlikely that a signature-based NIDS rule set will have sufficient coverage to 
make this task difficult for the attacker. In that sense, a signature-based NIDS significantly limits 
the capabilities of the warden to detect new covert communication. 
An anomaly-based NIDS warden builds a statistical model of legitimate traffic and analyzes 
conversations between Alice and Bob to see if the conversations follow the statistical model 
described. If it does, the conversation is judged to be legitimate and if it does not, the 
conversation is judged to be malicious. Following that rule, a malicious conversation must 
attempt to match legitimate conversations as closely as possible in order to remain undetected. 
If the warden is an ideal warden, it will possess a complete description of the traffic. As such, 
traffic going through the channel will be required to strictly adhere to the description. This means 
that the traffic will be required to precisely follow any deterministic parts of the protocol (i.e. no 
exploits in the signaling of the protocol) and will be required to have the same entropy as 
legitimate communications. Using Shannon's theorem, the maximum quantity of information that 
should be carried on the channel is the entropy of the source. If the encoding adds entropy, for 
example with random padding, addition of timestamps or randomly generated sequence numbers, 
70 
 
 
we must also add this entropy to the entropy of the source. We obtain a channel entropy 
described by the following equation: 
                                  
According to this equation, an attacker that is operating in a network where the entropy of the 
sources is low, and the sources are using a protocol which introduces little entropy in the 
signaling, will have less bandwidth at his disposal than an attacker working in an environment 
where both of these are high. 
Real NIDS are not ideal wardens. It is very rare that the traffic is sufficiently characterized to 
have the entire description of the legitimate traffic. Typically, an anomaly-based NIDS will focus 
on a small number of statistically significant traffic features that are highly indicative of anomaly. 
For example, consider a feature recording the values of two flags which cannot be set at the same 
time. In normal traffic, the proportion of traffic that demonstrates this characteristic will be zero. 
In this case, the decision to label this traffic malicious if this feature records that both flags are set 
is easy. On the other hand, if a feature can have a wide range of expected values, the feature is 
less relevant in terms of decision making for an IDS. In that sense, the easier it is to produce 
features that are relevant to decision making, the easier it is to approach the ideal warden. 
Using this model of covert communication, we can focus on a strategy for fighting covert 
channels. In traditional study of covert channels, the complete elimination of side channels is 
eschewed in favored of limiting the amount of information that the attacker can transmit. By 
strengthening the capabilities of the warden, we can pursue the same strategy, forcing the attacker 
to trade further bandwidth for stealth. The more the attacker bandwidth is reduced, the more 
complicated it is for him to perform routine actions, such as updating his tools and increasing his 
presence in the system. So, while it will not prevent a persistent attacker from eventually 
establishing a presence in the system, it will restrict the impact of the penetration. Also, given 
sufficient constraints, it may well be that a mistake on the part of the attacker or a new 
operational requirement forcing the use of more bandwidth will allow the defender to ultimately 
detect the intrusion. 
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3.4 conclusion 
In this chapter we presented a model for the behaviour of advanced persistent threats in SCADA 
networks. By showing that there is significant incentives for targeting critical infrastructure,  we 
showed that some motivated attackers are likely to try their hand at attacking, for example, the 
power grid. The lack of spectacular cyber incidents involving critical infrastructure can partly be 
explained by the current state of international relations where there is no open state of warfare. 
This does not preclude the presence of low intensity cyber conflicts, under the threshold of full 
on cyber warfare. 
In order to understand the impacts of this state of affairs on the strategy of advanced persistent 
attackers, we created a model for a strategy focusing on a high number of small impact attacks 
called pinprick attacks. This model was presented at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense 
Center of Excellence Conference on Cyber Conflicts (now CyCon) in June 2010 as a contribution 
to the community. Under this model, the greatest constraint on attackers is the motivation to 
avoid an escalation of the conflict in the physical realm. So attackers must focus on slow 
degradations requiring long presences in the adversary's network. Because of this, these attacks 
put a premium on stealth.  
Based on the desire of the attackers for stealth, we presented our defensive strategy around 
denying that stealth. Using the propensity of attackers to express this stealth through covert 
communication, we offered the model for covert communication in the presence of a Warden as 
the intellectual basis of our defensive strategy. Then, we conclude that, by strengthening the 
Warden, we will be able to limit the bandwidth of attackers wishing to remain stealthy, 
constraining further their ability to perform routine actions such as tool maintenance and 
propagation through the network. 
In order to test the effectiveness of that strategy, we will first need to provide a framework for the 
realization of network security experiments. 
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CHAPTER 4 IMPROVING THE FIDELITY OF SCADA NETWORK 
SECURITY EXPERIMENTAL METHODS 
By analyzing advanced threat behaviour, we notice their propensity for covert communication 
and identified attacking their ability to do so as a valid defensive strategy to defend SCADA 
networks. However, because current research is not focused on this particular problem, it is not 
possible for us to use currently available research methodology to test the effectiveness of the 
strategy we propose. For the same reason a biologist requires appropriate foliage to evaluate the 
ability of a chameleon to blend in, we need a method to provide high fidelity network traffic in 
which attackers can hide. Only then will we be able to gauge our ability for finding covert 
communication in SCADA network. 
There is a lack of good data for experimentation in SCADA network security. As shown in 
section 2.4, there is a lack of public domain data sets for SCADA networks and the current 
experimental methods are not adequate to provide high fidelity network traffic. Obtaining this 
data is a necessary step in devising an experiment to test our defensive strategy focusing on 
increasing surveillance in SCADA networks. So, we must devise a new methodology to generate 
high fidelity network traffic and implement an apparatus to generate the data. The validity of our 
approach must also be tested to ensure suitability for experimentation.  
This chapter presents a novel approach combining emulation and simulation to generate high 
fidelity network data for experimentation. This work significantly advances the  ability of the 
community to perform research in SCADA network security and sections of this work were 
presented at the First International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security in 2013 [37]. 
Section 4.1 presents the ICS sandbox approach and its implementation. Section 4.2 presents 
training sessions in which the ICS sandbox was used, and which can be used as a benchmark for 
the fidelity of the emulation component in representing a real SCADA network. As further 
validation, section 4.3 reproduces a power engineering experiment using the ICS sandbox as a 
proof of concept of the hybrid emulation/simulation approach. 
4.1 The ICS sandbox 
This section is adapted from work presented at the First International Symposium for ICS & 
SCADA Cyber Security in 2013 [37]. 
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Based on our study of existing approaches, we found that physical implementation-based 
approaches are too costly, but simulations cannot fully capture the interaction between the 
physical and computer system. Emulation approaches seem to provide the correct balance 
between realism and feasibility. However, they struggle to integrate the physical aspect. Our 
approach strives to find a way to integrate the ICS physical component with existing emulation 
infrastructure in order to create an ICS sandbox. 
The goal of this ICS sandbox is to study the effects of network attacks, such as denial of service, 
falsification or injection of data, malware infection and so on, on both the network infrastructure 
of SCADA networks and on the power grid. In other words, the goal is not to find and test 
vulnerabilities in specific equipment, but rather to perform impact assessments of known attacks 
or to evaluate the effectiveness of network defences to detect or prevent these attacks. This 
distinguishes us from other works in emulation, such as Davis et al. [57], which focus on the 
behaviour of SCADA equipment and do not offer the granularity of network traffic necessary to 
perform network security research. In that sense, our approach is, as far as we know, the only 
methodology available for high risk network security experiments for SCADA systems that takes 
into account  the physical side of the problem space. 
4.1.1 Scoping 
The first step is to scope the project in order to elicit requirements. The focus of our ICS sandbox 
is on network security. In that sense, only the elements relevant to network security are required 
to be fully emulated. Our focus was to make sure the network traffic that can be observed 
resembles as closely as possible that of a real-world implementation. In addition, any system 
component directly interfacing with the network, i.e. clients and servers, needs to be as close as 
possible to real-world implementations. The requirements of any other elements in terms of 
fidelity are less severe.  
In terms of SCADA systems, we require the actual network to have the highest degree of fidelity, 
MTU and RTU machines to have a good level of fidelity and the HMI, PLCs and the actual 
physical system require less fidelity. In fact, for all intents and purposes, the physical system can 
be considered a black box where the inputs are values of control points (ON/OFF values for 
breakers and voltage or current values for set point controls). To achieve this, we chose an 
architecture such that in the core, where fidelity requirements are high, an emulation approach 
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similar to DETER [59] is used and in the edge, where less fidelity is required, a simulation 
approach similar to PowerWorld [57] is employed. 
4.1.2 Implementation 
For the core of the network, we require a suitable platform for emulation where we can run actual 
SCADA software and perform real-world attacks. We decided to adapt the test bed for high risk 
security experimentation and training proposed by Calvet et al. [61].  
 
Figure 4-1: ICS Sandbox architecture 
Our infrastructure employs a number of IBM Blade servers running VMware software for 
virtualization.  A management network allows the deployment of experimental configurations 
(deployment of machines, starting/stopping the VMs, setting IP addresses, etc.) through the 
xCAT scripting language as described in Calvet et al. [61].  Figure 4.1 shows the architecture of 
the ICS sandbox.  The entire SCADA system is emulated on virtual machines running on the 
SecSI cluster. The SCADA system is then connected through TCP requests to the electrical 
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power flow simulator. Each section of the infrastructure will be covered in detail in the following 
paragraphs. 
The experiment network itself is a physical Ethernet network. Other network technologies could 
eventually be used to experiment with other types of interconnection technologies. Managed 
switches are currently used because the network topologies are simple, but virtual switches that 
could be configured programmatically by xCAT could be used. Port mirroring is used to capture 
and observe the network traffic so great care has to be applied in making sure experimental traffic 
makes it onto the network devices. Concretely, this means that communication between multiple 
virtual machines on the same server should not be implemented using the virtual networking 
provided by VMware unless this was specifically designed in the experiment plan. 
Running on this physical infrastructure is SCADA software designed to control an electrical grid. 
For this purpose, we used a commercial SCADA product obtained through special research 
funding.  The MTU and historian were hosted on a Red-Hat Enterprise Linux machine running 
the DNP3 version of the GENe SCADA software from General Electric [114]. The DNP3 
version was chosen because of the popularity of this communication protocol for electrical grid 
ICS. The physical server provided by the software vendor was backed up and restored on a 
virtual machine. This impacted its performance, but it provided the ability to make snapshots of 
the machine for quick restoration. This trade-off proved critical for fast re-initialization of the 
experimental setup in a training setting and for saving development time.  
The second piece of commercial software is the RTU emulator. The RTU Load Simulator (RLS) 
is special-purpose RTU software designed to perform load simulation for acceptance testing of 
GENe software. The RLS software is run on a virtualized Windows XP machine. Because each 
RLS typically represents an electrical substation, the RLS VM is cloned multiple times to achieve 
the desired scale. With the RLS machines (playing the role of RTUs) and the MTU machine, we 
have a fully functioning commercial grade implementation of a SCADA network. We can also 
add additional machines, such as operator workstations to enrich the network model. This 
implementation generates high fidelity traffic on the network. The implementation also responds 
exactly as a real system to cyber attacks. However, we have to address the physical component 
feedback. Because we consider the physical component to be a black box, we need to provide the 
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inputs from the SCADA system (i.e. the values of the command points) and integrate the outputs 
(i.e. the value of the measurement points). 
The RLS behaves exactly like a GE RTU in terms of network communications, but does not 
interface with actual PLCs. Instead, each RLS has a database residing in RAM with values for 
each PLC. A command-line interface (CLI) was built by Rosset [115] to interact 
programmatically with the values. This was achieved by injecting a DLL into the RLS program 
memory to be able to read and modify values directly in RAM.  A scheduled task on the RLS 
machine runs a script periodically to extract the values of the control points (through the CLI get 
method), and feed them to the power flow simulator and retrieve the results. The results are then 
fed back to the RTU emulator through the CLI set method. The frequency of execution of this 
script depends on the polling rate of the MTU and the convergence time of the electrical network 
simulator. The script needs to run faster than the polling to present accurate measurement point 
values, but must allow enough time for the simulator to converge. 
Because of the bulkiness of physical equipment and because our scope does not require detailed 
granular fidelity of the electrical side, we chose not to emulate physical equipment. However, we 
still need a system that could provide us with the physical feedback a real system would present. 
We chose to use a power flow simulation to provide us with the physical feedback. The simulator 
requires a global knowledge of the state of the system. As such, it was more convenient to run a 
centralized simulation rather than a distributed one. In order to collect information about the state 
of the system and to update the local state of the RTUs, TCP requests are used. To enable this 
functionality, our architecture assumes a TCP server is running on the simulation server. Should 
this not be the case, one has to be built. 
The experiment network is designed to connect to the electrical power flow simulator. This 
simulator may be hosted in the cluster for high threat experiments or  hosted on a separate 
computing cluster. Should the power simulator be hosted on a remote network, a firewall would 
separate the experiment network from the power flow computing cluster for a number of reasons. 
The first reason is to prevent any traffic from the computing cluster to interfere with the 
experiment. At the same time, we do not want malicious software used in our experiments to 
contaminate the computing cluster. Thus, the firewall prevents all traffic from getting in and only 
allows the correct TPC requests to the simulation servers to get through. In both cases, soundness 
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of network captures is impacted by the communication with the electrical simulator because the 
out-of-band communication (TCP requests going to the simulator) use the experiment network. 
However, this can be addressed by filtering out this specific traffic either at the capture or post-
hoc in the PCAP files.  
When choosing a power simulator to integrate, we have to be conscious of the requirements of 
the experiment as the physical component will impact the degree of fidelity of the physical 
results, but also of the network traffic. For example, a very fine grained simulator that 
incorporates interference and noise in the power will produce measurements that vary more often 
than if a simple steady-state power simulator is used. In turn, this will trigger the SCADA system 
to report more updates, changing the traffic profile. Of course, the fidelity of the physical 
component is even more important for experiments that focus on impacts of cyber attacks on the 
physical side. For example, an experiment aiming to test the effectiveness of certain physical 
attacks in causing a spike in voltage that would burn out a specific piece of equipment, a 
reproduction of the AURORA experiment [26]  for example, would require a very detailed model 
of transient effects in the power grid in real time, a firm model of physical protection 
mechanisms, an implementation of automated power grid operation and so on. A less detailed 
impact analysis, focusing on macro effects, might make due with a steady-state power flow 
simulator where end state values accurately reflect reality, but transient values, which have no 
lasting effect on power delivery unless they cause failures, are ignored.  
There is an explicit trade-off for the electrical simulator between the complexity of the model and 
the granularity of the results. A more complex model will provide better granularity of results, for 
example a complex model might more accurately model transient effects. However, the 
complexity of the model might hinder scalability. For example, providing a real-time 
representation of transient effects might require a very detailed model of all the physical 
equipment used in the electric grid. The modeling effort involved in standing up an experiment in 
the scale of the entire grid is intensive. Additionally, the computing power required to provide 
results with this many components cannot be ignored. So, while the fidelity of results is impacted 
both on the physical side and on the network side, if sacrifices are made on the electrical 
simulator, the loss of fidelity may be acceptable when weighed in against gains in experiment 
setup time and computing power required. 
78 
 
 
To allow for the selection of a simulator of the appropriate type for each experiment, a modular 
approach was taken. Both the electrical simulator and the SCADA software were considered 
black boxes connected through a shim layer that runs a basic update logic. Using "set" and "get" 
methods in interfaces designed specifically for the software used, the update script makes sure 
that the values on both the SCADA side and the physical side are consistent with each other. This 
guarantees that any "set" (operate) request coming from the network over DNP3.0 is propagated 
to the electrical simulator and any "get" (read) request provides the most up to date data on the 
state of the network. This modular design enables the electrical simulator to be changed without 
changing the experimental design. Figure 4-2 illustrates the interaction between the SCADA 
module, the update script and the simulator module. In that figure, the SCADA black box 
represents proprietary components we acquired. Similarly, the electrical simulator portion ideally 
leverages existing technology. The update script, the interface with the simulator and the 
interface to the proprietary software each had to be built. More details about the implementations 
can be found in Rosset [115] for the RLSinjector interface and in section 4.3.3 for an example of 
an interface with the simulator. 
 
Figure 4-2: Black box design of simulator and SCADA modules 
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This black box design also makes it easier to change the simulator if another power flow 
simulator is used instead or if a different physical system is modelled.  For example, if we wanted 
to model an oil and gas pipeline SCADA system instead of the electric grid, we could exchange 
the physical system black box.  
4.2 Validation with the ICS sandbox SCADA emulation component 
Because the ICS  sandbox represents a novel approach for experimentation in cyber-physical 
systems, we must provide support for the validity of the approach. The easiest way to do so 
would be to reproduce results obtained on a physical deployment, but there is no such results in 
the public domain. So, in order to provide support for our approach, validation experiments are 
performed for each component, except for the emulated SCADA software, which is actual 
software used in production systems, and the electrical simulator, which is validated by the 
appropriate power engineering community. This section focuses on the validity of the emulation 
component and its ability to accurately represent an actual SCADA deployment.  
The ICS sandbox had an opportunity to prove itself in training offered to industry practitioners. 
Due to logistical constraints of moving equipment to the training venue, it was not possible to 
move or remotely access the electrical simulator. However, the acknowledgement of usefulness 
of the emulation part of our approach from operators of real SCADA networks can provide some 
validation of significant parts of our work.  
4.2.1 Description of the training 
The training was organized by Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) which is the designated lead 
for energy infrastructure protection, including cyber threats. The training took place at the 
National Energy Infrastructure Test Centre (NEITC) located in Ottawa. The ICS sandbox was 
moved to that location for the duration of the training. A previous 1-day demonstration training 
on the ICS sandbox had been made to industry leaders in order to get their feedback on the type 
of training session that would be most valuable to their staff. The topic of incident handling in an 
ICS environment was identified as being the most important  topic to cover. Consequently, 
introductory training on cyber incident handling in an ICS environment with a focus on hands-on 
interaction was prepared and delivered. 
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The training was conducted for 28 industry practitioners. The level of skill varied. Trainees 
included system administrators, SCADA system engineers, security experts, security policy 
practitioners, security managers, compliance consultants and penetration testers. All were 
working in industry, either for energy providers or for consulting firms working with them. The 
length of training was two and a half days.  The ICS sandbox was used in four 90-min tracks and 
in a 3-hour training exercise on the last day. For the purpose of the training, additional machines 
representing corporate infrastructure were added to the ICS sandbox. The network infrastructure 
is presented in Figure 4-3. 
 
Figure 4-3: Training network infrastructure 
The training configuration consisted of the ICS sandbox with one MTU and 4 RTUs connected to 
4 PLCs each. We also had two “dual-homed” operator workstations (with one network card on 
the office network and another on the SCADA network) configured as HMI stations and four 
corporate Windows XP user workstations. Three servers provided enterprise services including 
mail, Domain Name Service (DNS) and security monitoring (Snort IDS). A small representation 
of the Internet containing one web server, one hacker workstation (Backtrack 5 R3) and a Web 
server for malware command and control was also included. A single OpenBSD machine was 
doing the role of router and firewall. A managed switch with VLAN support provided the layer 2 
connectivity. All the machines were virtualized for easy restoration. The MTU and IDS were 
each running on a dedicated server and everything else was run on 3 desktop PCs with multiple 
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network cards. A dedicated control network to access VMware applications on each machine is 
not shown in the figure. The power flow simulator could not be physically moved and was not 
integrated in the training scenario. 
The first track was a demonstration of how a persistent attacker would infect a machine in the 
office network then pivot and worm his way to the SCADA network through dual-homed 
machines. The second track was a demonstration of network components and counter-measures 
used in ICS, such as, looking at IDS and firewall logs and performing containment with the 
firewall. The third and fourth track were training on Wireshark and Sysinternal tools where a 
copy of one of the workstations was attacked by a drive-by download (automatically generated 
by the Social Engineering Toolkit (SET) Metasploit plug-in available on Backtrack) and 
numerous post exploitation actions were taken. The traffic from this attack was recorded and 
provided on the virtual image distributed to the students. The last-day exercise required the 
students to perform the full PICERL (Preparation, Identification, Containment, Eradication, 
Recovery, and Lessons Learned) incident response steps on the network shown in Figure 4-3. In 
the exercise scenario, we unleashed a custom-made program than emulated a worm. The initial 
infection was via USB key and the worm then connected to the external Internet command and 
control server and propagated over the network by brute forcing weak Windows share passwords.   
4.2.2 Evaluation and lessons learned  
Trainees were asked by the NEITC to fill out a questionnaire to help guide future training. In 
particular, they were asked to rate the course and the various sessions. They could give a grade of 
"adequate", "good" or "very good". Overall, the training was highly rated with 45% "very good", 
55% "good", and 0% "adequate". In addition, all participants unanimously responded that they 
would recommend this course to a colleague.   
Of the four sessions using the ICS Sandbox, two of them were very highly rated by the trainees.  
The SysInternals training track received 56% "very good" ratings and 33% of "good" ratings, the 
APT demo track got 40% "very good" and 50% "good".  Participants were also asked which 
session they enjoyed the most. The most popular ICS-related session was the advanced persistent 
threat demo session (20%), followed by SysInternals tool workshop (16%) and the Wireshark 
workshop (13%).  The sessions with the least amount of hands-on training finished last. This data 
seems to suggest that the ICS sandbox provided value to the trainees. It seems clear that the 
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students preferred hands-on exercise to lectures.  The use of the ICS sandbox to generate 
materials for the exercise helped frame the hands-on in the context of industry practitioners 
Additional conclusions can be taken from the observation of the trainees. During the hands-on 
sessions, a small majority of the students seemed to have good working knowledge of the tools 
covered in the hands-on sessions, but were interested in the exercise nonetheless, because they 
did not know that their knowledge of the tool could be relevant in the context of incidence 
response in ICS. For example, they knew Wireshark can be used to examine network traffic, but 
they did not know what traffic related to an incident would look like. They were able to observe 
artifacts of real attacks, something they cannot normally do on their production network. Trainees 
also learned when it was appropriate and effective to use the tools. This proved more relevant 
than how to use the tools for many students with prior knowledge. From this perspective, the 
ability of the ICS sandbox to perform and observe real attacks and provide before/after pictures 
of infected systems, probably proved to be a key factor in achieving the high satisfaction results 
we observed across a wide range of attendee skill level. 
4.3 Validation of the ICS sandbox simulation/emulation approach 
Because the ICS  sandbox represents a novel approach for experimentation in cyber-physical 
systems, we must provide support for the validity of the approach. The easiest way to do so 
would be to reproduce results obtained on a physical deployment, but there is no such results in 
the public domain. So, in order to provide support for our approach, validation experiments are 
performed for each component, except for the emulated SCADA software, which is actual 
software used in production system, and the electrical simulator, which is validated by the 
appropriate power engineering community. This section focuses on the validity of the hybrid 
simulation/emulation approach and its ability to be used in experimental research.  
The ICS sandbox was used for training, but the training was not using an electrical simulator nor 
was it required to provide experimental results.  As such, a second experiment, designed as a 
proof of concept for the hybrid emulation/simulation approach was realized. This section 
describes an experiment using the ICS sandbox to control the electrical network. First, the 
network that is the object of the experiment is presented, then the original experiment is 
reviewed. We continue with an explanation of how the ICS sandbox was configured for the 
experiment and we finish by presenting the results. 
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4.3.1 IEEE reliability test system 
One of the main research thrusts in power systems engineering is increasing the reliability of 
power systems. However, there was no standard way of testing reliability schemes. So, in 1979, 
the IEEE Reliability Test System Task Force of the Application of Probability Methods 
Subcommittee presented a system that would address this lack: the IEEE reliability test system 
[116]. This system includes a load model, a generation system and a transmission network. 
Figure 4-4 presents the network. In other words the model includes the production network, the 
transmission network and the distribution network. The system is expressly designed to provide a 
variety of case scenarios, illustrating a range of production sources and a range of load types. 
Each of the production sources have different parameters in terms of capacity and production 
costs and each of the loads has a different load profile. The IEEE Reliability Test Task Force 
updated these values to reflect more recent profiles in 1999 [117].   
 
Figure 4-4: IEEE reliability test system network (reproduced from [116] © 1979 IEEE) 
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As illustrated in Figure 4-4, the network is comprised branches and buses. Each branch is an edge 
in the network and each bus is a node. So, the branches connect buses with each other and are 
denoted by the buses they are connected to. For example, the branch in the lower left corner of 
the figure, between Bus 1 and Bus 3, is called Branch 1-3. In the physical world, the branches 
would be power lines. Because power lines sometimes run in parallel, the reliability test network 
specifies, using circles and letters such as the circle A encircling branch 17-22 and branch 21-22, 
the power lines that are collocated and that will fail simultaneously. 
If the branches are the power lines, the buses are the conductors in substations on which all 
production and distribution networks tap to provide or take power. Figure 4-5 provides a 
simplified illustration of a distribution bus. 
 
Figure 4-5: Simplified distribution bus 
Power coming from the transmission network is put on a high voltage bus. A transformer then 
transforms the voltage to a low voltage level. The power then goes on a low voltage bus where 
distribution lines redistribute it to clients. . In that sense, all the loads form a parallel circuit. 
Alternatively, in the case of switching nodes, the power is instead transferred to another section 
of the transmission network Production buses follow a similar architecture. The buses in the 
reliability test system function in that way. Each bus acts as a node where power can be 
transferred from one edge to the next and where loads, identified by ground symbols in the 
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figure, may consume power and sources, identified by round symbols with a sine wave in figure 
4-4, can add power to the system. 
The test system is divided into two zones. A 138kV zone and a 230kV zone. The two groups of 
buses, bus 3-24 and bus 9 to 12 groups, isolate each zone from the other. Each of these groups 
represent buses and branches that would be collocated in a substation. 
Optimized power flow problem 
The test system network description only lists the parameters of each piece of equipment. If we 
want to determine how power flows through the network, and what values the current and 
voltages phasors can be take on each element, we have to solve the power flow problem. 
The power flow problem is defined as a numerical analysis tool aimed at analyzing the values in 
steady state of the forms of power, for example voltage, voltage angle, current, current angle, real 
power and reactive power. This analysis is typically done on line diagrams such as the diagram of 
the IEEE reliability test system in figure 4-4. In other words, starting from the one-line diagram, 
the power flow analysis attempts to find the power, voltage and current for all pieces of 
equipment. Table 4-1 illustrates the kinds of results that can be obtained from a power flow 
calculation. 
Table 4-1: Power flow calculation example 
Branch From To From Bus Injection To Bus Injection Loss (I^2 * Z) 
# Bus Bus P (MW) Q (MVAr) P (MW) 
Q 
(MVAr) 
P 
(MW) 
Q 
(MVAr) 
0 1 2 11.94 -26.92 -11.94 -22.45 0.004 0.02 
1 1 3 -7.97 21.57 8.31 -26.11 0.342 1.32 
2 1 5 60.03 4.83 -59.29 -4.37 0.741 2.87 
3 2 4 38.44 19.15 -37.85 -20.43 0.587 2.27 
4 2 6 48.5 -1.04 -47.41 -0.19 1.093 4.22 
5 3 9 22.9 -17.01 -22.66 14.75 0.24 0.93 
6 3 24 -211.21 6.12 212.32 34.48 1.113 40.6 
7 4 9 -36.15 5.43 36.52 -6.83 0.364 1.41 
8 5 10 -11.71 -9.63 11.76 7.3 0.046 0.18 
9 6 10 -88.59 -130.31 89.66 -121.12 1.067 4.64 
10 7 8 115 26.84 -112.88 -20.35 2.118 8.18 
… … … … … … … … … 
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Additional information, such as the power distribution in buses and the voltage and current for 
branches is also available. This is considered the base case for power flow analysis. 
To solve this base case, the numerical solution must follow a certain number of constraints. In his 
book section [118], Bacher presents a summary of the constraints needed to build a mathematical 
model for the simulation. Essentially, the following physical constraints must be met : 
 Energy conservation in passive power elements 
 Kirchoff's law of currents (the sum of all currents in a node must be equal to zero) 
 Ohm's law (power-voltage-current relationship) for all elements 
These constraints ensure that all power generated by the source eventually makes its way to 
ground through a load. The constraints also ensure that the current and voltage values in 
intermediary elements represent the physical behaviour of the electric grid. Additional constraints 
based on physically enforced operating tolerances for the equipment may also be enforced. for 
example a line may not exceed its base operating voltage by more than 5%. If it does, it will 
trigger a physical protection mechanism that will shut down the line. So, while transient effects 
may trigger open lines, it is impossible to observe these values in steady state. Thus, we must 
create constraints to prevent these values from appearing in the solution space. 
For the majority of systems, there is more than one solution that meets all the constraints. For 
example, in the updated IEEE reliability test system, there is about 20% excess generation 
capacity compared to the total load. This means that there is a number of generation 
configuration that can meet demand. In order to satisfy the power current relationship, the loads, 
defined as power consumption, must induce a specific amount of current. In order to satisfy 
Kirchoff's law of currents, some sources must be turned off. The base case power flow analysis 
does not discriminate between the solutions  and returns a numerical solution that fits the 
constraints. The optimal power flow analysis finds the solution which meets the constraints at the 
lowest cost. The costs are calculated based on parameters provided by the operator. For example, 
in the case of the IEEE reliability test system, the costs is calculated from generation parameters 
attributing to each source a cost per unit of power produced based on the type of power plant it 
emulates. 
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4.3.2 Terrorist threat experiment 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks spurred a large volume of research in defending against terrorist attacks. 
In particular, the defense of the electric grid was identified as a point of vulnerability. In 2004, 
Salmeron et al. [119] analyzed the resiliency of the electric grid to terrorist attacks. 
The goal of their paper was to identify critical components of the electric grid by evaluating how 
terrorists could maximize their damage with a given set of resources. In their words, they strive to 
identify critical sets of a power grid's components [...] by identifying maximally disruptive, 
coordinated (nearly simultaneous) attacks [...] which a terrorist group might undertake [119]. 
Because they are uncertain of what kind of resources a terrorist group might possess, they 
consider a range of capabilities. However, they only consider physical destruction and assume 
that it is impossible for the group to perform cyber attacks on the SCADA system. 
To perform their study, Salmeron et al. use the 1996 IEEE reliability test system, the test system 
with the revised values presented in section 4.3.1. Using the reliability test system parameters, 
they construct a direct current optimal power flow model (an approximation of the actual optimal 
power flow model) DC-OPF. This model contains the usual constraints, but adds constraints to be 
able to shed load if there is not enough power generation resources available, notably that load 
shedding Sic cannot exceed demand. Then, they create disruption by removing interdicted 
components based on terrorist capabilities. For example, if a terrorist would blow up a pylon, all 
lines attached to it would be turned off. Once these components are removed, a new DC-OPF is 
calculated. A new function, I-DC-OPF, maximizes the impact of the interdiction on the power 
flow of the system. The interdicted components of the solution of I-DC-OPF form the terrorist 
interdiction plan. 
Among their findings, Salmeron and al. identify two interdiction plans for the single IEEE 
reliability test system. These "near-best" plans, are reproduced in Figure 4-6. In the first plan, the 
main substation, interconnecting buses 9, 10, 11 and 12 is destroyed and a number of lines (both 
lines of branch 15-21, branch 16-17 and both lines of branch 20-23) are cut. In the second plan, 
only lines are cut (branch 7-8, branch 11-13, branch 12-13, branch 12-23, both lines of branch 
15-21, branch 16-17 and both lines of branch 20-23). Of these two plans, plan 2 sheds slightly 
more load (1373 MW compared to 1258 MW), but plan 1 is identified as being the most severe. 
This analysis is based on the destruction of the substation in plan 1 which is dubbed more 
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difficult to repair than the line cuts in plan 2. The reasoning is that the cost in the entirety of the 
outage, measured in MW∙h, will be much higher if the impact in power is similar, but the time to 
repair is orders of magnitude larger.  
 
Figure 4-6: Near-best interdiction plans proposed by Salmeron et al. (reproduced from [119] © 
2004 IEEE) 
4.3.3 Adapting the ICS sandbox 
In their paper, Salmeron et al. have produced a consequence-based analysis of the impact of 
physical terrorism. They assumed cyber attacks would not be possible. However, if we could 
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replicate their physical attacks using cyber components we could perform similar impact 
assessments for cyber attacks. In order to do so, we must configure the ICS sandbox to fit with 
Salmeron et al.'s experiment. 
Electrical simulator 
The is a requirement to find an electrical simulator that can perform power flow calculations and 
can fit in our black box model. We can either solve the base case of the power flow analysis or 
opt for optimal power flow. There are advantages and drawbacks for each, so we must  carefully 
weigh  the options. If we solve the base case, we do not have any control over the numerical 
solution used. While the solver is likely to always produce the same solution for identical 
network states because the model is not probabilistic, the solution may be one of many. There is 
no guarantee that a utility operator would select that particular solution instead of one of the 
others. In fact, some solutions might actively be avoided by utility operators because of their cost. 
On the other hand, that same fact represents one of the advantages of using the base case. The 
lack of evaluation of the fitness of solutions does not make any assumptions about the behaviour 
of the utility operator and about the information at his disposal. The reverse is true for optimal 
power flow. Any rational utility operator would operate his network in order to minimize 
production costs. So, if an operator has a power generation discipline, it is highly likely that he 
will produce generation choices similar to the results of the optimal power flow calculations. In 
fact, many automated power generation algorithms use optimal power flow calculations to 
regulate power. Unfortunately, to use this discipline, we have to assume that the utility operator 
possesses all the knowledge required to perform this calculation. Notably, a good estimation of 
the state of the network and of the load is required. This is unlikely to happen if the attacker is 
willing to falsify the data returned by the SCADA network used in those calculations. 
 If the scope of the experiment is to reproduce the attacks from Salmeron and al., the attackers are 
only interested in shutting down the system to maximize interdiction. They only require the 
capability of shutting down the system using SCADA commands. This capability requirement is 
much less severe than the ability to send arbitrary grid state evaluation to the grid operator. 
Ultimately, as shown in Chapter 3, this is not the scenario an advanced attacker is likely to 
attempt, but its study would still have merit to model the effect of a destructive attack like 
Shamoon. In this kind of scenario, the production network operator is likely to have a good state 
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evaluation and continue to apply his discipline. Another particularity of the interdiction scenarios 
presented is that they only affect portions of the transport network: a substation and lines. As 
presented in section 2.1.3, the production network, distribution network and transport network are 
often controlled independently, as islands. By focusing our attention on the transport network 
SCADA system, we can assume that an attacker, even if he fully infiltrated the transport network, 
requires a different attack to compromise the production network's control system. In that case, 
the production network could still function optimally with no restraints to the attacker's 
capabilities. For these reasons, we should use an optimal power flow solver. 
PyPower [120] is a Python port of MATPOWER, a Matlab power simulation package. This 
simulation package is able to solve power flow and optimal power flow problems. It is also 
possible to describe line diagrams of electrical networks in matrix forms. It can also take into 
account costs for optimal power flow calculations. In addition, PyPower has a native description 
of the 1996 IEEE reliability test system case. The convergence time is relatively fast, in the order 
of seconds, which is fast enough for our update script. In addition, optimal power flow 
calculations provide an estimation of the generation costs based on the 1996 IEEE data. On the 
downside, the optimal power flow calculator strictly enforces constraints and load shedding is not 
allowed. This means that, under severe disruption, the solver may not converge on a solution that 
satisfies all the constraints. In that case, the solver will produce a solution that follows the three 
basic physical constraints (conservation of energy, Kirchoff's law of currents and Ohm's law), but 
may violate operating constraints for equipment.  
PyPower does not have a native network interface. However, because it is based on Python, we 
can create our own. We build a multithread TCP server that will be able to serve all the RLS at 
the same time if required. The server receives a communication from a RLS that contains the 
values of the control points and the name of the RTU. Once the message is received, the server 
looks in a correspondence table that matches the name of the RTU and the values received with 
pieces of equipment in the IEEE reliability test system description. The state of the test system is 
updated with the values of the control points. For example, if the breaker for the branch 15-17 is 
opened, the status value of the branch 15-17 line is set to zero. The PyPower simulation preserves 
the state of the system to make it available to all RTUs, then runs the optimized power flow 
calculation to calculate the measurement points and the generation cost for the computation. The 
results of the computation, the time of the simulation and the generation cost are stored locally. 
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Then, the server, based on a correspondence table, reads the power flow results and sends the 
value of the measurement points via the TCP response. The architecture is summarized in figure 
4-7. 
 
Figure 4-7: Black box architecture using PyPower as power simulation 
SCADA network 
The SCADA network needs to be customized to fit the IEEE reliability test case. In particular, we 
need to implement a SCADA control scheme that will enable us to replicate the interdiction 
scenario. 
There is no public domain documentation of to the extent to which operators integrate SCADA to 
their operations. The IEEE reliability test system is not an exception to this rule. So, in order to 
limit the experience setup time, we will limit the amount of control to the minimum required to 
replicate the scenario. Adding additional RTUs or control points is possible, but requires manual 
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configuration of the SCADA software which is time consuming. So, we will opt for a 
configuration with four RTUs : one RTU as the  bus 9 to 12 substation, one RTU on bus 20, one 
RTU on bus 17 and one RTU on bus 15. The substation RTU controls the lines connected to the 
transformers. The RTUs on the various buses control the lines connected to that bus. In that 
sense, the bus RTUs represent the transport network side of a transmission to distribution 
substation. In addition to controlling lines, each RTU reports the voltage value for each bus in its 
area. 
In terms of control points, each RTU has one 1 bit digital control point for each branch. For 
example, the bus 17 RTU has the following control points : 
 BRANCH-16-17 
 BRANCH-17-18 
 BRANCH-17-22 
Each control point has a default value of ATP_CLOSE, meaning that the breakers are closed, and 
current is allowed to go through, by default. Should the value change to ATP_OPEN, the status 
of the line has to be changed to 0. This is done by the PyPower server by changing the value of 
the power flow data structure. The power flow data structure that holds the IEEE reliability test 
system includes the "branch" array that is an array of branch type structures. The eleventh value 
of the branch type is status which is a binary value.  Should that binary value be changed to 0, the 
branch is removed from the line diagram. 
In terms of measurement points, each RTU has one Analog point for each bus. The analog point 
records the value of the amplitude of the voltage of the bus. For example the bus 17 RTU has the 
following measurement point : 
 BUS_17 
This measurement point cannot be used to perform control and only records the value obtained 
from the electrical simulator. Once the PyPower server finishes calculating the optimal power 
flow, the voltage amplitude can be accessed from the "bus" array of the power flow data 
structure. The eighth value of the bus structure is the amplitude of the voltage as a fraction of the 
base voltage. The tenth value is the base voltage of the bus. The actual voltage value can be 
obtained by multiplying these two values. 
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Once all RTUs are configured, we can now control the transport side of the IEEE reliability test 
system and receive feedback and report the state of the electrical network centrally. 
4.3.4 Reproducing the scenario 
With the ICS sandbox configured to match the IEEE reliability test system, we only have to 
operate the SCADA controls to affect the state of the test system. The effects of the scenario from 
Salmerin et al. can now be reproduced with cyber attacks. 
Unfortunately, while the effects can be reproduced, it is not possible with the current simulator to 
reproduce the results. Salmeron et al. report the results of their maximally disruptive attacks in 
terms of amount of load shed. As we have seen in section 4.3.3, the PyPower simulator does not 
allow load shedding. However, we can track the generation costs in real time and estimate the 
damage of the attacks in terms of increased generation cost. Because the damage is tracked in real 
time, we can also see the effect of each interdiction as it happens, allowing us to evaluate the 
impact of each interdiction separately. It would also be possible to perform all the interdictions at 
the same time. It was deemed preferable to allow for a delay between each interdiction to see the 
individual effects. This delay, however long in the scale of cyber attack, is negligible compared 
to the ability of even the best terrorists to coordinate physical attacks. 
In theory, the order of the interdiction influences the individual effect of an interdiction. For 
example, a break in a line might have little effect if the grid is in a relatively stable state. 
However, that same break might have disastrous consequences if the grid is already overloaded 
from previous failures. In practice, because the impact of individual interdictions in this 
experiment is only provided in a proof of concept framework, the validity of those impact has 
little bearing on the results. So, we adopt the following arbitrary ordering of interdictions: 
1. Interdiction of the transformer in substation 9 to 12 
2. Interdiction of both lines from branch 15-21 
3. Interdiction of the line from branch 16-17 
4. Interdiction of both lines from branch 20-23 
The generation cost of the optimal power flow in the face of these interdictions is presented in 
Figure 4-8. 
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Figure 4-8: Impact of the interdictions from scenario 1 on generation cost 
The effects of the loss of the transformer at around 75s can be clearly seen, imposing a 30 000$ 
burden on generation costs. The loss of the 15-21 branches around 150 has a smaller impact of 
around 3 000$ and further losses of branch 16-17 and branches 20-23 also produce impacts of 
similar magnitudes. Apart from the transients around the times of the interdictions due to the 
multithreaded nature of the server which may cause race conditions in the state of the system, the 
generation cost graph follows a strictly increasing cost curve as we would expect from mounting 
damages in the wake of a terrorist attack. This suggests that, should we use a simulator with the 
capacity to shed loads, it would be possible to reproduce Salmeron and al.'s experiment.  
This proof of concept experiment showed that the emulation/simulation approach can be used to 
produce experimental results. Should additional research from power engineers provide us with a 
simulator with the required capabilities or with a model for the case study where load shedding 
priorities were determined, sound results could be achieved with limited modifications to the 
$0 
$20,000 
$40,000 
$60,000 
$80,000 
$100,000 
$120,000 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 
G
e
n
e
ra
ti
o
n
 c
o
st
s 
($
) 
Elapsed time (s) 
95 
 
 
implementation. This lends credence to the claim that the ICS sandbox hybrid 
emulation/simulation can be used to perform cyber security experimentation. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have seen the ICS sandbox approach. This approach combines emulation of 
cyber components, to provide high fidelity network traffic, and simulation of the electrical 
components, to provide suitable feedback for the SCADA system at a reasonable cost and 
scalability. This enables us to generate network traffic that resembles the traffic of real SCADA 
networks at scale. This contrasts with current state of the art in experimental SCADA research 
where the focus is not put on high fidelity network traffic, the experimental network is not 
scalable or the cost of standing up an experiment is too high for most academic institutions. As 
such, the ICS sandbox approach represents a significant contribution to the community. 
In order to lend credence to results obtained from the ICS sandbox, efforts were invested to 
validate the ICS sandbox. Because no publicly available data sets could be used to calibrate the 
sandbox and produce a validation experiment, each component was validated individually. The 
validity of the emulated SCADA software was not evaluated because actual production level 
SCADA software was used in the experiment. The traffic produced by these elements is the same 
as the traffic produced in a real SCADA network. Similarly, the electrical simulation was not 
evaluated because subject matter experts in power engineering can provide the validation for 
whatever electrical simulator and electrical model are selected for experimentation. So, validation 
efforts were focused on validating the design of the emulation approach to SCADA network 
components and on the interaction of emulation and simulation. 
To test the ability of the emulated SCADA components, training sessions were conducted for 
members of industry. This training used the emulation component of the SCADA sandbox as a 
basis for the hands-on part of the training. Overall, the attendees were satisfied with the training 
in general but showed an even greater appreciation for courses with hands-on training on the ICS 
sandbox. Comments by users mentioned the ability to easily translate the hands-on training 
received into their own operational context and illustrate how the ICS sandbox successfully 
recreated an environment with which they were familiar, which is to say a production SCADA 
system. 
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For testing the emulation/simulation approach, the reproduction of a simulation only experiment 
conducted by power engineers in the ICS sandbox was performed. Using SCADA as a control 
element, the optimal interdiction scenarios proposed by Salmeron and al. were realized and the 
evolution of the production cost was recorded. While the actual values cannot be presented as 
results due to constraints in the power simulation software used, the ability to faithfully recreate 
the scenario in the ICS sandbox acts as a proof of concept of the emulation/simulation approach.  
Using the novel approach of the ICS sandbox, it is now possible to generate high fidelity network 
traffic for SCADA security experimentation. For example, using a simulator that integrated a 
load shedding model, we could evaluate the impact of cyber terrorists in terms of energy 
production costs using the same framework we have used for creating our proof of concept. We 
can also focus purely on network security and perform experimentation leveraging the high 
fidelity of the network traffic. In particular, we can now test the proposed defensive strategy, 
which consists of making it difficult for attackers to use covert communications, in conditions 
resembling real SCADA networks and with real SCADA traffic.  
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CHAPTER 5 ANOMALY-BASED INTRUSION DETECTION IN SCADA 
NETWORKS 
By studying the behaviour of advanced threats, we presented a strategy of attacking their ability 
to use covert communication to perform maintenance and expand their penetration in networks. 
The effectiveness of this strategy depends on the capabilities of the Warden to identify inmates 
communication with each other. In normal networks, where almost anything goes, it is difficult 
for the Warden to distinguish between unusual non-malicious traffic and malicious traffic. 
However, our intuition tells us that SCADA networks are unlike traditional corporate networks. 
Because of a polling based protocol, the traffic is well regimented and should provide a more 
regular backdrop against which malicious traffic can more easily be identified. In order to test 
this intuition, a new experimental method combining simulation and emulation allowed for the 
generation of high fidelity network traffic, which will serve as the data set for our experiment. 
Using data from the ICS sandbox, we will be able to test the effectiveness of our defensive 
strategy. Under normal circumstances, it is difficult to construct a feature set that is suitable for 
use with anomaly-based detection. So, if, by choosing a few simple features and evaluating how 
these features differ from the baseline in the case of a compromise, we obtain effective anomaly-
based intrusion detectors, we will know that anomaly-based intrusion detection performs better in 
SCADA networks than in the general case. In turn, this would lead credence to the foundation of 
the defensive strategy envisioned to defend SCADA networks against advanced persistent 
threats. 
In this chapter, we present the results of an experiment in which the effectiveness of anomaly-
based detection in a SCADA network is tested. Section 5.1 offers the methodology and 
experimental design used to characterize SCADA traffic. Section 5.2 presents the 
characterization of non malicious SCADA traffic according to three features, logical topology, 
interdeparture of packets and packet size, selected for their simplicity and good indication of 
compromise. Section 5.3 presents the three attack scenarios, common botnet, APT and covert 
channel, that were used as test cases for detection. Section 5.4. presents the results showing that 
even with the simple features, it was straightforward to detect most scenarios. The covert channel 
scenario proved more difficult to detect because of its high similitude with a regular source and is 
presented as the boundary for detection. 
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5.1 Methodology 
Our analysis of the behaviour of APT has identified that targeting their ability to remain covert 
while they perform routine maintenance tasks could be used as a valid defensive strategy. Also, 
our intuition tells us that SCADA networks, unlike traditional corporate networks, behave in a 
much more deterministic way that could be leveraged to enhance the performance of anomaly-
based detection. Common wisdom deems anomaly-based detection to have limited effectiveness. 
If we can create an effective anomaly detector for SCADA based on simple metrics, we will have 
proven the common wisdom wrong for the case of SCADA networks. This section presents a 
methodology to test the effectiveness of an anomaly-based detector for SCADA networks. First, 
a conceptual framework for characterizing traffic is presented. Then, the experimental setup used 
to perform the experiment is detailed.    
5.1.1 Characterizing SCADA traffic 
A number of authors [121], [122] have talked about the difficulty of modelling cyber-physical 
systems, such as SCADA networks. If we consider the case of the electric grid, there is still 
ongoing research into modelling both the grid and the control network in isolation. Studying 
them together is more rare. As a matter of fact, we can wonder if there is any impact of using a 
divide-and-conquer approach and studying each component of the cyber-physical separately. 
Using the Shannon communication model, the physical component represents the source of the 
communication. The information that the source wants to communicate is the state of the network 
as represented in values of measurement points.  For some measurement points, the value will 
seldom change. The example of the status of a protection circuit breaker comes to mind. Unless 
there is a failure in the grid, the value will stay the same. Other measurement points vary. For 
example, a meter measuring the voltage of a power line might be in constant flux based on the 
rigors of supply and demand on the grid. In that sense, the entropy of the source may vary from 
point to point and, ultimately, from system to system. The fluctuations directly affect the payload 
of SCADA packets. 
 Ultimately, the amount of fidelity in the representation of the physical part of the cyber physical 
system directly affects the source entropy of the communication. A complete abstraction of the 
physical system will leave a system with low entropy where it is easier to develop a number of 
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features for a NIDS. For example, if we have a system where none of the values ever change, the 
exact values could be used as a feature for intrusion detection. Obviously, this would allow a 
detector built on this data to appear overly efficient and closer to the ideal warden. If we look at 
the channel bandwidth in the presence of an ideal warden, we see that the bandwidth is limited to 
whatever entropy the protocol signaling adds if the entropy of the source comes closer to zero. As 
such, we must be wary of these effects when presenting research results. 
Similarly, fidelity in terms of the representation of the cyber system affects the traffic 
characterization. In a sense, the cyber component represents the encoding, where measurements 
and control actions are given an electronic data representation, and it also represents the channel 
where the information is carried to the recipient. Because the cyber system is directly observed 
by the warden, it is critical that the bits and bytes of the network be as close as possible to traffic 
observed on a real network. If we use a NIDS, the warden reasons about the representation of the 
traffic on the wire. A change in the representation would inevitably distort the reasoning.  
Because both cyber and physical components have an important role in the production of network 
traffic, the data needs to be generated by cyber-physical systems if we want a high level of 
fidelity. As detailed in section 2.4, current experimental approaches are not adequate to generate 
this kind of data. So, we must propose our own experimental approach to generate our dataset. 
5.1.2 Experimental Setup 
For our experiment, we want to generate traffic that resembles traffic from a live network. We 
will also want to have traffic that resembles real world threats. The easiest way to obtain the 
fidelity we need is to use real SCADA applications and real malware. So, we used the ICS 
Sandbox approach as described in section 4.1. For this particular experiment, we are not planning 
on evaluating the impact on the grid. This means, we do not need a high fidelity for the electrical 
stimulation. In fact, because we are not planning on doing deep packet inspection, the values 
output by the simulator are irrelevant. It is only important that the values are present. Also, we 
plan on using real malware. This makes the risk of using a remote simulator higher, so we will 
use a local simulator instead. Based on these requirements, we use an simplified electrical 
simulator that does not represent high fidelity scenarios, but that still manages to introduce some 
dynamism on the physical side, i.e. sending control messages will change the values reported by 
the RTU. 
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Figure 5-1 : Experiment network 
To build our scenario, we based our design on the network used in the training described in 
section 4.2. We took the SCADA component of the training scenario as a baseline and added one 
RTU to become infected. The resulting network is shown in Figure 5-1. Looking at the figure, we 
see we have one MTU and five RTU. The MTU we use is a virtualized version the DNP 3.0 
version of the General Electric GENe product [114] which was obtained through special purpose 
funding. Because of licensing issues, the MTU also serves as the HMI station. This slightly 
impacts our results as no HMI traffic will be seen on the network. However, our focus is the 
SCADA traffic, so the loss of HMI traffic is acceptable. We deployed six Windows XP machines 
running the RLS software to act as six RTUs. Each RTU is responsible for two control points and 
3 measurements points for which the values are stored in a database accessed by the RTU 
simulator software. Experiments with a different number of RTUs and points were also run to 
evaluate the sensitivity of our results to variation in these control variables and results are shown 
in section 5.2.5. Based on this setup, full packet captures were taken by using port mirroring on 
the switch.  
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In order to integrate the physical components, in our case study an electrical grid, we wanted to 
make sure the values reported by the RTU integrated the dynamism inherent to cyber physical 
networks. To do so, each RLS machine was treated as a substation with one 12 kV main line 
supplying it with power and three distribution lines with static 1kΩ loads. The two control points 
were used as breakers for two of the distribution lines, allowing us to shut off power to two of the 
loads. Two measurement points reported on the current flowing through the lines we controlled 
with breakers. The last measurement point reported on the current going through the main 12kV 
line. A small, local, "electrical simulator" written in Python (sim_elec) implemented the electrical 
constraints imposed by this model. Figure 5-2 summarizes the design. 
  
Figure 5-2 : Localized simulator design 
5.2 A portrait of "normal" 
Using the experimental setup, we can generate high fidelity network traffic. This traffic can be 
used to build a portrait of non-malicious traffic that will act as a baseline to spot anomalies. The 
first step is to select a number of features that are good representatives of the traffic and that can 
be used as indicators of infection. Then, we provide an analysis of non-malicious traffic for each 
of the three features, logical topology, interdeparture time and packet size, in turn. Finally, a 
sensitivity analysis of the impact of the experimental setup design choices in terms of number of 
RTUs and number of points per RTU is realized to ensure our design choices do not significantly 
affect the distribution of the features. 
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5.2.1 Feature selection 
In order to build our detector, we need to find a good candidate for anomaly detection. Looking at 
network security literature, we can find a large volume of research that looks at characteristics of 
traffic to identify the underlying protocols or applications. The idea is to look for artefacts, in the 
form of indicators in the network traffic, that hint at the use of a specific protocol or application. 
For example, a particular cloud service might send synchronisation packets at regular intervals to 
make sure the state of the client is always good. A myriad of techniques can be used to do the 
classification. We can find examples of classification using statistical techniques  [123], 
clustering algorithms  [124], [125], Bayesian analysis  [126], machine learning [127] and so on. 
The various approaches and the various selections of features that are used to uniquely identify 
the traffic have different strengths and weaknesses and are usually tailored to a specific use case 
such as finding encrypted traffic or performing quality of service decisions. 
One possible set of features that can be used to classify traffic is packet size and interarrival time. 
Wright et al. [128] have shown that using only these features, it is still possible to obtain a 
reasonably good classification of a number of applications. This approach has the advantage of 
using only a small number of features, none of which require any deep packet inspection and 
protocol parsing. For SCADA protocols, such as DNP 3.0, not requiring protocol parsing is 
useful because, even though analyzers exist to interpret protocol headers, relevant information 
(e.g. is this breaker ON or OFF) is typically encoded and not readable without additional parsing 
and in-depth knowledge of the idiosyncrasies of each brand of equipment.  
Previous work in characterizing worms using these measurements by Dainotti et al. [129] shows 
that a worm can be characterized by looking at interarrival time and packet size. Because worm 
traffic is generated by an automated process, the distribution of packet sizes and the time between 
the departure of two packets from the host differ greatly from those of traditional traffic. In 
SCADA networks, the requests for measurement updates by the MTU are also completely 
automated and have the potential to have similar properties which may be used to characterize the 
traffic. If the traffic is sufficiently characterized, we may be able to detect malicious traffic that 
falls outside the characterization. 
From the packet captures, we select a subset of features we want to analyze. The first feature is 
the aggregate conversation flow characteristics, notably the IP source and IP destination pair. The 
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successful use of this characteristic to create network configuration and IDS signature by Hadeli  
[93] and Langill [105] suggest that this feature can be used to identify malicious behavior with 
traffic analysis. The second feature we select is packet size. This feature was a feature used to 
characterize worms by Dainotti et al. [129] and research by Wright et al. [128] indicated it, in 
conjunction with interarrival, time is a good classifier of network traffic. For the last feature, 
Dainotti and Wright both use time between packets, but one is receiver-oriented and the other is 
emitter-oriented. We select is interdeparture time, i.e. the time between the departure of two 
consecutive packets by the same host. This feature makes more sense with our polling mode of 
operation (in contrast with typical server architecture where clients initiate connections). The use 
of interdeparture also helps us observe cases where no responses are received, such as beaconing 
packets where no response is received. 
Three methods are used to generate these features. For the conversation flow aggregate results, 
the packet captures are loaded into Wireshark and the conversation tool from the analysis toolset 
is used to generate a table of existing conversation pairs in the capture. The table is then exported 
using the copy function. For packet size, we use the Tshark tool, the Wireshark command line 
tool, to read the packet capture with the -e option to extract the frame.len field from the packet 
capture. This gives us the size of the frame as observed on the wire. Because we are using the 
same layer 1 and layer 2 technology for all RLS, the same packet from two RLS will have the 
same frame length. For a real network where this would not be the case, it would be possible to 
strip layer 1 and layer 2 headers from this value, but it was not required in our case. We also use 
the Tshark tool with the -e option to generate the interdeparture feature. The frame.time_relative 
field is extracted along with the ip.src and ip.dst field. This gives us the source and destination 
IPs in addition to the time from the start of the capture at which the frame was observed on the 
wire. Packets are then sorted by source IP address and ordered according the observation time. 
The interdeparture time is then calculated by taking the difference in observation time between 
two consecutive packets. We can now analyze the features using a spreadsheet application such 
as Excel or a mathematical analysis tool such as Matlab. In addition, we can reference the 
original packet capture to explain situations observed in the features. 
So, to build our baseline, we will focus on two features: 
 Interdeparture time between packets going to a same destination 
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 Packet size 
This will provide a good baseline that should be able to be used for the detection of simple 
attacks. Should an attack be impossible to detect using this baseline, we will look at an advanced 
feature, the packet payload entropy, to see if it enables detection or if the attack mimics the 
regular traffic sufficiently to evade these techniques. 
5.2.2 Logical Topology 
A first characteristic of SCADA systems that may be leveraged to detect intrusions is the logical 
topology created by the master-slave aspect of the protocol. Even in an IP environment, the DNP 
3.0 protocol has legacy embedded link layer operations encapsulated in the payload. This means 
that the SCADA machines will only communicate with other SCADA equipment for which they 
are preconfigured. In our case, the MTU can only communicate with the 5 configured RTUs and 
each RTU can only communicate with the MTU.  We analyzed the packet capture using 
Wireshark's prebuilt conversation analysis tool. Table 5-1 summarizes the results based on the 
network and addressing plan illustrated in Figure 5-1. 
Table 5-1: Wireshark conversation analysis 
IP source (A) IP destination (B) Packets A→B Bytes A→B Packets A←B Bytes A←B Duration (s) 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.255 172 18362 0 0 124.2 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.103 242 19904 215 18454 126.3 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.105 243 19980 214 18427 126.1 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.107 258 21249 224 19681 126.1 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.104 241 19845 215 18468 123.3 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.106 237 19498 211 18164 123.2 
 
As expected, the only conversations we can observe are between the MTU and the RTUs. No 
communication between RTUs exists. In addition, all the conversations have approximately the 
same duration, number of packets exchanged and number of bytes exchanged. This result is also 
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expected because the speed of the automated polling is superior to the speed with which a human 
can operate the controls through the human machine interface. 
5.2.3 Interdeparture time 
Another legacy aspect of the DNP 3.0 protocol is the concept of polling. While the protocol 
allows for unsolicited communication originating from the RTU in case of failures, the normal 
mode of operation is polling from the MTU. The MTU polls each of the RTUs in turn to update 
the values of the points for which the RTU is responsible. This means that, for a given RTU, the 
interarrival time of polling requests is approximately constant. Each polling request is then 
followed by a small number of responses (e.g. returning requesting measurements) and ACK 
(acknowledging MTU communication) packets sent in short succession and a confirmation 
packet is then sent. Figure 5-3 illustrates the average time between the departure of two packets 
from the MTU. 
 
Figure 5-3: Average Interdeparture time for the MTU by RTU 
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We can clearly see two groupings, one under 100 milliseconds and another at around 2 seconds. 
This is a consequence of the polling interval. The packets around 0.01 seconds are the ACK and 
confirmation packets sent to acknowledge RTU communications and, as such, are heavily 
correlated with the sending of a polling packet. The other packets arriving between polling 
sequences are the result of our limited human activity (i.e. sending commands to change the 
values) or from delay in the server side. This abnormal or human activity is several orders of 
magnitude smaller than the automated network traffic and seems at first glance to be more evenly 
distributed across all interarrival time values. This would mean that, even on a production 
network the periodic components are likely to significantly outweigh human activity.  
If we choose not to split the packets sent per RTU stream, we still get a heavily periodic 
interarrival time distribution. Figure 5-4 presents the interdeparture time of packets at the MTU.   
 
Figure 5-4: Interdeparture time MTU - multiplexed 
This is similar to the demultiplexed interarrival time, but with the 2s periodic component missing. 
This can be explained by the serialized nature of the polling: at each polling step, the MTU sends 
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a polling request to one piece of equipment, going down the list. So, each 100 ms or so, the MTU 
receives a response from each RTU in turn creating the periodic components we can observe in 
the traffic from the RTU machines and in the deaggregated MTU graphs.  
This is also true is we look at the traffic sent by the RTU. If we look at the interdeparture time of 
traffic going to the MTU for each RTU separately, we obtain a graph very similar to the graph in 
Figure 5-4 showing the traffic from the MTU going to each RTU. Figure 5-5 illustrates this 
situation. Because no packets originate from the RTU, this similarity between packets sent by the 
RTU and the packets sent to that particular RTU by the MTU is expected. We can still see the 
two heavily periodic components at around 100 milliseconds and around 1.8 seconds. 
 
Figure 5-5: Interdeparture time RTU 
5.2.4 Packet size 
The use of polling also has an observable effect on the distribution of packet lengths. Because the 
polling requests are generally serialized, the MTU typically sends the same request to all RTUs. 
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In the same vein, unless there is a significant change in the operating environment, the responses 
will be very similar. Even if we do not perform deep packet inspection and decode the protocol, 
we can look at packet length to impose constraints on the traffic to create signatures. Figure 5-6 
and 5-7 presents the averaged distribution of packet lengths sent by the MTU and the RTU 
respectively. 
  
 
Figure 5-6: Distribution of packet lengths - MTU 
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Figure 5-7: Distribution of packet lengths - RTU 
We can see the vast majority of packets are of only two sizes: the size of the request or response 
and the size of the ACK packet used to acknowledge the request or response. The is also a small 
number of packets with larger sizes to account for large requests (ex. update for multiple values 
at the same time) and the occasional human command sent. Naturally, a large number of 
measurements elicits a higher percentage of oversize responses. Even these packets are of fixed 
sizes based on the number of records sent and are observed a number of times even if their 
frequency is much lower.  
The MTU's behaviour is even more regular than the RTUs. In essence, because the MTU is 
always asking the same questions (what is the value of point X? can you operate point Y?), it is 
always sending the same packet. In addition, because the order in which the polling questions are 
sent is deterministic, it will always ask the polling questions in the same order. Only a small 
ammount of variability is introduced by human operators activating control points, but the 
volume of those will always be marginal compared to the large number of automated requests 
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sent. Because of this, it is easier to see the attacker's effect on the RTUs where there is a smaller 
amount of traffic so small abnormalities stand out even more.  
5.2.5 Sensitivity analysis 
In terms of distribution, if we look at the effect of our design choices, we can analyze the 
sensitivity of our results to design choices. To gauge the effect, we will compare the distribution 
of interdeparture time and packet size of different configurations.  
 
Figure 5-8: Distribution of interdeparture time for control RTUs 
Our first design choice is the number of measurement points per RTU. We perform a number of 
experiments where one RTU has a different number of points configured in its TelDB database. 
We then calculated the distributions for all the experiments for one of the RTUs. In order to get a 
better picture of the level of variability, we calculated, over all the experiments, the maximum 
value, the minimum value and the average value for all the bins. Figure 5-8 and 5-9 show us the 
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distributions for the minimum, maximum and average values for both interdeparture time and 
packet size.  
 
Figure 5-9: Distribution of packet sizes for control RTUs 
As we can see, there is limited divergence between the traffic of similarly configured RTUs 
across the various experiments. We will pick one of the 8 point RTUs to act as the control 
distribution in a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to determine if the number of measurement points 
alters the distribution of the RTU in a statistically significant way. Table 5-2 summarizes the 
results obtained from an online K-S calculator [130]. 
From these results, we can see that we require a significant increase in the number of points in 
order to start seeing a distance sufficiently high for us to be able to reject the NULL hypothesis 
that the distribution is different from a baseline of 8 points per RTU. Further analyzing the 
results, we find a likely cause for the sharp decline at bigger packet lengths: some packets 
become too big for the protocol and require the sending of additional packets. 
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Table 5-2: Sensitivity analysis - number of points 
Metric 3 points 6 points 9 points 15 points 21 points 30 points 45 points 
Interdeparture D: 0.0494 
P: 0.897 
D: 0.0544 
P: 0.816 
D: 0.0439 
P: 0.958 
D: 0.0729 
P: 0.433 
D: 0.0871 
P: 0.242 
D: 0.0835 
P: 0.286 
D: 0.1088 
P: 0.081 
Packet size D: 0.0269 
P: 1.00 
D: 0.0228 
P: 1.00 
D: 0.0262 
P: 1.00 
D: 0.0771 
P: 0.363 
D: 0.1015 
P: 0.113 
D: 0.0797 
P: 0.339 
D: 0.4623 
P: 0.00 
Even in systems where there is a greater variety in terms of number of PLC supported, we would 
see that the graph would have the same general shape, but with greater diversity for "big packets" 
on RTUs only. After all, all the MTU will send the same polling requests and the same response 
acknowledgement packets no matter the number of PLCs. For the RTUs, the proportion of 
acknowledgement packets and response packets will the same. The size of acknowledgement 
packets will stay the same, as well as is the size of responses reporting no changes. So, only the 
size of response packets that include records will vary. Even then, the packet size will take 
discrete values based on the number of records included multiplied by the fixed value of a record, 
up to the maximum packet size where DNP3.0 will split the packet. This will only serve to spread 
the tail end of the distribution over these discrete values if the sample has a large variation of 
packet sizes. 
Table 5-3: Sensitivity analysis - number of RTUs 
Metric 2 RTUs 4 RTUs 8 RTUs 10 RTUs 12 RTUs 14 RTUs 15 RTUs 
Interdeparture D: 0.1004 
P: 0.252 
D: 0.0803 
P: 0.527 
D: 0.0688 
P: 0.719 
D: 0.0573 
P: 0.890 
D: 0.1023 
P: 0.213 
D: 0.1183 
P: 0.082 
D: 0.0785 
P: 0.525 
Packet size D: 0.0714 
P: 0.672 
D: 0.0712 
P: 0.680 
D: 0.0713 
P: 0.677 
D: 0.0713 
P: 0.675 
D: 0.0291 
P: 1.00 
D: 0.0558 
P: 0.870 
D: 0.0339 
P: 1.00 
In terms of number of RTUs, a more limited sensitivity study was done prior to experiment 
design. Using default configuration RTUs with a standard TelDB database with 7 measurement 
points, we tested the impact of the number of RTUs in the system. We compared the distributions 
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for multiple numbers of RTUs to a baseline of 6 RTUs to verify that there was no significant 
modification of metrics for a given RTU which was present in all experiments. Table 5-3 
summarizes the results obtained from an online K-S calculator [130]. 
After further study, we determined that the serialization of communication, the fact that the MTU 
communicates with each of the RTUs in turn, prevents the observation of big differences in the 
distributions until the MTU itself comes into contention. When it does, the architecture requires 
the use of additional Front End Processors to eliminate the contention. 
In summary, the behaviour of SCADA network equipment is driven by the master-slave 
architecture. In that architecture, the slaves, in our case the RTUs, can only communicate to the 
master, i.e. the MTU, and never communicate with each other or with other endpoints. This 
creates a communications table similar to the one illustrated in Table 5-1. In addition, the 
protocol strictly codifies the communication between MTU and RTUs, which causes the traffic to 
follow patterns which are very distinct from the patterns of traffic in a typical corporate network. 
These patterns can be identified by looking at the distribution of certain features such as packet 
sizes and interdeparture times. 
Because neither the number of RTUs or the number of measurement points assigned to a RTU 
affect the distribution of packet sizes or interdeparture times the distributions presented in figures 
5-5 and 5-6 truly represent the typical behaviour of an RTU, even if small statistical variations 
can be observed.  To limit the effects of these variations, we will use the average distributions 
illustrated in figures 5-8 and 5-9 to act as our description of normal traffic for the RTUs and the 
maximum and minimum distributions illustrated in the same figures to act as boundaries for the 
statistical variance. 
The combination of these features gives us a good portrait of normal traffic in a SCADA system 
against which it will be possible to detect abnormal behaviour. 
5.3 Scenarios 
Jumping off from the characterization of normal traffic and using our ICS sandbox for high risk 
experiments, we can create scenarios to test our defensive strategy for detection. We settled on 
three scenarios, with increasing levels of sophistication and this section describes each of the 
scenarios in turn. The first scenario represents an infection from commodity malware, the 
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Waledac botnet. The second scenario represents a hacker performing maintenance operations 
such as updating files using commonly used hacking tools, in this case Metasploit. The third 
scenario presents a sophisticated attacker using a limited bandwidth DNP3.0 covert channel.   
 
Figure 5-10: Experiment network - Scenario 1 
5.3.1 Common botnet 
The first scenario infects a machine with a sample of the Waledac malware [131], [132]. This 
particular malware was chosen because its network behaviour is well documented and because 
experiments were performed using a similar setup as shown in Calvet et al.  [133]. Since our 
setup is isolated from the Internet and since we did not deploy any piece of the Waledac 
command and control, we do not have the full bot traffic. We have instead the beaconing traffic 
from the Waledac malware trying to contact a list of hardcoded IPs to establish command and 
control. This attack represents a very common scenario for SCADA system where a machine is 
infected either prior to delivery or by performing maintenance with infected equipment. The 
machine starts beaconing out, attempting to join a command and control server, but has no direct 
route. Thus, the machine remains infected for a long time. We believe this beaconing behavior is 
more difficult to spot in network traffic than the comparatively large volume of peer-to-peer and 
spamming traffic associated with an active Waledac bot. This attack scenario represents a low 
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level of attacker sophistication where the attacker relies on direct communication with the 
machine. Figure 5-10 summarizes the scenario. 
5.3.2 Advanced persistent threat 
The second scenario increases the level of sophistication of the attack. Instead of relying on direct 
contact to the Internet, the attacker goes through a compromised machine to create a pivot that 
enables him to access the other machines. Normally, the pivot point could be a machine that was 
badly configured and provided a remote access which is not directly observable (for example a 
through a modem or a local wireless network) or through an out of band access (such as a USB 
stick). The pivot node can now serve as the local distribution node for any command and control. 
This scenario is somewhat representative of the type of peer-to-peer C&C network that can be 
observed in the Stuxnet worm: a communication node with access to outside is identified and that 
node propagates updates to other infected nodes on the local area network.  Network defenders 
do not see any of the telltale connections to outside addresses on abnormal ports coming from 
inside. However, unlike Stuxnet, we did not deploy a full peer-to-peer network. Instead, we used 
the pivot function of the Metasploit framework [134] to create the pivot point. Typical 
maintenance operations (e.g. moving files back and forth, launching processes) were performed 
through the Metasploit interface to generate traffic. The TCP port of Metasploit was then 
modified post-hoc to prevent an easy identification of the traffic through the use of port number. 
While this does not represent actual SCADA malware behaviour, it is common practice for 
malware operating in corporate networks which hide themselves in the large volume of HTTP 
traffic. Also, in order to generate a reasonable volume of good and bad traffic, additional RTUs 
were added. This has little bearing on the ability to compare results with the other two scenarios 
as shown in section 5.2.5.  Figure 5-11 summarizes the scenario. 
116 
 
 
 
Figure 5-11: Experiment network - Scenario 2 
5.3.3 Covert channel 
The third scenario represents an attacker intent at hiding his presence. As in scenario 2, the 
attacker compromises a node to act as a pivot that allows him to push updates to other infected 
machines. This compromise is not observable either because of the technical properties of the 
backdoor (e.g. unmonitored local wireless) or by using out-of-band offline methods such as a 
USB key. The attacker then communicates through a channel that mimics the valid protocol used. 
The HTTP covert channel used by Stuxnet is a good example of the state of the art of this type of 
technique for web traffic. Unfortunately, there is no DNP3.0 covert channel publicly available for 
research. We opted to emulate this kind of behaviour by creating our own channel over DNP3.0 
which would represent a malware deployed on RLS103 sending upgrade information to another 
malware on the MTU. 
By analyzing the DNP 3.0 protocol, we observed that measurement updates contained a 16 bit 
field representing the new value of a point. Let's say that a reported voltage value is 24.94kV (the 
nominal value for a Hydro-Quebec standard medium voltage network [135]). The 16 bit  
representation is 0110 0001 0110 1100. If we use the 4 least significant bits of the value to send 
data, we have 0110 0001 0110 CCCC where C is a bit of covert data. So, we now have values 
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going from 24.928kV to 24.943kV. This could be interpreted by an operator to be a normal 
fluctuation of the values coming from a number of non-malicious sources from variations in 
customer demand to space weather. Another way of sending traffic is to add bogus measurement 
points which are not known to the MTU. Because they are not known to the MTU, they are never 
stored in either the MTU database, the graphical display or on the historian. However, the RTU 
may still elect to send that measurement as an update and automatically sends the value if the 
MTU requests a general update (which it does approximately every 60 seconds in our 
configuration). Naturally, the more bogus values used and the more bits per value transferred, the 
more noisy the channel is. Too many bogus values and the real values are never selected for an 
update. Too many bits transferred per value and the more noticeable the effect is. In order to test 
multiple levels of attacker stealth, we settled on 8 values and we tested multiple numbers of 
covert bits C.  This gives us a channel bandwidth of (C/2+ 8C/60) bits per seconds assuming a 
polling requesting an update every 2 seconds and an update of all the points every 60 seconds 
which corresponds to the default values used in our SCADA setup.  
In order to implement this, we modified the simple electrical simulator and the RTU update script 
to update the RTUsim database with values based on the hex values of a compressed executable. 
By changing the values in the database based on the content of the coded communication, we 
ensure that the packets generated by the RTU strictly adhere to protocol standards while still 
carrying our covert communication encoded in the measurement values. This type of channel 
represent a channel that is established after infection to maintain command and control and 
provide a path to perform routine maintenance, such as propagation a new version of malware. 
The return communication from the MTU was not modeled because of the technical complexity 
of trapping the proprietary software and the multiple configurations of 
acknowledgement/retransmit signals that could be implemented within the DNP3.0 protocol that 
would require a full protocol parsing to detect. Figure 5-12 summarizes the scenario. 
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Figure 5-12: Experiment network - Scenario 3 
5.4 Results 
For each of the attack scenarios, the ICS sandbox was used to generate a network trace. In order 
to evaluate the effectiveness of an anomaly-based intrusion detection using these features, this 
trace was then analyzed using the selected features and compared to the baseline to see if the 
attackers actions stood out against the backdrop. We start by showing that the botnet in scenario 
1 produces traces that are very indicative of malicious activity. Then, we see that the lateral 
movement of a traditional APT also stands out clearly against all three chosen features. We 
follow by finding the threshold of effectiveness of the suggested method for the detection of the 
covert channel used in scenario 3, which does not stand out against background traffic. Finally, 
we use a more complex feature, entropy calculation, to show the level of similarity to real traffic 
that needed to be achieved by the attacker to retain stealth. 
5.4.1 Scenario 1 - Botnet 
After infecting one RTU with the Waledac malware, we can observe the infected machine's 
behaviour and see how it diverges from the baseline we established with clean machines. 
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Table 5-4: Conversation analysis with infected RLS (Hardcoded Waledac C&C in red) 
IP source  
(A) 
IP destination 
(B) 
Packets 
A→B 
Bytes 
A→B 
Packets 
A←B 
Bytes 
A←B 
Duration 
(s) 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.103 264 21706 235 19959 130.2 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.105 273 22459 240 20832 130.0 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.106 241 19781 219 17806 130.2 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.108 261 21465 233 19845 130.3 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.104 269 22193 241 20491 130.3 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.107 249 20449 223 18216 130.2 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.255 176 18128 0 0 129.2 
89.18.58.10 172.31.255.103 0 0 9 558 50.9 
119.192.145.145 172.31.255.103 0 0 6 372 50.9 
83.87.159.131 172.31.255.103 0 998 3 0 9.0 
117.102.35.90 172.31.255.103 0 0 3 186 8.9 
69.203.207.115 172.31.255.103 0 0 3 186 8.9 
Logical topology 
In terms of intrusion detection, this feature can be a great asset because one of the first instincts 
of the malware is to try to connect to its command and control network to join the botnet. The 
creation of white list rules for communication within the SCADA network seems feasible in most 
environments where human access on the machines is rare. In other cases, threshold rules or even 
a simple inspection of net flows, in which a volume of communication significantly different 
from the other branches of the tree is observed, could be a good indicator of the need for a more 
thorough investigation. To illustrate this, we infected the  RLS 103 machine with a sample of 
Waledac. Once infected, the machine immediately attempts to contact a machine in the 
hardcoded peer list to establish command and control. Examples of this communication can be 
seen in the last five rows of Table 5-4. Because we did not provide internet access, only the SYN 
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packets can be seen. This traffic is easily identifiable in the Wireshark conversation report 
presented in Table 5-4. 
 
Figure 5-13: Comparison of interdeparture time for infected RLS 
Polling frequency 
 In terms of intrusion detection, the analysis of packet interdeparture time would force attackers 
to synch with the existing periodic elements to stay undetected. This makes the task of an attacker 
manually attempting to perform post exploitation operations on a compromised machines more 
complex because it would create a significant volume of traffic that is located away from the two 
periodic components in our model of normal. Figure 5-13 illustrates the difference between the 
periodic components of SCADA traffic and the Waledac traffic as observed on the infected RLS. 
Because of the large amount of time between the C&C packets, we scaled our bins to be 1 second 
instead of 100 ms to increase the readability of the graph.  We can see that the vast proportion of 
traffic going to the MTU is the periodic components we have identified. On the other hand, if we 
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look at the other conversations, we observe a longer time between the occurrence of packets. 
These features did not appear in the model of normal traffic and can be flagged as anomalous. 
Packet size 
In terms of intrusion detection, the small number of possible values for packet sizes would 
suggest that the distribution of packet length would be a good tool to detect malicious or unusual 
activity on a SCADA network. The possibility of observing legitimate packets associated with 
human operator actions which have differing lengths makes it unlikely a white list could be built 
without extensive protocol analysis. These types of packets are seldom encountered. It is possible 
that rules based on crossing a certain threshold could be built. Such rules would be able to detect 
tools operating continuously and sending packets of abnormal sizes. Figure 5-14 illustrates the 
difference in sent packet size between a clean version of the RTU and the version we infected 
with Waledac.   
 
Figure 5-14: Packet size comparison between infected and clean  
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
0
 
1
0
 
2
0
 
3
0
 
4
0
 
5
0
 
6
0
 
7
0
 
8
0
 
9
0
 
1
0
0
 
1
1
0
 
1
2
0
 
1
3
0
 
1
4
0
 
1
5
0
 
1
6
0
 
1
7
0
 
1
8
0
 
1
9
0
 
2
0
0
 
2
1
0
 
2
2
0
 
2
3
0
 
2
4
0
 
2
5
0
 
2
6
0
 
2
7
0
 
2
8
0
 
2
9
0
 
3
0
0
 
3
1
0
 
3
2
0
 
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
tr
af
fi
c 
(%
) 
Distribution of packet size - Infected and clean  
Bin size (5 bytes) 
Infected with Waledac 
clean 
122 
 
 
As we can see, the infected machine has a significant proportion of packets in the 60 to 65 bytes 
frame length bin (attributed to many 62 bytes packet).   This is of course the size of the beaconing 
packet from Waledac. Because this is not a usual size for a request packet, the clean RTU has no 
occurrence of a packet of that size. As a matter of fact, that packet size was not observed  in any 
of the SCADA traffic we generated for the sensitivity tests. 
5.4.2 Scenario 2 -APT 
After setting one RTU as a pivot point with Metasploit, we perform malware maintenance 
operations on other infected nodes. We can observe the infected nodes and see how their 
behaviour differs from the behaviour of clean machines. 
Logical topology 
As for the Waledac scenario, this metric is an indicator that there is something wrong. While 
there is no tell tale sign like machines connecting to outside IP addresses, we know from the 
protocol that there should be no conversation between two RTUs. The RTUs only respond to 
polling from the MTU. However, once an attacker gets control of a node in a sub network, he 
often attempts to enlarge his foothold by infecting other machines in the same network from the 
machine he compromised. Once these machines are infected, they often create a local command 
and control network amongst themselves to enable the attacker to easily access any of these 
machines from where he sits outside the network, usually going through the only machine he has 
access to, the machine initially compromised. All of this generates conversation between 
machines in the same sub network, in our case RTUs, which is not naturally occurring. The 
conversation list from scenario 2, reproduced in Table 5-5, illustrates this behaviour. 
Table 5-5: Conversation analysis with pivot point (malicious conversations in red) 
IP source 
(A) 
IP Destination 
(B) 
Packets 
A→B 
Bytes 
A→B 
Packets 
A←B 
Bytes 
A←B 
Duration 
(s) 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.104 516 39285 479 37778 291.2 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.105 554 45464 515 40775 321.3 
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IP source 
(A) 
IP Destination 
(B) 
Packets 
A→B 
Bytes 
A→B 
Packets 
A←B 
Bytes 
A←B 
Duration 
(s) 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.106 521 42683 482 39397 289.5 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.107 553 45375 513 40614 319.2 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.108 429 35066 396 31426 231.4 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.109 561 46039 521 41210 321.4 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.110 554 45451 513 40624 319.2 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.111 518 42433 480 38130 292 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.112 486 39796 448 35706 269.5 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.113 520 42615 483 39439 291.2 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.114 485 39630 444 35435 262.1 
172.31.255.104 172.31.255.105 17 2631 16 2590 0 
172.31.255.106 172.31.255.105 1133 1473475 670 192601 246 
172.31.255.107 172.31.255.105 1284 1706684 667 192659 291.7 
172.31.255.108 172.31.255.105 1120 1472911 607 188926 289 
172.31.255.110 172.31.255.105 1130 1474539 621 189550 277.8 
172.31.255.114 172.31.255.105 1121 1472767 595 188101 241.7 
As we can see, the MTU establishes conversations with all the RTUs as expected. We also see all 
the conversations between infected RTUs and the pivot point. There is also an unexpected 
conversation between 104 and 105 which is actually a small Netbios exchange between two 
Workgroup machines to check for domain information. While this is not an attack per se, it could 
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be argued that it is a configuration (hardening) problem on the machines as this traffic is not 
required for operation. So it could be classified as grey traffic or acted upon to improve hardening 
on the RTUs. We can also note that the volume of this conversation is order of magnitude smaller 
than the volume of malicious conversations. However, this could still be used as a channel by a 
patient attacker. 
Polling frequency 
The distribution of interdeparture time for packets on the infected RTUs presents no doubt as the 
abnormal nature of the communications. Figure 5-15 presents the distribution of interdeparture 
times for all the infected RTUs and compares it to the average distribution of a clean RTU we 
established in our baseline. 
 
Figure 5-15: Distribution of interdeparture time for infected RTUs compared to clean distribution 
Looking at the graph, we see that the infected RTUs have a much greater tendency to send 
packets less than 100 ms after the previous packet. This behaviour is to be expected because all 
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the malicious traffic has to take place between two polling sessions, reducing the average 
interdeparture time. In addition, the traffic sent is not regulated by the polling speed, but only the 
TCP flow control speed. So, to transfer large volumes of data, for example when a new 
executable was pushed, TCP will send packets as fast as it can to maximize bandwidth. 
Packet size 
As with the interdeparture time, the distribution of packet size from the infected RTUs differs 
drastically from the expected distribution. Figure 5-16 presents the distribution of packet sizes 
from infected RTUs compared to the average distribution established in the baseline. 
 
Figure 5-16: Distribution of packet size for infected RTUs compared to clean distribution 
As can be expected, the TCP packets are not as strictly constrained to specific packet sizes as are 
the DNP3.0 packets. This spreads out the distribution of packet sizes for all infected RTUs and 
generates packets of sizes that are just not normally produced by the DNP3.0 protocol. 
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Of course, the attacker could attempt to match the statistical distributions we established in our 
baseline for conversation pairs, interdeparture time and packet sizes. We see one example of this 
in scenario 3. 
5.4.3 Scenario 3 - covert channel 
After installing our software that alters the measurement values to carry data on an RTU, the 
attacker can now use the measurement values of that RTU to transfer data without violating the 
constraints of the DNP3.0 protocol.  
Conversation analysis 
Unlike in the previous two scenarios, there is no obvious sign of malicious traffic. All the RTUs 
communicate only with the MTU and no extra packets are sent. This makes detecting this kind of 
communication difficult to spot using conversation analysis. Table 5-6 illustrates this by 
reproducing the conversation table from the experiment using the 9 LSBs as a covert channel. 
Table 5-6: Conversation list - covert channel experiment 9 LSBs 
IP source 
(A) 
IP destination 
(B) 
Packets 
A→B 
Bytes 
A→B 
Packets 
A←B 
Bytes 
A←B 
Duration 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.103 1117 91013 937 72160 582.3 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.104 947 77807 899 67855 553.3 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.105 1009 83109 974 73363 610.5 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.106 977 80378 938 70679 581.6 
172.31.255.100 172.31.255.107 703 64476 740 56196 434.3 
172.31.255.103 172.31.255.104 11 1565 10 1237 0 
172.31.255.105 172.31.255.104 17 2631 16 2386 0 
Studying the chart, we might be tempted to look closely at 172.31.255.104 because of the grey 
traffic, while the compromise node is actually 172.31.255.103. The only clue as to the abnormal 
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nature of communications from 103 is in the slightly over average number of bytes transferred for 
the duration. This is cause by having a larger proportion of response packets containing updates 
than our normal sample. 
Polling frequency 
Because of the manner in which the channel is constructed, we should see no discrepancies in 
terms of distribution of interdeparture time. In fact, the channel is piggybacking on top of regular 
communications and thus uses the same timing. Figure 5-17 presents the distribution of 
interdeparture time for the various covert channel experiments. 
 
Figure 5-17: Distribution of interdeparture time for covert channel compared to clean distribution 
As we can see, the distributions are not wildly dissimilar to the model as we have seen in 
previous cases and are within the maximum variation envelope of the baseline. As expected, this 
metric provides little information on the presence of a malicious channel. 
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Packet size 
As with the distribution of interdeparture, the distribution of packet size should follow legitimate 
parameters since the channel is piggybacking on top of the protocol and follows protocol rules. 
Figure 5-18 presents the distribution of packet sizes for the various cover channel experiments. 
 
Figure 5-18: Distribution of packet size for covert channel compared to clean distribution 
As we can see, the distribution of packet sizes follows more or less the standard distribution. The 
one exception is the greater proportion of response traffic containing data because the channel 
always changes the value of the measurement point. While this metric can be used to detect 
against our sample, we are again falling victim to the limited noise model for our baseline data. It 
is likely that data from a live deployment would present a level of variation of measurements that 
would make it very difficult to find a statistically significant increase for the channel distribution. 
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5.4.4 Entropy measurements for covert channel 
Detecting this covert channel against regular traffic is hard. This is easily explainable by the 
piggybacking of the malicious traffic over regular communication. It is designed to match the 
normal communications very closely. Normally, even if common features would not be useful to 
find the malicious traffic, advanced features, such as packet entropy, might be used to identify 
covert channels. For example, entropy-based techniques can be used to detect very covert timing-
based channels over the Internet [136]. In this case, even entropy-based techniques fail in 
detecting the channel showing how close the distribution of symbols from the covert channel is to 
the source. 
In order to analyze the difficulty of  detecting the channel using entropy, we need to refine the 
model of the source, i.e. the electrical network, to represent the correct source entropy. Our 
simplified simulator produces constant values, much like a steady state simulator would. 
However, real electrical grids cannot produce such clean power and the measurements always 
include some small variations caused by the vagrancies of demand, electromagnetic disturbance, 
solar activity and so on. In order to model the higher variation of an actual source, we modified 
the simulated source in order for it to have constantly changing values and create a new baseline 
against which to analyze our channel. 
The amount of variation from the source will impact the traffic properties. To replicate the 
difficulty of identifying the channel on a real system, the source should have variations 
representative of the variations that can be measured by a PLC on a real system. While we do not 
have data from real systems that would enable us to build a distribution, we can find descriptions 
of the distributions based on measurements of high voltage lines in the literature. In their paper, 
Reinhard et al. [137] describe the voltage variation of the synchrophasor of a 765 KV line based 
on 2400 measurements. Over these measurements, they obtain a mean of 1.0003 p.u. (per unit 
voltage) and a variance of 7.062∙10-8 Vpu. Based on those values, we modified our simple 
electrical simulator to follow these parameters by integrating a Gaussian distribution with µ = 
1.0003 and σ = √ 7.062∙10-8. 
With the source that includes Gaussian noise, measurement vary all the time. This means that it 
becomes even more difficult to identify the tunnel using packet lengths. Figure 5-19 shows the 
new comparison with the new packet length baseline. The baseline now shows the same spike as 
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the channel for packets containing data. Only the channel with 1 bit differs from normal because 
of the small number of bits used which creates a higher number of "no change" packets. 
 
Figure 5-19 : Distribution of packet size for channel compared to a source with noise 
We need to find new metrics to identify the channel. The natural choice is to use the pseudo-
entropy of the packets. The pseudo-entropy is a statistical estimator of the entropy for a given 
communication. The formula for the calculation of the average entropy per symbol is : 
              
 
  
 
 
where SN is the message to be estimated and fi is the frequency of symbol i in the message. Once 
the average entropy per symbol is calculated, we can multiply by the message size to get the 
message entropy. As seen in section 3.3, the packets contain two sources of entropy : entropy 
from the DNP3.0 signaling and entropy from the source. The pseudo-entropy from the signaling 
will be fairly constant across all packets, for example, the bits to request a read will always be set 
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in the exact same way. This means that the pseudo-entropy is a good estimator of the entropy of 
the source of the communication. 
Shannon tells us that the amount of information we can carry is the entropy of the source. 
Attackers want to maximize their bandwidth. So, when an attacker is using a measurement as a 
medium for communication, we are expecting him to maximize the entropy of the measurement. 
Because the pseudo-entropy is a good estimator of the source entropy of a communication, we 
can use pseudo-entropy to evaluate the amount of information carried by a message. Therefore, 
the more information an attacker attempts to transport, the greater the entropy of the packet. We 
hope this will stand out against the baseline. Figure 5-20 shows the distribution of entropy for all 
covert channel sizes and for the source with Gaussian noise. Figure 5-21 shows a close up of the 
140 to 180 range to improve visibility. 
Figure 5-20: Distribution of entropy for all channel sizes and noisy source  
As expected, the majority of packets carry no data, so carry no entropy. Because of the need to 
carry multiple OSI layers of signalling as part of the tunneling of DNP3.0 in TCP payloads, we 
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also observe a fairly concentrated distribution for the non empty packets. This indicates that the 
efficiency of the covert channel is low because we only carry a small amount of information 
compared to the signaling data. Because of the high amount of useless information carried, we 
need to zoom in to see the effect of the channel size. 
 
Figure 5-21: Close up distribution of entropy for all channel sizes and noisy source 
As the number of bits carried in the channel increases, the entropy of the source should increase. 
This is illustrate in the figure as an increased weight of high entropy packets. The phenomenon 
can be observed in the ordering of the distribution curves in the 140-180 range. A shift in the 
center of mass of the curve toward higher entropy denotes a larger volume of information carried. 
Unfortunately, the small number of packets that are actually carrying information makes the 
proportion of traffic fairly small which increases the variability of the statistical estimator. The 
small contribution of the channel to the amount of bits transferred further complicates the 
problem. If all the bits of the payload would be used to transfer a compressed binary, the entropy 
would be near maximum for the message, meaning around 744 bits (93 bytes) for messages 
0% 
1% 
2% 
3% 
4% 
5% 
6% 
7% 
1
4
0
 
1
4
4
 
1
4
8
 
1
5
2
 
1
5
6
 
1
6
0
 
1
6
4
 
1
6
8
 
1
7
2
 
1
7
6
 
1
8
0
 
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
tr
af
fi
c 
(%
) 
Distribution of entropy 
bin size (4 bits) 
Source 
1 LSB 
3 LSB 
5 LSB 
7 LSB 
9 LSB 
133 
 
 
containing a measurement.  The studied covert channel with the highest bandwidth uses the 9 
LSBs to carry data. This data comes from a compressed executable. So, in the case of our channel 
with the most bandwidth, only 9 bits out of 744 bits of the packet are compressed. This reduces 
the weight of the covert communication compared to remaining 735 bits and distorts the pseudo-
entropy measurements based on the compressibility of the packet.    
Comparing the distribution of entropy for the channels and comparing it to the baseline, we 
notice a very similar distribution. In fact, it would seem that the source conveys more information 
than the channels using only 1 or 3 bits. This is entirely expected because of the model used to 
introduce variation in the source. Using a Gaussian distribution on the measurement values is the 
equivalent of adding white noise to the channel. Because the standard deviation is low, this adds 
a small quantity of entropy. The amount of entropy injected is also relatively constant, explaining 
the tighter profile of the curve. In terms of values, we are affecting the least significant digits, 
meaning that it creates the same effect as the covert channels with a similar bandwidth. This 
makes it unlikely that there could be a statistically significant test that would be able to clearly 
identify the covert channels, especially in the face of a large variety of distribution for source 
noise in a production network. In turn, this means that the covert channel is nearly 
indistinguishable as a source from the white noise that is present in networks.  
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have adapted the ICS sandbox to generate high fidelity SCADA network 
traffic. Because this traffic was a good representative of SCADA networks, we were able to use 
this traffic to characterize non-malicious SCADA traffic. This characterization was made based 
on metrics commonly used to characterize worm malware such as interdeparture time of packets 
and packet sizes. Additional characterization was made from looking at the communication pairs 
which represent the logical topology inherent in SCADA networks. Three malicious traffic 
scenarios of increasing detection complexity were then used to evaluate how effective the 
characterization was at identifying malicious traffic. Common botnets and standard advance 
persistent threat behaviour proved to be very easy to identify from abnormal communication 
pairs, unusual interdeprature time and packet sizes which are not present in normal operations. A 
covert channel based on the DNP3.0 measurement update mechanism proved indistinguishable 
from normal traffic, but entropy evaluation of this traffic showed that this is explainable by the 
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similarities with the behaviour of a normal source. This threshold of detection pushes attackers 
wishing to remain stealthy to a complex method of communication that requires increased tool 
complexity and extensive reconnaissance to characterize source entropy prior to establishing 
covert communication. This confirms that anomaly-based detection is effective in restricting the 
ability of attackers to communicate covertly. The fact that this is done using simple features only 
strengthens our intuition that SCADA systems provide a favorable environment for the use of this 
technology. 
In summary, we have tested the effectiveness of anomaly-based intrusion detection in SCADA 
networks. Based on simple features, we have built a model of normal traffic against which 
common botnets and routine maintenance operations performed by advanced persistent threats 
easily stand out. To evade this basic surveillance method, attackers may move to employ 
specifically designed covert channels that match the source entropy of the physical system, which 
is the electric grid in our case. In traditional corporate networks, it would not have been possible 
to build such a detector because there is no clear structure in the distribution of communication 
partners, departure time of packets or packet sizes. This lends credence to our intuition that 
SCADA protocols impose a structure on network traffic that makes anomaly-based detection 
more effective in SCADA networks than in traditional networks. This support our strategy of 
increasing surveillance to limit or detect the covert communication used by advanced persistent 
threats. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
With the production of a set of features to perform anomaly-based detection in SCADA 
networks, we have finally reached our goal of helping power grid operators defend their SCADA 
networks against advanced persistent threats by better understanding how the behaviour of 
advanced persistent threats will manifest itself in a SCADA network and developing, based on 
evidence derived from experiments, new tools and techniques to defeat the expected behaviour. 
We started by showing that the true nature of SCADA networks was to serve as a basic control 
loop for the electric grid. The consequence of this was that any attacker that gained access to the 
SCADA network could send the grid into any state he wishes. We also showed that, should 
advanced persistent threats attempt to pursue this goal, current research in SCADA security 
would not provide significant help. We also saw that experimental approaches currently used are 
not appropriate to perform experiments in network security in the context of SCADA network. 
The first step we tackled to reach our goal, was to develop an attacker model for advanced 
persistent threat behaviour in SCADA networks that did not necessarily involve causing massive 
physical damage. We introduced the pinprick attack scenario, our first major contribution, in 
which it is likely that an attacker will cause small amounts of damage that accumulate over time 
in order to stay under the radar. From this scenario, we developed a strategy of increasing the 
capability of surveillance, or boosting the radar so to speak, in order to prevent advanced 
persistent threats from using this scenario. 
To test the capability of our detector, we needed to address the lack of experimental infrastructure 
suitable for network security. To solve this problem we introduced the ICS sandbox concept, our 
second major contribution, that uses a hybrid approach combining the high fidelity results of 
emulation and the scalability and cost reduction of simulation to create an experimental setup 
able to produce high fidelity network data sets for experimentation. An evaluation of the validity 
of our experimental approach using industry training sessions and the reproduction of a power 
engineering experiment were also provided to lend further credence to the results produced by the 
sandbox. 
Finally, we were able to test an implementation of anomaly-based intrusion detection, our third 
major contribution, using the ICS sandbox. Using only simple features, it was possible to detect 
command and control traffic in SCADA network and push attackers to use complex covert 
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channels with limited bandwidth to perform their routine maintenance operations. This attests to 
the validity of our intuition that anomaly-based detection is particularly effective in SCADA 
networks, revivifying a defensive technique that was considered ineffective because of its poor 
performance in typical corporate networks. 
The sum of these contributions represents a significant improvement in the defense of SCADA 
networks against advanced persistent threats, including threats from nation state sponsored 
intelligence agencies. This contributes to the increased reliability of critical infrastructure, and of 
the electrical grid in particular, in the face of an increasing number of cyber attacks. 
This chapter summarizes the contributions made throughout the course of this research project 
and specifies the limitations on the scope of these contributions. This chapter also proposes 
several avenues for future research based on this project's contributions. Section 6.1 presents 
these elements for the field of advanced persistent threat study. Section 6.2. presents the same 
elements for experimental research in SCADA network security and section 6.3 covers the same 
ground for traffic analysis and anomaly-based detection in SCADA networks. 
6.1 Behaviour of advanced persistent threats 
At the beginning of our research project, very little information was available on advanced 
persistent threats. In fact, the lack of a major cyber incident involving critical infrastructure was 
cited as a proof that it was not an issue. Some argued that this was explained by the fact that even 
the most reckless cyber attacker would think twice about causing major disruptions of critical 
infrastructure. In a sense, that this level of damage would run contrary to the hacker ethic.  
The only scenario which was identified has having a potential for massive disruption was cyber 
warfare. In this scenario, two countries at war would target each other's critical infrastructure. In 
that vision, two armies wielding massive denial of service infrastructure would bury the 
adversary's SCADA system under a flood of packets and whoever had the highest bandwidth 
won. This scenario had little interest in terms of defense, especially for countries which 
controlled the bandwidth crossing the border with their adversary. Looking at the sophistication 
of offensive network security, it seemed unlikely that well funded dedicated attackers, 
intelligence agencies for example, would be constrained to such a narrow scenario. 
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Our first contribution was to envision a scenario which did not require a state of active warfare 
(or close to it) to be realized. Adapting the concept of the spectrums of engagements from the 
land doctrine, we posited that a cyber attacker could engage in limited forms of engagement other 
than warfighting if political tensions between two nations increased. These engagements would 
pursue disruption by accruing a large amount of small damage over a long period of time. These 
were dubbed pinprick attacks. 
This contribution was presented to the strategic community for cyber warfare at the 2010 
Conference of cyber conflicts (now CyCon) [36] organized by the NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defense Center of Excellence. 
After this model was presented to the community, real world events provided a test for the 
predictions of the pinprick attack model. Stuxnet, the first admitted cyber weapon was discovered 
in the wild and thoroughly analyzed. Additional operational details were then published in the 
New York Times. Using all this information, we were able to see that the overall strategy behind 
the Stuxnet attack was in line with the predictions of our pinprick attack model. 
Unfortunately, this represents the extent of the validation we could perform on the model. Being 
able to get more data points to further prove the validity of our theory would have enhanced our 
confidence in the model. However, realistically, due to the secretive nature of these programs, it 
is unlikely that we get to peak again behind the curtains as we did with Stuxnet. Naturally, this 
would have been unthinkable before it occurred with Stuxnet, so the future may hold more 
surprises. 
This work laid important groundwork for future work which would not have been possible 
without an attack model. Notably, this offensive strategy, because of its low tempo, requires 
attackers to establish a presence in the target networks for a very long time. In order to do this 
without the defenders interfering, stealth is required. This opened the door for a defensive 
strategy focusing on denying the ability for stealth by increasing surveillance which ultimately 
proved suited for SCADA networks. 
This work also established the ground work for further work in strategic studies. For example, 
this work was cited in the study of cyber militias. Future developments are also possible. We 
currently pursue work designed to address the integration of low probability high impact 
scenarios by adapting current risk analysis techniques to adopt an actor-based approach rather 
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than a scenario-based approach. Also, using the concept of spectrum of warfare which is a by-
product of this contribution, we can analyze the requirements for the pre-positioning of cyber 
weapons.   
6.2 The ICS Sandbox 
In order to test the conclusions of the analysis of the advanced persistent threats in SCADA 
networks, a new experimental approach is required. This section summarizes how the ICS 
sandbox contributed to our overall research effort by providing the experimental framework 
required. We start by summarizing the contribution of the ICS sandbox to our research effort and 
to the community in general. Then, we discuss some of the limitations of the work. Finally, we 
present future work that was made possible by the introduction of the ICS sandbox.  
6.2.1 Contribution 
In order to test the defensive strategy that we were led to by the analysis of advanced persistent 
threat behaviour, we needed an experimental platform. From the study of the literature, we 
noticed that none of the experimental approaches used provided network data to the level of 
fidelity we required to test the effectiveness of a surveillance-based strategy. In most cases, the 
approach did not accurately represent cyber physical systems either because of the lack of 
interaction between the two components or because insufficient validation detracted from the 
fidelity of the representation. In other cases, such as limited deployment, the approaches did not 
provide the scalability necessary to represent a real network. In cases that achieved both scale and 
good cyber-physical interaction, cost tended to be a problem. Alternatively, the focus was not on 
producing high fidelity network data, but rather on producing high fidelity electrical data. This 
lack forced us to develop our own apparatus and methodology for generating data sets. 
This methodology represents our second contribution to the community which was presented at 
the 2013 International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Security [37]. Additionally, because it was 
possible to perform high-risk experiments, the setup was used to provide training to industry 
practitioners in order to teach them how to react to real incidents. A final contribution of this 
experimental method is that, unlike real deployments which are under regulatory constraints to 
protect the confidentiality of their data, the data sets produced for our experiments can be made 
publicly available for use by the research community. 
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Also, this work acts a necessary stepping stone for our strategy of defeating advanced persistent 
threats in SCADA network. In particular, this allows us to provide evidence of the effectiveness 
of our defensive strategy of using anomaly-based detectors for surveillance. 
6.2.2 Limitations 
While our approach has the advantage of being able to reproduce the physical effects without 
imposing a significant burden in terms of lab space and budget, a number of challenges still 
remain. 
The first challenge is that of repeatability of experimentation. In most situations, we want to be 
able to repeat an experiment a number of times to prove the statistical validity of the results for 
the independent variable. We also want to study the impact of model simplifications by analyzing 
the sensitivity of the results to variation in control variables, such as was demonstrated in Calvet 
and al. [61]. In practice, most of the SCADA components still need to be configured manually. In 
particular, the MTU asset database, which is used to determine which equipment should be 
polled, requires extensive manual configuration. HMI visualization screens also need to be 
crafted by hand if a human is expected to work with them. While using VMware snapshots for 
sterilizing the environment makes repeatability for independent variables easy, repeatability for 
control variables would require modifying the SCADA configuration. Using the xCAT tool, it is 
possible to craft a number of experimental configurations and run them sequentially for 
repeatability. However, the production of each of those experimental configurations is very time 
consuming if it cannot be done programmatically.  
Another important challenge is the presence of a synchronization problem, caused by the choice 
to run scripts on the RLS machines at regular intervals to update the power flow simulation 
values and measurement point values. If a control point value changes between those intervals, 
for example as a result of a command sent by an operator to trip a breaker, there will be a delay 
between the change in the control point's value and the electrical network effects. For drastic 
changes in values, this can have an impact on the soundness of the DNP3 network traffic because 
the DNP3 protocol allows for traffic initiated outside of polling sequences by the slaves to report 
outages. This could also create inconsistencies if a command is sent as a polling request from the 
MTU within the convergence time of the power flow simulator. A full study of the impact of the 
choice of discrete time rather than discrete event simulation would be required to evaluate the 
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impact of the design decision. The synchronization problems can also become more significant 
when a change affects the value of multiple points across a number of RTUs which may not all 
update at the same time. 
A final challenge with our infrastructure is the availability of standard models to validate this 
emulation approach, and eventually the proposed security solutions.  While there exist some toy 
models for electrical networks, computer networks and SCADA topologies, there are no models 
that integrate all three aspects.  For example, while standard benchmark models exists for power 
grid simulation (such as those proposed by the IEEE), these models do not describe the 
corresponding SCADA infrastructure (i.e. the placement of measurement and control points).  
The physical SCADA test beds have yet to produce data sets (such as traffic captures on the 
network component) that could be used to validate our ICS sandbox model.  Packet captures from 
live networks could also be used, but unfortunately critical infrastructure operators are typically 
reluctant to provide the information, due to confidentiality concerns.  However, this problem is 
common to all ICS security research. 
In terms of validation, we are very confident of the fidelity and soundness of the SCADA system. 
Using emulation with commercial products guarantees that the packets sent on the network will 
be properly formatted. Going back to the Shannon model, this corresponds to the encoding and 
decoding boxes. This means that the warden is seeing the correct messages going back and forth 
on the channel.  
Based on our experience with the ICS sandbox for training, we also believe the basic network 
infrastructure to be representative of real networks. While not necessarily a complete sample, real 
practitioners found the network architecture to represent accurately the type of problems they are 
facing themselves. Some variation of the type of network based on the industry was reported. For 
example, some operators with more geographical distribution have their RTUs on different LANs 
based on geographical location. However, adapting to these observations only requires that the 
collection of packet captures be distributed and does not detract from the general validity of the 
network architecture. 
This leaves only the question of the electrical system in terms of validity. The validity of the 
electrical simulation can be addressed by choosing a simulator which has been vetted by peer-
review in its field. This gives us a reasonable expectation of the soundness of results. Even with 
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peer-reviewed simulators, the simulator may not produce results at a granularity appropriate for 
our needs. For example, the triggering of a breaker might create transitional effects in the 
network that may not be captured by a steady state simulator. In that sense, it is important to 
select a simulator that is appropriate to the kind of experimentation we are running. 
Other questions related to the integration also surface. For example, what kind of sensors would a 
grid operator install in a substation? What is the precision of their measurement? When a breaker 
is operated, how long does it take for the pneumatic system to fully complete the process? How 
does that fit with the update lag? A number of other questions like this can shape the entropy of 
the source and ultimately affect the soundness of traffic. However, these questions are not linked 
to the validation of the source traffic. Rather, these questions are related to the calibration of the 
machine. 
Measurement tools usually need to be calibrated. For example, a balance giving results accurate 
to the milligram will produce erroneous results if the zero was not set properly. In the case of the 
SCADA Sandbox, the tweaking of the granularity of the representation of the electrical source is 
ultimately a calibration of the measurement device to a specific setting. In the context of building 
a warden, the fluctuation of the source entropy represents a baseline level of noise in the system. 
This baseline will vary from one grid operator to another. Some will run systems that are very 
deliberately configured and hardened while other will build patchwork systems or default 
configurations. In that sense, the lack of calibration of the Sandbox does not detract from its 
validity. However, if the Sandbox could be calibrated to an operational production system, it 
would enhance the confidence we have in the validity of the modelling of the source. 
Unfortunately, due to the lack of availability of production level SCADA traffic, it is not possible 
to perform this experiment.  
6.2.3 Future work 
In terms of future work, the tackling of various limitations of the ICS sandbox present a number 
of interesting challenges for the software engineering and for the validation communities. In the 
same vein, the power engineering community could be interested in testing a number of power 
simulators and their possible integration to the ICS sandbox. However, additional research paths 
are also opened by the ICS sandbox. 
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One such path is impact assessment research in the vein of Salmeron et al. [119]. Naturally,  the 
scenarios from Salmeron and al. are not representative of cyber attacks. One of their main 
underlying assumptions is that the incremental cost of causing more disruptions is significant. So, 
a terrorist has to make choices in terms of disruption targets to allocate his attack resources 
adequately. In terms of cyber attacks, the initial cost of intruding in the system is "high" 
(depending on the security posture of the SCADA network), but the marginal costs of causing 
more disruption is often zero. For example, if I find a remote exploit that gives me administrative 
access to an RTU, it is likely that the same exploit will give me the same access to all other RTUs 
of the same brand and software version. This enables attackers to replicate impact at no cost on a 
scale undreamt of by physical terrorist. However, the use of this methodology to perform impact 
assessment for cyber attacks is still relevant in a number of cases. For example, the case where 
there is a marginal cost to infecting more systems, such as infection by a human carrying a USB 
key. Impact assessment of indiscriminate cyber attacks where impacts on the electrical grid are 
either incidental or not pre-planned are also interesting. For example, a denial of service attack 
that prevents operators from reconfiguring the system after a failure, or a malware that causes 
breaker to open at random.  
With future work, it would be possible to perform more accurate impact assessment. This specific 
implementation of the ICS sandbox, in addition to suffering from the limitations presented in 
section 6.2.2, could benefit from some improvements. Most of those improvements would come 
from using an electrical network simulator with less limitations. The major drawback of PyPower 
is the validity of the results for interdicted scenarios. Because of the absence of a load shedding 
model, there are many scenarios where the calculator cannot converge on a solution that fills the 
constraints. However, PyPower is open source and could be modified to address this issue. A 
second drawback of PyPower, shared by all steady-state electrical simulators, is that it is not 
possible to observe transient effects. This restricts the kinds of cyber attack that can be 
performed. For example, it would be impossible to cause line breaks due to triggering physical 
protections from a spike in current in a transitory state. Finally, the use of optimized power flow 
solvers imposes a power generation network discipline that cannot be decoupled from the 
electrical stimulation. The use of a generator where this is possible could help model more 
attacks. 
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Using the ICS sandbox rather than using conventional electrical simulators for impact assessment 
has many advantages for cyber security research. First, it is possible to test actual malware 
collected from the wild (small adjustments may be necessary if a command and control server is 
necessary). This increases the fidelity of the attack scenario. Second, electrical emulators, unlike 
the ICS sandbox, have no model of the IP structure and instead rely on physical proximity of 
equipment. Two pieces of equipment that are hundreds of kilometers apart physically may be 
neighbours on the network. Third, power flow simulators assume that operations can be 
optimally delivered and assume the availability of perfect data, the testing of the impact of false 
data from infected SCADA devices cannot be considered.  
6.3 Anomaly-based detection in SCADA networks 
Using the ICS sandbox as a means to generate high fidelity network data, it was possible to test 
the conclusions of the analysis of the advanced persistent threat in SCADA networks, i.e. that 
increased surveillance would restrict the ability of an attacker to remain hidden in a SCADA 
network for a long period of time. This section summarizes the development of a technique using 
anomaly-based detection to detect command and control communication in the network. We start 
by summarizing the contribution of this research. Then, we discuss some of the limitations of the 
work. Finally, we present future work that can use our findings as the basis for the research.  
6.3.1 Contribution 
By analyzing the behaviour of advanced persistent threats and proposing the pinprick attack 
scenario, it was possible to devise a defense based on surveillance. Prior work had been done on 
detecting attackers in SCADA networks. Unfortunately, a lot of this research was not focused on 
finding command and control type communications which is the cornerstone of the ability of 
attackers to persist in the network. Of the research that was able to do so, the majority did not 
provide validation of their performance. However, a small number of researchers focused on the 
predictability of SCADA networks to detect attackers. Unfortunately, due to the lack of network 
traffic data or from a lack of a deep understanding of the behaviour of attackers, this research did 
not lead to actionable anomaly-based detection.  
Our contribution was to take three simple features available without any deep packet inspection 
and create an anomaly-based intrusion detection system for a SCADA network that detects 
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command and control channels. The fact that this detector was effective, proves that, while the 
technology is considered to be unreliable in traditional corporate networks, anomaly-based 
intrusion detection is effective in SCADA networks because of the regularity of the network 
traffic. 
While none of the characteristics we presented would prevent an attacker from building a tool 
that would mimic the properties of legitimate traffic, each of those, taken in isolation, could be 
used to detect malicious activities from common tools. In addition, when taken together, the 
characteristics we presented create a profile that severely limits the options of even a dedicated 
attacker using mimicry attacks. It is difficult to do a lot of things when you are limited to sending 
a small number of packets of specific size at a specified time over a specified network link. In 
addition, this greatly increases the amount of reconnaissance that attackers are required to 
perform in order to achieve a high level of stealth. If we take the example of the packet length 
distribution for covert channels, an attacker would need a good sample of the level of variability 
of measurement points attached to it if they would want to match the distribution. Additional 
analysis of the protocol could further tighten the patterns of normality (request packets are 
followed by a small flurry then a long silence, packet size observations always occur in a specific 
pattern, etc.), but, using only the easily measurable logical topology, interdeparture time and 
packet length features, we managed to provide interesting possibilities for detection. 
While this method was developed based on our experimental network, it should be applicable to 
the majority of production level networks. The features we used are the consequences of the 
protocol definition, and of its use of polling in particular. Most other SCADA protocols, such as 
Modbus, follow the same design principles and, even though the exact values might differ, will 
also have the same regularity in terms of distributions. The effort to build these distributions, and 
evaluate their fitness to act as features for anomaly detection, would mostly reside in adapting the 
testbed used in this experiment to incorporate Modbus equipment. The main hurdle for this 
project is the acquisition of Modbus aware SCADA equipment. In that sense, we can argue that 
the exclusive use of the DNP3.0 protocol does not detract from the validity of the claims. 
This contribution allows us to meet our goal of providing new tools and techniques to defeat 
advanced persistent threats targeting SCADA networks. Our ability to detect common botnet 
command and control, and the maintenance channel from common hacking tools already 
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significantly degrades the ability of advanced persistent threats to remain undetected. According 
to our analysis, the use of covert channels closely mimicking the behaviour of an electrical 
network is required to avoid detection. This level of sophistication is well out of the reach of 
most advanced persistent threats actors such as cyber gangs. For adversaries for which the 
development of covert channels tailored to their target network is within the realm of possibility, 
such as nation state backed intelligence agencies, their ability to perform routine actions while 
remaining stealthy is still heavily hindered. First, the use of a covert channel such as the one 
presented severely restricts their bandwidth. This forces cyber weapon maintenance to longer 
schedules and limits their ability to respond to defender moves. Second, the need to fully 
characterize the entropy of the system in order to calibrate their covert channel significantly 
increases the reconnaissance requirements for mounting a successful attack. For example, if an 
attacker attempts to move a high volume of data from a measurement point that seldom varies, or 
that varies with a distribution other than Gaussian noise, the entropy will not match the 
distribution and the attacker may be detected. Imposing this constraint on the operations of an 
attacker this advanced represents a significant headway on a problem on which we had little 
previous traction. 
6.3.2 Limitations 
The work presented here does suffer from some limitations. The major limitation is the 
undetermined validity of the ICS sandbox, and of the electrical model in particular. In the 
absence of publicly available data of live-world SCADA systems, it is not possible to ascertain 
with certainty that our system behaves as it should. The combination of emulation and simulation 
as described in section 4.1 does provide a reasonable guarantee that the systems follow the 
correct protocols, but the system cannot be calibrated. Having  detailed knowledge of how real 
systems are operated would enable us to choose more representative values in terms of numbers 
of RTU, number of points per RTU and so on. Our sensitivity analysis shows that the choice of 
these parameters has minimal effects on the results, but validating against a real system would 
increase the confidence in our results. Alternatively, the successful application of our anomaly 
detection on a production level system could also provide the same confidence in our results. 
Unfortunately, there is no publicly available data to test it on. 
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Finally, it could be argued that the limited choice of features for anomaly detection is a 
shortcoming of our work. Normally, by increasing the number of features, we would provide 
even more restrictions for the attacker and thus limit his bandwidth even more. It would even be 
possible to use data mining to find features that are not obvious to a protocol analysis or to train a 
machine learning anomaly detector on clean data. However, the production of such a feature list 
in the face of the limited noise model seems premature. As such, keeping the focus on coarse 
grained features that provide fairly strong indicators of compromise seems appropriate. Naturally, 
this could be the topic of future work in the domain. 
6.3.3 Future work 
In terms of future work enabled by our research, one interesting avenue would be to investigate if 
further refining our source model would affect our capability of detection. In that sense, the 
development, in tandem with researchers in power engineering, of a full model of a power grid 
and its corresponding SCADA network using a real-time simulator able to model transient effects 
would represent the ultimate source of data to characterize normal SCADA traffic. 
Another research axis would be to develop a tool that is able to automatically build the baseline 
and detect malicious activity. This work using results from our characterization is currently in 
progress as an undergrad project. The tool could then be provided to an industrial partner to test 
its effectiveness in a real network deployment without violating confidentiality. The results from 
this test could further validate our approach. 
Other research could be undertaken to develop more features for detection. The use of machine 
learning approaches could provide us with features that were not previously expected. The use of 
state machine-based features that further leverage the fact that SCADA traffic distributions are 
not Markovian (for example, a response packet always has the same size and always follows a 
query packet of standard size, so there is a memory-based pattern on packet sizes) could also 
further decrease the wiggle room of attackers. Finally, using deep packet inspection, or partial 
inspection of packet payloads could allow us to create features based on the DNP3.0 protocol 
instead of relying purely on TCP and IP headers. 
We could also pursue other paradigms for intrusion detection. At first glance, SCADA networks 
are so regular that white listing packets based on a small number of features could be considered. 
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For example, it may be possible to create an exhaustive list of SCADA commands and allowed 
responses to these commands. Typically, these commands and responses will have fixed packet 
sizes and headers. This could be used to create a list of the possible values for these features and 
perform intrusion detection with a white list. This approach might require additional research 
work in rules-based intrusion detection for which tools are not yet built using this paradigm. 
Another intrusion detection paradigm that could be tested would be machine learning-based 
anomaly detection. In particular, it would be interesting to test the feasibility of training the 
intrusion detector on a production system reproduced in the ICS sandbox and then move the IDS 
to the real production network. This could provide a method to ensure that machine learning-
based intrusion detection does not include prior infections in its baseline for normal traffic. 
Overall, the entire research effort, whether we consider the strategic study of advanced persistent 
threats, the development of tools to perform experimental research or tools for the detection of 
command and control channels in SCADA networks, represents a first series of contributions to 
the problem space. The stepping stones laid in the tackling of this research work can be used to 
address other problems in the larger issue of the security of SCADA networks.  
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